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PREFACE

In Henrv Fielding's Torn Jones: The Novelist as Moral
Philosopher (Sussex University, 1975), Bernard Harrison dis
tinguishes his approach from other “scholarly literary his
tory* that deals with “philosophical and theological influ
ences .“
An idea is not a self-contained item of negotiable in
tellectual currency: it does not have a settled value
and significance inscribed upon it like a bank-note or
a share-certificate. The life of ideas is in systems
of thought, and the same idea may take on a radically
different weight said significance when transferred
from one such system to smother. This is something
which influence-tracing as sm activity undervalues: it
is subject to an inevitable temptation to suppose that
when we have assembled the influences bearing upon a
writer we have understood his mind; whereas what we
have done is often merely to assemble the materials
upon which his mind worked to produce a structure yet
to be comprehended. The temptation, in short, is al
ways to regard the recipient of an older idea as a
passive exponent of it, and to reserve originality for
the original begetter, neglecting the truth that
thought is not a matter of juxtaposing but of articu
lating ideas, and that originality in thought consists
as much in the articulation as in the materials artic
ulated. (22)
These comments are appropriate to my study of Jane Austen's
novels, particulary because of the ironic paradox between
Harrison's “original begetter" and his universal masculine
author. Both must, it would seem, bring forth new ideas in a
sort of parthenogenesis. Would a woman author, then, be dis
qualified as a “begetter" and limited to that of a “passive
exponent" of the "originality" of a predecessor who “bear(s)"
upon her? Austen would have fun with Harrison’s metaphor, and
might play with it comically as she mocks the sententiousness
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or conceit of Messrs. Collins and Darcy in Pride and
Pre-iudice.
The vocabulary of eighteenth-century moralist texts of
fers the same masculine universals as does Harrison, but I
claim that Austen insists on gender equity in her dramas to
challenge the inscribed masculinity of the discourse. Moral
partnership for men and women is critical for the world fac
ing her Regency characters and audience. Central to Austen’s
reshaping of the discourse, as I argue, is the role of grati
tude, traditionally an oppressive duty ■bearing" most heavily
on women. In the novels, however, gratitude transcends gender
and is revealed to be a virtue that graces and makes possible
the future happiness which the novels implicitly promise.
Happiness, for Austen, seems to be the standard for
evaluating decisions by their consequences, which is also the
standard for Francis Hutcheson, whom Harrison would term the
■original begetter" of the ideas that Austen's novels shape
and transform. As I discuss, a number of scholars consider
that Hutcheson's primary, if not exclusive, test of virtue by
consequences classifies him as an early apostle of utilitari
anism, and at least one of the readers of this dissertation
expresses "shock" that Austen, then, might be identified as
an early Benthamite. I am not a student of Bentham, and my
impressions of his theories are conditioned by Foucault's
presentation of prison design in. Discipline and Punish, which
seems at first like a long stretch from Austen, although
Austen does caution us not to rely on first impressions.
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Other scholars may wish to explore the possible connection of
Austen with later utilitarianiin, and perhaps try to locate
the architecture of happiness in the structure of the prison.
My reading of Austen is didactic, a critical approach
that has not been particularly popular in recent years. I be
lieve Austen is seriously concerned about the values her so
ciety has espoused in the past and that she tries to show,
through the workings of gratitude, how people might continue
to join together in loving and virtuous bonds. My approach
probably is close to that of Jan Fergus and of Maaja Stewart,
whose recent work, Domestic Realities and Imperial Fictions:

Jans,Austen '.s.Novels ..in Eight eeathrCentmy. .Contexts
(University of Georgia, 1993), pays more attention to the
role of gratitude than it has attracted from most scholars.
Although I disagree with many of Stewart's ideas, I think it
is more significant that we may be participating in an impor
tant new debate that recognizes Austen as a major voice in
the history of philosophical and moral discourse.
People have asked me why I want to talk about Jane
Austen. My answer is, simply, that she is at the same time
the wisest and funniest writer I know. Her humor reveals her
wisdom. This dissertation cannot possibly do justice to my
continuing delight in the short shelf of books she composed
in an equally short lifetime.

Durham, New Hampshire
July, 1995.
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ABSTRACT
THE DISCOURSE OF GRATITUDE IN THE NOVELS OF JANE AUSTEN
by
William G. Sayres
University of New Hampshire, September, 1995
Jane Austen is preeminently the novelist of gratitude,
and no substantive noun of similar moral content recurs in
these texts with the frequency of “gratitude." Gratitude has
enormous power in her novels. It is a necessary precursor of
love in the formation of bonds between men and women, and no
"good" mutual love is possible unless it evolves through the
process of gratitude. For successful marriages, gratitude is
even more necessary than love. Among the scholars who focus
on significant terms in Austen novels, few give more them
passing attention to gratitude or to the massive volume of
eighteenth-century moralist texts that wrestle with
gratitude's role in the discourse of virtue. Internal and
external evidence confirm Austen's understanding of this
discourse, particularly the texts of the "moral sense"
philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) and of the Anglican
bishop Thomas Sherlock (1678-1761).
Those scholars who do discuss gratitude in Austen tend
to see it as the acceptance and approval of subordination to
authority, necessary to correct humanity's essential
depravity and selfishness, a long standing theosophical view
in classical and Christianized philosophical discourse, and
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which shadows the debate between Edmund Burke and William
Godwin at the onset of the French Revolution. But Austen
distances herself from older theosophical views, as well as
from the Burke-Godwin debate itself, and instead uses
Hutcheson, who believes in humanity's essential goodness, to
transform gratitude into a virtue and guide for achieving
happiness in this life, rather than to avoid punishment in
the next.
Gratitude is closely linked with benevolence,
traditionally an aristocratic virtue, but Hutcheson's
biographer, William Robert Scott, argues that Hutcheson ■de
mocratizes" the Third Earl of Shaftesbury's elitist
philosophy of benevolence. Hutcheson’s theories, as well as
the "practical Christianity" of Thomas Sherlock's Discourses
seem to support the same goal of human happiness that
Austen's novels also endorse as the standard of moral virtue
Driving the moral thrust of her narrative seems to be
confidence that, through gratitude, men and women can over
come social and gender structures that stand in the way of
happiness.
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CHAPTER I

THE VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE: GRATITUDE AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Gratitude energizes the moral world of all Jane Austen's
novels, and no substantive noun of similar moral content re
curs in these texts with the frequency of "gratitude.1,1 Austen
grants enormous power to gratitude. It is a necessary precur
sor of love in the formation of bonds between men and women,
and no "good" mutual love is possible unless it evolves
through the process of gratitude. For successful marriages,
gratitude is even more necessary than love. A number of
scholars have discussed what seem to them to be significant
terms in Austen novels, yet none gives more than passing at
tention to gratitude2 or to the massive volume of eighteenthcentury moralist texts that wrestle with gratitude's role in
the discourse of virtue. Internal and external evidence con
firm Austen's understanding of this discourse, particularly
the contributions of the “moral sense" philosopher Francis
Hutcheson (1694-1746) and of the Anglican bishop Thomas
Sherlock (1678-1761).3 Austen, however, goes beyond
Hutcheson's theory that gratitude is a variety of benevo
lence. Instead, she reshapes gratitude as the central contin
uing and positive value for the moral life. Driving the moral
thrust of her narrative seems to be confidence that, through
gratitude, men and women can overcome social and gender
structures that stand in the way of happiness.
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2

The moral discourse in which Austen, Sherlock, and
Hutcheson participate is grounded in religious belief, a sub
ject in Austen studies that has been approached warily. Hie
allusions in novels and letters to attendance at *divine ser
vices ,* as well as comments on sermons and discussions of
clerical duties, cure all evidence that Austen observed at
least the forms of religion and that the same could be ex
pected of her characters. However, her religious commentary
seems generally confined to character portrayals, often un
flattering, of clerical figures, but which do not invite in
ferences about the offices they represent. Scholars tend to
respond to the absence of more overt religious discussion by
shrugging it off as not germane to their studies. Gilbert
Ryle, for exanple, observes that Austen "draws a curtain be
tween her Sunday thoughts, whatever they were, and her cre
ative imagination."4 Recently, however, there seems to be more
interest in drawing aside Ryle's "curtain." Bruce Stovel
writes about the usefulness of Jane Austen's published
prayers for understanding her novels, and Irene Collins has
published a sympathetic biographical work, Jane Austen and
the Clerav. which connects the novels with her life-long
close involvement with the church and clergy.5 As with
Hutcheson and Sherlock, I believe that Austen's ideas about
benevolence and gratitude must be understood in relation to
their religious sources and foundation.
The few scholars who do discuss gratitude in Austen tend
to see gratitude as the acceptance and approval of subordina-
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tion to authority, and misread Austen as they misunderstand
how she transforms gratitude. Gratitude, according to these
scholars, is repressive for the underclass, both women and
the working poor. The view of gratitude as subordination has
a long history in classical and Christianized philosophical
discourse as well as in fiction prior to Austen. In 1740 the
moralist George Turnbull saw social and economic inequalities
as desirable for the flowering of virtue.
. . . [W]hat can be happier than deficiencies and
wants, which are the foundation of so many and so great
goods [such as] generosity and kindness, gratitude and
reliance?6
When Squire Allworthy in Tom Jones condemns the game
keeper, Black George, not so much for stealing Tom's purse,
but for "the black Ingratitude of this Fellow toward you, "7 he
justifies punishment more for violating the relationship of
servant and master than for a penal offence. Had the case
been set in Swift's Lilliput, punishment would have been as
sured, since the Lilliputians made ingratitude a capital of
fence.8 Gratitude becomes a mechanism for controlling behavior
of the lower classes and may be considered, in Foucault's
terms, one of the "disciplines'' that constitutes an "infra
law. "9 The justification of punishment for perceived ingrati
tude reflects a skeptical view of human nature as inherently
selfish and assumes that sanctions are necessary to enforce
morality in a system of fixed class hierarchies. In philoso
phy, Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville also base their
systems on the selfish view of human nature.
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Hutcheson intrudes into this discourse as the eigh
teenth-century leader of "universal benevolence" moral phi
losophy, opposed to that of Hobbes and Mandeville. He was
born into a dissenting Ulster family, and in 1710 entered the
University of Glasgow, where he spent six years, then re
turned to head a private academy in Dublin. Leechman writes
that he taught "for seven or eight years with great reputa
tion and success,"10 then joined the faculty of the University
of Glasgow in 1729 for the remainder of his life. In 1724, he
published "Reflections on our Common Systems of Morality" in
The London Journal, followed a year later by

ftn -IIKtuirY. int-S

the_Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. The lengthy
title goes on to claim that "In Two Treatises . . . The
Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explain'd and
defended, against the Author of the Fable of the.Bees: . .
."11 Shaftesbury argues that humans have a natural propensity
to virtue, for the same reason that we have a sense of
beauty, which we approve, just as we recoil from vice as from
ugliness. Mandeville, following Hobbes, argues the reverse,
that people are naturally selfish.
Hutcheson avoids reliance on Shaftesbury's aesthetic
analogy, and instead supports his claim that people are not
naturally selfish but instinctively benevolent by an appeal
to common experience. In the closest personal relations,
benevolence is at its most intense and fuses with the recip
rocal force of gratitude, a process important to Austen's
dramas. Before Hutcheson's re-working of these ideas, grati-
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tude had been approved as an admirable and obligatory duty to
benefactors. But unlike benevolence, gratitude had never been
recognized as either an "official" cardinal or theological
virtue. Hutcheson, however, elevates it to a level of equal
virtue with benevolence. William Robert Scott claims that the
Inquiry "begins to democratize Shaftesbury's philosophy,"
which is "aristocratically esoteric" and "addresses . . .
•gentlemen of fashion.*"12 Ihe equalization of benevolence,
usually an aristocratic virtue, with gratitude also seems to
"democratize" the interaction of gentry and bourgeoisie in
Austen's novels.
Hutcheson is also the principal developer and champion
of the "moral sense" theory of ethics, a term first used ca
sually by Shaftesbury, but which Hutcheson makes the princi
pal motivator of behavior. Although Hutcheson states that he
is an advocate for Shaftesbury and is not offering anything
new, Adam Smith, Hutcheson's student at the University of
Glasgow, gives him credit for originating the moral sense
theory, which differs from Shaftesbury in substituting for
the aesthetic link of virtue and beauty the idea that there
is a separate, stand-alone "moral sense," which is as real as
any of Locke's five senses. For Hutcheson, "divine grace" is
the source of our "moral sense."

He observes that people

seem to have a "Sentiment" that approves "the Perception of
moral Excellence, . . . "
And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be
called a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to
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it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any
Idea from the Presence of an Object, which occurs to
us, independently on [sic] our Will.13
The moral sense reveals itself in virtuous feelings, foremost
of which are benevolence and gratitude. Virtue is quantified,
since the "Virtue" of an "Action . . . is in proportion to
the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend."
This theorem leads to its corollary, "that Action is best,
which accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest
Numbers."14 D. D. Raphael observes that "Hutcheson appears to
be the first to use this explicit formulation of the
Utilitarian doctrine."15
Hutcheson also distances himself from Shaftesbury by in
sisting that the revealed truth of Christianity is fundamen
tal to his philosophy. Although he commends Shaftesbury for
giving "the best and most elegant account" of "the social na
ture of man," the subject of Hutcheson's Inaugural Lecture at
the University of Glasgow (1730), he acknowledges that "in
other respects he [Shaftesbury] is liable to censure from the
theologians." Hutcheson's theocentrism is also the principle
difference between his ideas and those of his admirer, fol
lower, and correspondent, David Hume, revealed in a 1739 ex
change of letters. John Mullan points out that the decorum of
the correspondence masks this basic conflict.
But for the fundamentally friendly nature of this
exchange, Hume might have added that whereas
Hutcheson's moralism could look to the final proofs of
religion, his own 'experimental' philosophy recognized
only the facts of a world without external sanctions or
purposes.15
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Nevertheless, Hutcheson’s philosophy, as well as his identi
fication with Shaftesbury, exposed him to attacks from both
the dissenting Presbyterian theocracy, of which he was a mem
ber by birth and education, and also to attempted legal pros
ecution by the Archbishop’s court of the Anglican Church of
Ireland. Scott writes that ”[a]t this time it was a bold act
to have placed Shaftesbury’s name on the title-page of the
Inquiry— in fact, Shaftesbury was then the bgte noire of the
combative theologian.”17

Hutcheson's religious ortho

doxy was also challenged by other moralists, including con
temporaries John Balguy and Bishop Joseph Butler (possibly
the "combative theologian” cited by Scott) as well as by John
Wesley in sermons as late as 1788. The main points of con
tention are Hutcheson's measure of virtue by its contribution
to human happiness, rather than by divine law, his belief
that human nature is essentially good, not depraved, and that
feelings are superior to reason as a guide to virtuous behav
ior. Except for consistent rejection of Hobbes and Mandeville
in his writings, Hutcheson's comments on other moralists mix
approval and criticism of his immediate predecessors,
Cumberland and Puffendorf, and of Cicero among the ancients.
He also responds in later published works to John Balguy, and
carries on a debate in letters published in The London
Journal with Gilbert Burnet.
Thomas Mautner observes that Hutcheson's religious views
were those of "the Moderate party," in contrast with "the or
thodox-conservative Evangelical party in the Church of
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Scotland." Mautner associates such views with Anglican latitudinarians, and as they "slowly gained acceptance among the
Scottish and Irish Presbyterians, . . . Hutcheson became
their most significant early advocate."18 Despite scholarly
disagreement over the definition of latitudinarianism and its
influence, there clearly was an Anglican movement in the late
seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries that was
opposed to the Evangelical theology of man’s naturally de
praved nature and innate sinfulness, which could only be re
deemed through faith and repentance. By contrast, the socalled "latitudinarian" doctrine insisted that people gener
ally were well-motivated, and by their own efforts could lead
both a godly and happy life, pleasing to God and helpful to
their fellow humans through charitable works and virtuous
conduct.
Such views closely complement those of Francis Hutcheson
and are also found in the writings and career of Thomas
Sherlock whose sermons Austen praises in an 1814 letter to
Anna Austen.19 Sherlock’s biographer Edward Carpenter, writing
in 1936 for the "Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge,"
observes that "Sherlock is an able exponent of the claims of
a practical religion" who is "opposed to ‘Enthusiasm’ in re
ligion."20 While Sherlock endorses benevolent feelings and
conduct, he is concerned to establish their authority in
scripture. Against the deistic attack on revealed religion,
Sherlock re-focused religious thought to search for the "his
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torical Jesus*21 in such works as his Trial of the Witnesses
to the Resurrection of Jesus (1729).
Anglican latitudinarian religious thought has its an
tecedents in the late seventeenth-century "Cambridge
Platonists," whose ideas Basil Willey recognizes as antici
pating eighteenth-century ■•moral sense* philosophies,■ join
ing philosophy and religion in a union, so that reason and
faith mutually support each other. In their objective both of
refuting Hobbes's "selfish* theory, as well as Calvinist pre
destination doctrine, they sought to offer a pragmatic moral
code with a humanitarian focus that emphasizes benevolence as
charitable works. Doctrinally, they occupy a "middle" posi
tion between the High Church and the Puritans, and share a
common philosophical ground with the benevolence moralists,
especially, I would emphasize, with Hutcheson.22
The scholarly debate about what constituted "latitudinarianism" is incorporated in essays by R. S. Crane, Donald
Greene, and Frans de Bruyn (1981),23 which address a larger
controversy over the nature and importance of eighteenth-cen
tury "sentiment" and "sensibility," which I discuss later in
connection with the place of Henry Mackenzie in Austen's phi
losophy. De Bruyn's review of latitudinarianism goes back to
the origin of the term and the meaning recognized by early
apologists, as well as critics, which strongly emphasizes
charitable works and "the ecumenical spirit." Those caught up
in this movement reflected "their self-conscious sense of
novelty" in their writings.
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[E]ven the terminology used in their sermons conveys
this sense of newness. Time and again the latitudinarians relied on the language of the new science— the lan
guage of Newton and Locke— to explicate their doc
trines . 24
"The language of Newton and Locke" is also aggresively em
ployed by Hutcheson. He leans on Newtonian mechanics to ex
plain how the moral sense promotes benevolence, which in
creases in proportion to the degree of intimacy that people
have with each other, and he employs a series of algebraic
proofs to demonstrate this theory in the first three editions
of the Incruirv.25
Locke also argued that it should be possible to prove
virtue mathematically.
They that are ignorant of algebra cannot imagine the
wonders in this kind are to be done by it: . . . This
at least I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not
those alone that are capable of demonstration and
knowledge; . . . and [the nature of God and "our
selves "], if duly considered and pursued, . . . might
place morality amongst the sciences capable of demon
stration: wherein I doubt not but from self-evident
propositions, by necessary consequences, as incon
testable as those in mathematics, the measures of right
and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply
himself with the same indifferency and attention to the
one, as he does to the other of these sciences.26
Hutcheson's attempt at moral mathematics exposed him to some
ridicule, such as the mockery Scott attributes to Laurence
Sterne.
Hutcheson, in his philosophic treatise on beauty, har
mony and order, plus's and minus's you to heaven or
hell, by algebraic equations— so that none but an ex
pert mathematician can ever be able to settle his ac
counts with S. Peter— and perhaps S. Matthew, who had
been an officer in the customs, must be called in to
audit them.27
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When Hutcheson abandons this apparent attempt to take up
Locke’s challenge in the fourth edition, he explains that
•same Mathematical Expressions are left out, which, upon sec
ond Thoughts, appear'd useless, and were disagreeable to some
Readers.”28 Even at this point (1738), it may be that the in
fluence of 'sentiment* was making moral mathematics unappeal
ing, even though Jane Axisten later found Hutcheson's math
useful to suggest Emma's moral transgression against Miss
Bates.
De Bruyn backs Crane against Donald Greene on the theory
that sentimental moral philosophy can trace its sources in
latitudinarianism, but I think the debate gets into a quag
mire on the shifting and overlapping interpretations of "sen
timentalism" and "sensibility." I cannot draw a line that
this massive scholarship has failed to inscribe, but Austen
does use both terms, and "sensibility" quite clearly suggests
understanding through the "senses, ■ or feeling guided by rea
son. "Sentiment" and its derivatives imply feelings that have
lost their moorings in reason, as personified by the incom
plete and weakened figure of the sighing romantic, Captain
Benwick, in Persuasion, a character whose prototype may be
found in James and Henry Austen's periodical The Loiterer,
which Jane Austen appears to have read, and to which she may
have contributed while in her teens.
Hutcheson's A System of Moral Philosophy and Thomas
Sherlock's Several Discourses preached at the Temple Church
are both reviewed approvingly by Hugh Blair in the 1755 first
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edition of the original Edinburgh Review, joining in one vol
ume three writers important to Austen.29 Blair's reviews
clearly see no religious incompatability between fellow
Presbyterian Hutcheson and the Anglican bishop, Sherlock,
which tends to support Mautner's claim for Hutcheson's impor
tance to the liberal Anglican movement dubbed "latitudinarianism. *
Sherlock was b o m into a politically visible church fam
ily. His father had been Dean of St. Paul's and 'Master of
the Temple," essentially the regular preacher and religious
overseer of that institution of lawyers. Thomas succeeded his
father in the post in 1705, and with such a congregation may
have sharpened his own legal knowledge, demonstrated later in
his theological courtroom drama, The Trial of the Witnesses
to the Resurrection of Jesus (1729), which went through eigh
teen editions during the next one hundred years. In a rapidly
rising career, Sherlock became chaplain to Queen Anne and
Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge.
Both Sherlocks were strong Tories, and Thomas's career
was interrupted by the consequences of his pamphlet,
Vindication of the Corporation and Test Acts, as well as his
opposition to the essentially Evangelical doctrine of
"Sincerity" advocated by King George I's appointee, Bishop
Hoadley. This confrontation put him at odds with Robert
Walpole's Whig administration and cost him his royal chap
laincy. He managed to regain favor, however, and his upward
mobility resumed with successive appointments as Bishop of
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Bangor, Salisbury, and London, although he declined the offer
of “the primacy," i.e., Archbishop of Canterbury. This polit
ical adaptability of the Sherlocks is celebrated in a contem
porary jingle.
As Sherlock the elder, by his jure divine
Did not comply till the Battle of Bpyne;
So Sherlock the younger still made it a question
Which side he would take till the Battle of Preston.30
As did his father in 1690, Thomas apparently kept his options
open until the collapse of the ill-supported rising of 1715.
Sherlock's attack on Hoadley also brought him in con
flict with John Balguy, who defended Hoadley's doctrine of
“Sincerity* with the same appeal to “reason" he used in at
tacking Hutcheson's moral sense theory. “Reason," for Balguy,
is deductive, leading to the knowledge of a priori truth re
vealed in Scripture. Sherlock argues that, if “Sincerity* is
the ultimate test of a Christian, there would be no way of
“converting a Papist," whose erroneous belief is supported by
"Sincerity." Balguy replies that a “Papist" is not “sincere*
if he refuses to listen to "reason."31 Sherlock and Hutcheson,
then, joined admiringly by Blair, also share in Balguay a mu
tual opponent. Their common offense seems to be their shared
belief that the workable usefulness of principles in the
world testifies to their religious merit and moral worth, not
their conformity with a priori divine authority, deduced by
"reason."
Sherlock's sermons argue for the reconciling of fre
quently opposing viewpoints, including the common basis of
"natural religion" and the "gospel;” "sense" and "reason" as
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both gifts of God; and the need for good works to supplement
faith in order to achieve salvation. He is vocal against "en
thusiasm, ■ which he sees as divisive and one-sided in its
negative view of human nature and rejection of good works. He
strongly urges Christian charity, and advises his audience to
agonize less over the purity of their motives, and to be more
concerned with the positive effects of their benevolence on
others. His focus on charity matches Hutcheson's elevation of
benevolence, and his test of virtue by its effects seems
close to the relativism of Hutcheson's proto-utilitarian ap
proach.
Jane Austen's Tory family may well have approved
Sherlock's record of early resistance to the Hanoverian
Whigs, and discounted his later compliance as the practical
recognition of political pressure to conform. Anglicans
Overton and Relton in their 1906 history show that the Church
hierarchy's accomodation with the Hanoverian succession cre
ated a split between the clergy and church leaders.
The great mass of the inferior clergy were in their
heart of hearts in favour of James the Pretender, while
the dignitaries, as in duty bound, were in favour of
George . . . and the result was a growing alienation
between the higher and lower clergy.32
There are no strident pronouncements on record by the Austen
family clergy on this issue, but Jane Austen's Stuart idola
try at age fifteen is trumpeted in her "History of England"
and it seems reasonable to assume that her views were not in
consistent with those of her family.
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However, by the time of the third Hanoverian monarch,
and the permanent end of Jacobite restoration efforts, the
urgency of the issue had subsided, and the appeal to Austen
of Sherlock's sermons, which say nothing about claims to the
Crown, seems to have little to do with sympathetic Toryism.
Austen's letter expressing her enjoyment of Sherlock's ser
mons probably refers to the 1812 Clarendon edition of his
works, which were collected and published thirteen times be
tween 1754 and 1830, not counting the separate editions of
Trial of the Witnesses mentioned above.

Jane Austen's "dear Dr. Johnson" also admires Sherlock.
Boswell asks Johnson for his opinion on "the best English
sermons for style," and Johnson's reaction to Sherlock is
that "his style too is very elegant, though he has not made
it his principal study." "Sherlock's Sermons" is also the
only sermon collection included on a list of thirty books on
various topics recommended by Johnson to a clergyman "for his
studies."33 The "style* admired by Johnson apparently grated
on John Balguy, who in attacking Sherlock criticizes his
"Stile" as a "Satyrical Way of Writing by no means proper for
Divines," who should "be content to imitate the Simplicity of
the Gospel."34 It seems not unlikely, however, that Sherlock's
"style" might have been a factor in Austen's professed admi
ration.
Sherlock and Hutcheson together represent the full de
velopment of the first of what Isabel Rivers sees as "two
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crucial shifts in ideas* that "took place* in the later sev
enteenth century.
The first is an emphasis in Anglican thought on the ca
pacity of human reason and free will to co-operate with
divine grace in order to achieve the happy and holy
life. This optimistic portrait of human nature repre
sents a rejection of the orthodox Reformation tradi
tion, which stresses the depravity of human nature. . .
. The second is the attempt to divorce ethics from re
ligion, . . .35
Clearly, neither Sherlock nor Hutcheson participate in
Rivers’s "second* category. Hutcheson, however, does seem to
acknowledge reason as an ally and monitor for the judgment of
feeling: "When the moral Sense is thus assisted by a sound
Understanding and Application, our own Actions may be a con
stant Source of solid Pleasure, . . .*36

Scott comments on

this and other gestures to reason.
It will thus be seen that Hutcheson assigns an impor
tant if somewhat vague position to reason in the pro
cess attending moral decisions. In fact so far from
reason being 'expressly excluded,* it has the function
of 'assisting,* even of 'governing' the Moral Sense . .
.37

Austen, too, seems to recognize that reason and feelings
should work in concert to guide conduct, but in case of con
flict, she grants authority to the feelings. An early scene
in Pride and Prejudice situates gratitude in relation to the
conflict of feeling or sentiment versus a priori obligation,
deduced by reason. Darcy's affirmation of love is received by
an astonished Elizabeth Bennet with unexpected hostility.
In such cases as this, it is, I believe, the estab
lished mode to express a sense of obligation for the
sentiments avowed, however unequally they may be re
turned. It is natural that obligation should be felt,
and if I could feel gratitude, I would now thank you.
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But I cannot— I have never desired your good opinion,
and you have certainly bestowed it most unwillingly.38
Elizabeth acknowledges that gratitude is an "obligation* but,
rather paradoxically, also “natural* and based on feeling, a
paradox which rests squarely on the same dichotony offered in
Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary definitions: "1. Duty to
benefactors. . . .

2. Desire to return benefits."39

■Obligation* points toward the pervasive and ancient moral
discourse of rights and duties, but the primacy Elizabeth
gives instead to her feelings ("feel* is underlined in the
text) suggests the "moral sense* approach of Hutcheson's An
Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.4° This and other
Hutcheson works may be read as a running moral commentary on
Austen's dramatic narrative, which in turn seems to test and
probe for the strengths and weaknesses in Hutcheson's philos
ophy.
Except for conduct book literature, Mary Poovey appears
to dismiss the moralist texts important to Austen as inacces
sible to modem audiences.
The special resonances and impact that her contempo
raries sensed in the statements and situations of
Austen's novels are dim or absent altogether for twen
tieth-century readers.41
The term "gratitude" today has an antiquarian ring, yet this
study claims that understanding its meaning for Jane Austen
is essential to understanding her novels. The challenge,
then, is to access a defunct and lost moral universe, and to
revivify it for the modern scholar.
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The term "moralist" has an even more antiquarian ring
than "gratitude," and its connotation today might be somewhat
disparaging, as suggesting hypocrisy or a "holier-than-thou
attitude." The O.E.D.'s first definition, "One who practices
morality," even quotes ironic usages in the eighteenth cen
tury and earlier that reflect a similar attitude. But the
first and only definition in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary is
"One who teaches the duties of life, ■ which is echoed in the
O.E.D.'s second definition, "A teacher or student of morals;
a moral philosopher," and there were legions of them in addi
tion to Hutcheson. Although debating among each other in
books, letters, pamphlets, and journals, their shared project
was opposition to the "selfish" theories which were also per
ceived as irreligious, particularly those of Thomas Hobbes.
By melding classical philosophy with Christian doctrine,
they sought to produce a workable theory of morals grounded
in religion, and differed among each other primarily on the
relative authority of feeling or reason. For David Norton,
Hutcheson's argument with the advocates for reason "was a
dispute among friends— the friends of virtue— concerning the
foundations of morality."42 Hutcheson strives to formulate
moral principles which have a general applicability, while
Sherlock is more concerned with the practical applicability
of moral principles than with motives, including benevolence
as expressed through the paramount Christian virtue of char
ity.
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Sherlock suggests that the "act of charity" itself is of
more moral significance than introspective anxiety about
■special motives" and that virtue can be, at least tenta
tively, deduced from its effects- Since consequences in terms
of personal happiness is also Hutcheson's "bottom line," he
and Sherlock seem to agree in essentials. Particularly in
Emma and Persuasion- the last two novels, Austen seems to
move toward this pragmatic approach to virtue. The novels,
then, engage in a dialogic triad of dramatic text with the
works of Hutcheson and Sherlock, with gratitude the unifying
focus.
Over forty years after the deaths of Hutcheson and
Sherlock, and during Jane Austen's young adulthood, the role
of gratitude becomes a point of contention between Edmund
Burke and William Godwin in the larger debate about rights
and duties in the contemporary context of the French
Revolution. Godwin's Encruirv Concerning Political Justice
(1793, rev. 1796, 1798) is a direct rebuttal to Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution on France (1790). Godwin's con
tention is that human rights, amply justified by reason, are
denied by the irrationality of authority systems resting on
nothing but tradition and “prejudice." Gratitude is among
such irrational institutions, and Godwin argues, conse
quently, it "is no part either of justice or virtue."43 Godwin
completes the rejection of gratitude with its corollary: "It
is therefore impossible for me to confer upon any man a
favour; I can only do him right."44 That is, if I am in a po-
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sition to help a needy person, that person has a "right" to
my resources.
Burke, on the other hand, appeals strongly to feelings
which seem to revere traditional institutions of authority.
In "Letter to a Noble Lord" (1796), he charges that "ingrati
tude is the first of revolutionary virtues" and
"Revolutionaries are miscreant parricides, ■ for whom
■Ingratitude is indeed their four cardinal virtues compacted
and amalgamated into one. "45 As Squire Allworthy also insists
in condemning Black George, ingratitude is an evil abberation
from gratitude, which is the duty of allegiance, respect, and
thankfulness for benefits and protection owed to those placed
in authority over us.
For Austen, gratitude itself seems to be placed at risk
in the conflict between rights and duties, which become the
rallying cries of ideological enemies in the real war that
casts its shadow over these debates. If gratitude is at risk,
then so is benevolence and, by a kind of logical domino ef
fect, the whole idea of the society founded on virtue that
both Burke and Godwin, despite their mutual hostility, claim
to endorse. Austen's novels, particularly the later ones, are
profoundly involved with challenges raised by the French
Revolution and Napoleonic wars, as many scholars have conclu
sively established, but the Burke-Godwin debate seems more an
ominous presence lurking at the margins of the novels, unlike
Hutcheson and Sherlock, whose very texts are inscribed in
Austen's.
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Austen's response to the debate's implied, if unspoken,
challenge to gratitude addresses the complex relationship of
“feeling" and “obligation" with which Elizabeth Bennet pref
aces her rejection of “gratitude" for Darcy's avowal of love.
Unlike Godwin, however, Austen does not subordinate feelings
to reason, and reject gratitude as such, and unlike Burke,
neither does she recognize that duty exercises controlling
authority over her feelings or, for that matter, her reason.
Each of the novels, with increasing stress, tests the
strength and justification of Austen's vision of gratitude
for the society emerging around her. In Mansfield Park and
Emma, it barely survives the test, but in Persuasion grati
tude seems to fully and conclusively claim its authority.
Austen's linkage of “obligation" and “gratitude* seems
to agree with Hutcheson's pairing of these terms in his
posthumous A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1747),
when he claims that “there's no obligation more sacred than
that of gratitude, . . ..“

although he admits that “[t]he

term obligation is both complex and ambiguous.*46 Nevertheless
“obligation," whether or not we are influenced by self-inter
est, always leads back to the inward motivation of the moral
sense.
But if by Obligation we understand a Motive from
Self-Interest sufficient to determine all those who
duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage
wisely, to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a
Sense of such Obligation by reflecting on this
Determination of our Nature to approve Virtue, to be
pleas’d and happy when we reflect upon our having done
virtuous Actions, . . . and also by considering how
much superior we esteem the Happiness of Virtue to any
ether Enjoyment.47
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When Hutcheson talks about "duty" rather them "obligation,"
it is

in terms of duty to God48— he is not interested in duty

as a prescribed standard of conduct abstracted from the moral
sense and the guidance of reason.
"Obligation" and "duty" imply the assistance of reason
for knowledge of virtue, and therefore Austen's attempt to
join "obligation" with “feeling," brings together the “head"
and the "heart" in shared allegiance. J. A. Kearney finds
"that the ideal state of affairs for Jane Austen is when rea
son and feeling possess equal strength."49 This reading has,
in my opinion, much to recommend it, and also suggests why
Austen might find the views of Thomas Sherlock compatible
with her own.
Nor do we teach that nature and reason cannot lead to
the speculative knowledge of divine truths; for the ev
idence of all divine truth resolves itself ultimately
into either sense or reason; which are the common gifts
of God to mankind, by the principles of which the truth
of all things, depending upon the deductions of sense
and reason, may be proved and examined.50
Sherlock, however, argues that "sense" and "reason" are means
to an end, the "knowledge of divine truth," as distinguished
from Kearney's reading that the balance of the two by itself
as a sort of golden mean is Austen's ideal. The flaw in
Kearney's argument is that the ideal of balance implies a
kind of stasis, of forces coming to rest in equilibrium.
Reason in Austen serves as a moderator and guide for the pas
sions; it serves the feelings but does not overrule them, and
both are but means to the goal of happiness.
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Hugh Blair's review of Hutcheson's A System of Moral
Philosophy in the original Edinburgh Review makes much the
same favorable observation about Hutcheson's work as Kearney
does concerning Austen.
His philosophy tends to inspire generous sentiments
and amiable views of human nature. It is particularly
calculated to promote the social and friendly affec
tions; and . . . it has the air of being dictated by
the heart, no less than the head.51
In fact, Hutcheson's philosophy is “dictated'' primarily by
the “heart," although he is far from slighting the usefulness
of reason in A System, or any of his works, as he acknowl
edges in his discussion of the moral sense.
And 'tis pretty plain that reason is only a subservient
power to our ultimate determinations either of percep
tion or will. The ultimate end is setled [sic] by some
sense, and some determination of will: . . . Reason can
only direct to the means; or compare two ends previ
ously constituted by some other immediate powers.52
Reason guides the moral sense when decisions are unclear, and
in the earlier Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense (1728), he
acknowledges that "Our Reason does often correct the Report
of our Senses, about the natural Tendency of the external
Action, and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of
the Agent."53
The important and consistent focus for Hutcheson is
moral decisions in a social environment. The "moral agent"
must be a viable human being, combining both "head" and
"heart." That Hugh Blair, who enjoys two approving references
in Austen's novels, applauds Hutcheson's union of "heart" and
"head" suggests, I believe, that Jane Austen might also find
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his philosophy compatible with her own. Gratitude as both a
■feeling" and an "obligation" requires, in the latter sense,
the exercise of reason and, thus, the use of the "head" as
well. These novels, then, seem like playful enactments of the
moralist project and perspective on human nature, and I agree
with those scholars who have concluded that Austen may be
read, therefore, as a moralist herself, with didactic inten
tions.54 Understanding Austen requires engaging her moral
point of view and recognizing that the playfulness is a seri
ous game that tests and refines moral codes.
But how can Austen offer as new and empowering an idea
of virtue with antecedents in moralist writings of the first
part of the preceding century, whose authors had no idea of
coming political upheavals, or the vast shifts in wealth and
social class directly or indirectly linked to the French
Wars?

Despite the gap in years since Hutcheson published his

ideas, Austen seems to recognize that the fluidity and rela
tivism Hutcheson introduces into gratitude gives it an adapt
ability to the violent changes of the period, which directly
intrude in her personal life, and rumble at the edges of her
dramas. Where Godwin would discard gratitude, Austen would
dramatically revitalize it.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of grati
tude's transformation by Hutcheson and Austen, but by making
benevolence and gratitude interchangeable, benevolence is de
throned as the latter is elevated. Austen, then, seems to em
brace the "democratization" of these virtues that Scott con-
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siders Hutcheson's major departure from Shaftesbury. This
leveling of the field, as it were, challenges the hierarchi
cal class, economic, and gender structures associated with
benevolence, and is as subversive, in a sense, as Godwin's
political and atheistic anarchism.
Jane Austen was not alone in responding to Hutcheson
years after his texts were first published. Isabel Rivers
notes that Hutcheson was John Wesley's “ ‘bete noir' among
moralists'1 and that Wesley was attacking Hutcheson in sermons
in 1785 and 1788. Wesley's objections are that human nature
is not essentially good, but evil, and that grace alone is
the means to salvation.55 Hutcheson's confidence that people
have essentially good instincts and his conviction that
benevolence is the greatest virtue because it promotes human
happiness are at the core of Sherlock's pragmatic
Anglicanism, and of the moral perspective revealed in
Austen's novels.
Since the shared responses of Austen's moral discourse
community are, as Poovey observes, "dim or absent" today,
scholars who have attempted to identify Austen's philosophi
cal point of view often contradict each other.56 These dis
agreements reflect, as I have suggested, the failure to rec
ognize the central unifying role of gratitude, particularly
as shaped by the moralist thought of Francis Hutcheson. But
instead of stimulating further research and discussion, this
failure to arrive at any sort of consensus has not encouraged
continued investigation, and most studies I have cited are
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over ten years old. Why does scholarship seem to have turned
away from inquiry into Austen's philosophical sources? One
reason that suggests itself may be the sexist focus of these
studies.
D. D. Devlin sees Samuel Johnson and Bishop Joseph
Butler “looking over her [Austen's] shoulder as she writes,"
which calls up the cameo of the spinster novelist in her
drawing room, hovered over by her shadowy mentors, and writ
ing in tidy little journals, easily whisked under cover. Even
though there seems to be admiration in C. S. Lewis's claim
that Austen “unblushingly“ employs “the great abstract nouns
of the classical English moralists,*57 he nevertheless implies
that she takes a daring leap from feminine propriety to re
peat the very words of masculine pundits.
Much Austen scholarship today, instead of investigating
philosophical sources, tends to reflect feminist readings
that posit, with much justification, a hostile relationship
between women writers and repressive patriarchal ideology,
and to examine how women accept, reject, or evade its domi
nance.58 Finding that the texts of that ideology tend to be
flawed by inscribed sexism, substantive study of their con
tent seems unrewarding, and also perhaps irrelevant.
Instead, feminist scholarship tends to define the dis
courses of gender, or of morality, or both as concerned pri
marily with issues of power rather than of virtue; or rather
that power defines virtue itself. Gilbert and Gubar note the
weak position of women "[g]iven the financial, social, and
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political power of men."59 Claudia Johnson claims that Austen,
as well as other women novelists, employs "the device of cen
tering her novels in the consciousness of unempowered charac
ters— that is, women."60 Wendy Moffat points out that
Austen's apparently most autonomous character, Emma Woodhouse
(Emma), is "not representative" of women of her class or
time, and that to "treat Emma as if she had power in her fic
tional world" is "to repress history."61
The eighteeth-century British legal system often is
cited for its complicity in the cultural repression of women.
Phoebe Smith analyzes English property and inheritance law
that forces women into dependency on a system of "benevolent
paternalism," and she shows that in Sense and Sensibility
this system fails to benefit the Dashwood sisters and their
mother, whom the laws of England have ground into poverty.62
By employing the term "benevolent," Smith, although she seems
unaware of it, opens up the ancient debate about the relative
importance of virtue as benevolence, versus justice as codi
fied in laws. Smith correctly sees that Sense and Sensibility
exposes the law's profession of equal protection as a sham
for women, but in focusing on the texts of the law and ne
glecting those of moral philosophy, she fails to recognize
that Austen offers a positive alternative in a code of virtue
based on gratitude. Smith's only acknowledgment of the moral
ists is perfunctory.
By the ease with which Fanny [Dashwood] undermines
John's benevolent intentions, Austen appears to support
the view held by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and
Bernard de Mandevilie that humans are naturally self-
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ish, rather them naturally benevolent as posited, for
example, by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury.63
■Such as* and "for example* imply a comprehension of the
moral philosophy discourse, but Smith's citation for such in
clusive generalities is an Alistair Duckworth article in a
collection of essays. Smith's view, of course, is quite dif
ferent from mine, and perhaps reflects her reliance on
Duckworh's scholarship for her understanding of the moral
discourse of the time.
My discussion of the novels will show that, for Austen,
gratitude is a virtue of far greater potential for happiness
than reliance on the law, which always betrays people and
sabotoges happiness. This is not to suggest that Austen of
fers some kind of "money isn't everything* moral treacle, or
that gratitude is financially rewarded. But gratitude does,
however, seem to open purse strings, and to grace the deploy
ment of resources, such as Darcy's funding of Wickham's mar
riage to Lydia in Pride and Prejudice. For Austen, gratitude
as *empowerment * reverses the subordination of virtue to
power that Smith, Gilbert and Gubar, Susan Fraiman, and oth
ers seem to argue.

Instead, in the world of Austen's novels,

virtue defines power. The “empowerment* of gratitude applies
to both men and women in Austen's novels, but its effects are
more manifest for "unempowered" women.
My reading also contrasts with that of the few scholars,
such as Richard Handler and Daniel Segal, who recognize the
role of gratitude in novels by Austen and her contemporaries,
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but who see its function as reinforcing repressive power
structures that deny women power of choice.
Like admiration, gratitude can be either a masculine or
feminine sentiment, but, in contrast to admiration, it
is more frequently a feminine response to male initia
tive. Since it is men who have the advantage of choice,
it is women who must be grateful to men for taking the
initiative at the key moments of courtship.64
Marriage is only one institution where gratitude enforces
ideology. Claudia Johnson seems to read Austen as writing
against the constraints of gratitude in all kinds of rela
tionships .
In contrast to conservative writers such as West, More,
and Edgeworth, Austen explores the sinister aspects of
benevolence and the burden of gratitude it places on a
recipient.65
But Johnson reflects the older “traditional" view that grati
tude defines the inferior position of a dependent to a supe
rior’s “benevolence," and thus apparently makes virtue depen
dent on class, economic, and even gender inequality.
According to the “traditional* view, economic inequality was
not necessarily considered undesireable, as attested by the
moralist George Turnbull quoted earlier, and in the marriage
proposal the woman's gender inequality reflects those “defi
ciencies and wants“ which the suitor supplies. For Handler
and Segal, then, gratitude is gender-skewed and a character
istic, if not unique, feminine response. Austen, however,
makes gratitude equally applicable to men and women, in mari
tal engagements as in all relationships.
This genderization of virtue creates a double standard,
reflected in the popularized version of morality offered by
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Richard Steele in Tatler #172, which suggests that "there is
a Sort of Sex in Souls" and "[t]he virtues have respectively
a Masculine and a Feminine Cast."66 Addison ducks the question
*n Spectator #128, while contrasting the "Nature" of men and
women.
Women in their Nature are much more gay and joyous
than Men; whether it be that their Blood is more re
fined, their Fibres more delicate, and their animal
Spirits more light and volatile; or whether, as some
have imagined, there may not be a kind of Sex in the
very Soul, I shall not pretend to determine.67
Addison advises that husbands and wives should strive to ben
efit from each other's qualities, but much of the essay is
devoted to showing how "irregular Vivacity of Temper leads
astray the Hearts of ordinary Women, ■ with unfortunate domes
tic consequences (10).
There is ample evidence of Austen's familiarity with
Addison and Steele, and both Margaret Kirkham and Robert
Uphaus insist that Austen not only rejects the double stan
dard, but creates heroines who assert independent moral au
thority. Kirkham argues that:
Jane Austen's heroines are not self-conscious femi
nists, yet they are all exemplary of the first claim of
Enlightenment feminism: that women share the same moral
nature as men, ought to share the same moral status,
and exercise the same responsibility for their own con
duct.68
Much of Kirkham's book is concerned with establishing that
Jane Austen shared the feminist ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft,
which is also the thesis that Robert Uphaus develops. Uphaus
notes "Austen's clear departure from the assumption that
women lacked a full moral character," and finds that she "im-
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plements" Mary Wollstonecraft•s goal for "the consideration
of women not as moral objects of decorum and propriety, but
as 'moral beings'.1,69
Paula Cohen also claims that Austen's position "can be
seen to mark a convergence with Wollstonecraft, ■ and she
places Austen in opposition to Rousseau's belief that gender
differences in character and moral capacity are grounded in
•natural law.“70 The connection suggested by Cohen between
Austen and Rousseau is tenuous, but her exploration is impor
tant because it represents one of the few recent serious ef
forts to connect Austen with the texts of moral philosophy.
However, her observations on Rousseau apply equally well to
the "double standard* of popular philosophy and moral behav
ior as reflected in Addison, Steele, and conduct literature.
Cohen claims that Austen’s story-telling is a "self-conscious
declaration that she must depend on other texts for the cre
ation of her own," which "implies a potential plasticity in
the code of behavior which governs her novels; . . . "

The

authority Austen exercises over her own texts and their moral
code "testifies to her increased self-confidence as a woman
and a writer capable of shaping a model for male-female in
teraction in which both sexes are at last governed by the
same principles."71
Although I question the Rousseau connection, I agree
completely with Cohen that Austen is building her own text of
moral philosophy, within which women characters have or gain
power, and successfully assert their claims to gender equity
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and moral parity with men. What is important is that scholars
like Cohen, Uphaus, and Kirkham, who da try to place Austen
in a moral discourse, and who study the texts of that dis
course, seem to find her women characters not powerless, but
strong. Scholars who overlook, exclude or belittle the influ
ence of moral philosophy, and who concentrate instead on con
duct literature, legal codes, and perceived ideological re
pression, see Austen's women as victimized and oppressed. TO
the extent that an Emma does not seem to fit the pattern, she
is “not representative" (Moffat) and to the extent that
Austen does not seem to speak out against female oppression,
she is engaging in deep irony. This seems to be Susan
Fraiman's position.
I am arguing . . . that the female protagonist's hu
miliation, as much as it advances the marriage plot,
also comments ironically on this plot and on marriage
as a girl's developmental goal.72
My study, by contrast, follows the approach of those who look
at Austen in the context of the moralist discourse, but ar
gues further that the centrality of gratitude to the novels,
based upon Hutcheson's ideas as mediated by Thomas Sherlock's
pragmatic Christianity, suggests a unity and coherence lack
ing in the earlier studies I have noted.
Margaret Kirkham claims that the feminist ideas of
Austen were buried "in the aftermath of the anti-feminist re
action which followed Mary Wollstonecraft ’s death, a time
when open discussion of feminist ideas, however unexception
able they might appear to modem readers, was almost impossi
ble."73 Since Hutcheson's ideas represent, in my opinion, the
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philosophical basis of Austen's feminism/ he may have been
caught in the same reaction which re-imaged Austen as the
“gentle Jane“ who wrote “comedies of manners.“ Therefore, his
importance to Austen's view of gratitude, and its empowerment
for her women characters, has been lost to modern scholars.
This is not to argue that Hutcheson is a “feminist" philoso
pher. His texts reflect the usual masculine universal nouns
and pronouns, and his examples draw on male historical mod
els. But, as I have suggested, his radical idea of the ex
changeability of benevolence and gratitude erases and even
reverses culturally recognized gender roles.
William Blackstone believes that “Hutcheson became lost,
historically, between Shaftesbury and Hume, “74 but Blackstone
clearly is talking about his disappearance in our times. For
over fifty years after his death in 1746, his texts partici
pate in philosophical discourse, and the 1771 first edition
of the Encyclopedia Brittanica, in its article on “Moral
Philosophy, or Morals," specifically cites Hutcheson, along
with Shaftesbury, Butler, and “the Stoics.*75 Hobbes, Hume,
and Mandeville differ from Hutcheson, as well as from most of
the other sixty-five moralists identified by Selty-Bigge, in
excluding from their theories a unifying and authoritative
religious basis. John Mullan appears to see the severance of
this link as progress.
Famously, he [Hume] abandoned the theocentrism of writ
ers like Locke and Hutcheson, both of them in different
ways willing to submit philosophy to the final verdict
of religious belief.76
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Mullan, of course, does no more than implicitly claim that
philosophy should be secular study. Because most "theocentric" moralists believed in human nature as essentially
benevolent, Mullan also disparages eighteenth-century novels
which "show benevolence as an operative, reforming influ
ence," since "it is typically like the benevolence of Pamela
to the poor of the neighborhood; rewarding the obedience of
the socially inferior, affirming hierarchy, . . . "

(144).

Mullan, however, fails to do justice to Hutcheson's concept
of benevolence and gratitude as interchangable, which under
mines the structure of oppressive hierarchy. As I have ar
gued, it is this idea, with its profound implications, that
drives Austen's novels.
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CHAPTER II

THE TEXTS OF VIRTUE: JANE AUSTEN AND MORAL DISCOURSE

Two worlds uneasily coexist in Jane Austen’s novels, as
well as in the society they mirror. One is a world of laws,
which administers justice unjustly, and serves the avarice of
the mean, contemptible, and the simply unworthy. This is the
world which disinherits mothers and daughters through
primogentiture reinforced by custom in Sense and Sensibility,
or through the entailed estate in Pride and Prejudice, the
world that through fraud, greed, and relentless creditor
pressure both creates and impoverishes the widowhood of Mrs.
Smith in Persuasion.
The other world is the world of virtue, which for
Hutcheson is virtually synonymous with benevolence. For
Austen, a world driven by virtue represents the only real
hope for happiness and protection from laws, which invariably
are perverted by the venial to serve their selfish objec
tives. Virtue requires self-motivated giving of help or re
sources; justice relies on laws for protection against harm
or loss. For Hutcheson, there is no question which is the
more important, as he reveals in the concluding section of
Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been
said, see the true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This
moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

Evidence of Benevolence; and that we have Ideas of
Virtue and Vice, abstractly from any Law, Human or
Divine. . . .
But that our first Ideas of moral Good depend not
on Laws, may plainly appear from our constant
Inquirys into the Justice of Laws themselves, and
that not only of human Laws, but of the divine.1
Hutcheson proves his claim by a logical exercise that demon
strates the futility of seeking the “laws of a Superior* when
it comes to divine Justice and concludes that the only abso
lute is divine benevolence as the guide for human virtue.
Austen even shows in Sense and Sensibility that the
force of legal guarantees of benevolent intent can be twisted
into a threat used to thwart that benevolence, when Fanny
Dashwood talks her husband out of a moral commitment to pro
vide an annuity for his widowed stepmother and her daughters.
Since an annuity is a legally enforcable fiduciary
obligation, Fanny frightens John with the possibility that
his stepmother’s life span might exceed actuarial assump
tions, and then she adds the clinching argument: •. . . and
after all you have no thanks for it. They think themselves
secure, you do no more than what is expected, and it raises
no gratitude at all."2 Fanny argues that, since the money may
be seen by the mother as a legal right rather than benevo
lence, "it raises no gratitude."
Fanny, however, expresses a hard-nosed concept of
gratitude that has classical support. Cicero encourages
carefully calculated generosity, both public and private, in
order to "win us greater gratitude" that will enhance
personal power and prestige.3 Cicero argues that generosity
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(beneficentia) and gratitude are subject to the overriding

principle of justice, in which he includes the laws of the
state. Cicero's De Officiis claims the authority of Socrates
and Plato in presenting the cardinal virtues of prudence
(wisdom), justice, fortitude (courage), and ■moderation" or
■self-control."4 Of these categories, "justice . . . is the
crowning glory of the virtues . . . and, close akin to
justice, charity ['beneficentia'], which may also be called
kindness or generosity. ■
In the next twenty-four pages of the Loeb Classical
Library edition, Cicero amplifies on justice, "the crowning
glory of the virtues," before taking up "kindness and gen
erosity, " which "calls for the exercise of caution," so that
generosity will not "be beyond our means" or hurt instead of
help, "and finally, that it shall be proportioned to the wor
thiness of the recipient; for this is the corner-stone of
justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of kindness
must be measured* (47). It is clear that the scope of gen
erosity is circumscribed, not only by justice, but also by a
rather narrowly construed virtue of prudence.
How did Cicero's "beneficentia" become elevated to "benevo
lence, * the most important virtue for Hutcheson and "the Name of
Perfection" itself? The answer is that "benevolence" represents
the linkage of the classical cardinal virtues with the central
"theological" or Christian virtue of "charity." The scriptural
foundation of Christian benevolence rests principally on Matthew
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22: 37-40, which records Jesus's response to a loaded question
put to him in the teirple by “one of them, which was a lawyer.*
Master, which is the great commandment in the law?
Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy mind. This is the first and great command
ment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love
thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments
hang all the law and the prophets.5
This is a sweeping mandate indeed, and Thomas Sherlock

af

firms in his Discourse on this text that "the whole reason of
religion lies in these two general commandments; that in
these all particular duties and precepts are founded; . . .“6
“Benevolence" is among the examples Sherlock uses to illus
trate the love which Jesus commands, and in a later Discourse
he amplifies on this topic, using as his text 1 Peter 4:8,
“And above all things have fervent charity among yourselves:
for charity shall cover the multitude of sins.“
[This epistle] plainly shows how highly the Apostle
[Peter] esteemed this great virtue of charity; and
that it is the perfection of a Christian, the very
life and soul of all other duties. . . . [T]he char
ity spoken of in the text [has reference to no par
ticular acts]. It is therefore the principle of char
ity, or a general benevolence of mind towards one an
other, which the Apostle recommends.7
The term "charity" as used by Sherlock to mean the "love“ of
one’s neighbor commanded by Jesus and manifested by “benevo
lence" reflects, originally, the King James translation of
caritas from the Latin Vulgate, in turn a translation of the
Greek aaape. For Sherlock and the earlier translators, love
and benevolence are indistinguishable, and all three words
have the same meaning.

But the alternative translations have

evolved into different meanings, so that "charity" is one of
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those terms whose special "resonance" for the eighteenth cen
tury is, as

Mary Poovey suggests, "dim or absent" for modern

readers.8 But for Sherlock and Austen, love, charity and
benevolence converge into the same, central Christian virtue,
and their common quality is giving, not allocating resources
with due consideration to the circumstances, as Cicero ad
vises. Maaja Stewart, who has written on gratitude in Tom
Jones as well as in Austen, observes that the gratitude of
Miss Bates in Emma expresses this coalescence of meaning.
Her gratitude is not an expression of social humility
to social superiors that demeans both the giver and
the receiver, but an expression of trust in "such
good neighbors and Friends" that is part of her trust
in life itself as a gift of God. The community called
forth by Miss Bates is thus the premarket Christian
community of caritas and reciprocity that coexists
uneasily with' the dominant market society in the
novel.9
Stewart's focus is the subjugation of women by the emergent
British imperialism and capitalism, which debases gratitude
into a form of enslavement for the powerless, contrasted with
Miss Bates's Christian gratitude as a vestigial cultural rem
nant. Stewart fails to recognize, however, that Emma learns
from Miss Bates, and that Austen tries to show that the "pre
market" gratitude is not moribund, but survives as the hope
for virtue in the modem world.
Hutcheson always starts with and leads back to benevo
lence as "absolutely good" and not justified by useful re
turns of gratitude, or subject to justice codified in law, as
Cicero argues. Hutcheson first reverses, then conflates,
Cicero's justice-benevolence relationship. Neither Hutcheson
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nor Austen attempts to argue for the triumph of virtue over
vice, but all contend that a system of virtue represents a
viable alternative, perhaps the only alternative, to selfish
human nature shielded by law. Hutcheson's near-contemporaries
and successors, Hobbes, Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith,
however, continue to argue the importance of justice over
benevolence, but at the same time abandon (with the possible
exception of Smith) Hutcheson's theocentrism for a secular
and skeptical view of human nature. Fanny Dashwood's argument
that charity must be avoided where it does not "earn grati
tude" is exposed, then, as un-Christian, and this religious
subtext underscores the venial selfishness of her hypocriti
cal hiding behind the law.
Sense and Sensibility suggests Austen's disapproval of
Fanny's idea of gratitude and benevolence. More concrete evi
dence of Hutcheson’s informing presence has been persuasively
argued by Mark Loveridge, who identifies Mr. Weston's alpha
betical conundrum in the later Emma as an algebraic equation
employed by Hutcheson to express the highest value possible
for benevolence.10 Mr. Weston poses his riddle to the assem
bled party at the Box Hill outing.
"— What two letters of the alphabet are there, that
express perfection?"
"What two letters!— express perfection! I am sure
I do not know."
"Ah! you will never guess. You (to Emma), I am
certain, will never guess.— I will tell you.— M. and
A.— Em— ma.--Do you understand?"
The reaction to this sally, intended to compliment Emma, is
mixed, but Mr. Knightley has the last word: "Perfection
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should not have come quite so soon" (371), a veiled rebuke
that he soon makes explicit in chastising Emma for earlier
humiliating Miss Bates.
The equation Mr. Weston borrows for his conundrum is
Hutcheson's ■proof" of benevolence as the "Perfection of
Virtue," presented after four pages of intermediate steps.
Since then Benevolence, or Virtue in any Agent, is
as M+A, or as Mfcl+A, and no Being can act above his
natural Ability, that must be the Perfection of
Virtue where M=A, or when the Being acts to the ut
most of its Power for the publick Good; and hence the
Perfection of Virtue in this case, or M*-A is as
Unity.11
In the process of proof, benevolence is symbolized by “B,"
while "M=Moment of Good, ■ and A represents "Abilitys, ■ so
that "M=BxA." Austen's adaptation of Hutcheson's unique, if
not bizarre, mathematics for an alphabet game in Emma is an
astonishing feat, and could not be accomplished without inti
mate knowledge and understanding of the philosopher's method
and objectives. Loveridge suggests that Austen's comic re
working of Hutcheson might represent "oblique criticism of a
Moral Sense writer."12 This reading rests on the questionable
assumption that values cannot be “serious" if they are used
in "comic" situations. Further, Mr. Knightley's criticism
that "Perfection should not have come quite so soon" is
loaded with moral meaning, emphasized by the italics in the
text that set off the word, which joins Austen and Hutcheson
in a larger moral discourse. Mark Loveridge's article creates
a rare opportunity to link specific texts of Austen and
Hutcheson, and the algebraic "demonstration" of virtue has a
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cameo appearance in Emma to underscore ironically just how
far Bnma is from "the name of perfection" in her cruel
ridicule of Miss Bates, whose superior virtue is pointed out
by Maaja Stewart.
Where did Jane Austen acquire both her specific knowl
edge of Hutcheson's arcane benevolence formulae, as well as
the larger

understanding of his philosophy which shapes

gratitude's driving role in the novels? I will discuss three
possible sources: her father George Austen's library at
Steventon, sermons heard and read, and periodical literature,
probably in the form of bound volumes of older journals.
The formulae themselves only appear to have been pub
lished in "Treatise II" of the first three editions of
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.13
It is probable that more than sixty years must have passed
since publication before this work seems to have attracted
Austen's interest, and its domicile for the latter part of
that period, I suggest, would likely be her father's five
hundred volume library, sold upon the family’s move to Bath
in 1801.14 It is an exasperating mystery that no catalog of
its contents seems to have survived, yet it is scarcely con
ceivable that this collection was never inventoried. David
Gilson appears to have done the most exhaustive research, ex
cept possibly for Deirdre Le Faye, but his investigation
comes up empty-handed: “Her [Austen's] first recourse would
have been to her father's library; virtually nothing is known
of the fate of the books which this comprised, . . ,"15
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The response to xry own personal inquiries also has been that
no inventory of the library's contents seems to exist.
Nevertheless, moral philosophy and sermon literature
must have been represented in George Austen's library, and
Hutcheson's credentials to be among the moralists are
stronger than most. Republication of Hutcheson's original
writings ended in the late eighteenth century, except for
subsequent anthologies of representative moralists, such as
L. A. Selby-Bigge's 1897 compilation, updated by D. D.
Raphael in 1969. His complete works only became generally
available to scholars through the seven volume 1971 Georg
Olms facsimile edition. My count shows twenty-one printings
or editions of his various writings between 1725 and 1788, of
which twelve were posthumous (Hutcheson died in 1746), and L.
A. Selby-Bigge's 1897 compilation adds translations and edi
tions of letters under pseudonyms to this total.16 In SelbyBigge' s bibliography, Hutcheson's publications easily exceed
in number of printings those of the sixty-five other moral
ists represented, whose writings spanned the late seventeenth
and early nineteenth centuries, including such canonical fig
ures as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, and
David Hume, which testifies both to the large market for
moral philosophy, as well as to the significant share of that
market represented by Hutcheson.
Although the comprehensive study of the history of books
published in the eighteenth century has yet to be completed,
there cleariy was a lively market for moral and religious
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literature, as indicated by the extensive publication histo
ries of just the texts discussed in this study. Thomas
Preston’s research reveals that “an average of 230 books on
religion was published annually’’ over most of the eighteenth
century,“17 while John Vladamir Price, in “The reading of
philosophical literature, “ observes that “[i]t would be te
dious to enumerate the philosophical books that were pub
lished in just one decade, the 1750's. “18 However, Ian
Maxted's study of gross publication data makes it possible to
estimate the religious book market. Maxted tabulates an aver
age number of titles for most of the second half of the eigh
teenth century at 600 per annum, rising to 700 in the last
decade.19 Preston's figures, then, suggest that religious
books alone represented perhaps more than one-third of the
market. James Raven concludes that published sermons “were
such a staple of the eighteenth-century book trade that there
survive numerous announcements by booksellers pleading that
the market was saturated and that no new collections could be
accepted for publication.'20
At what point the market might be "saturated" is hard to
say, but there certainly must have been a substantial demand
for sermon literature. The data seems to contradict J. Paul
Hunter's claim that "they [sermons] seldom caught on with the
public," although he does argue that "[d]idactic writings in
the early eighteenth-century were everywhere." These included
"theological treatises which, . . . often argued points of
practical divinity and moral obligation as well as creed."21
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I suspect that Hunter is defining ■sermon" narrowly,
since many of Sherlock's "Discourses" follow the sermon pat
tern of explicating a biblical passage referenced or quoted
at the beginning of the text and relating its significance to
practical concerns of an audience. Hie length of these
Discourses is about that of other acknowledged Anglican ser
mon literature, and when Jane Austen says she is "very fond
of Sherlock ’s sermons,* I have no doubt she includes those
nominally published as Discourses.

Whether to stimulate de

mand for more publishable sermons, or to unload excessive in
ventories, Thomas Mautner notes that Shaftesbury accused the
booksellers of fomenting the trade in moral and religious
texts.
The publishing of books and pamphlets on religion and
morality had become a very profitable business, so
profitable indeed that booksellers in their unscrupu
lous quest for material gain could be suspected, at
least in jest, of fomenting theological controversy.
Shaftesbury likened them to a glazier who, in order
to insure a thriving business, tosses a football to a
bunch of street urchins on a frosty morning.22
Mautner's conclusion seems somewhat better supported than
Hunter's, and Jane Austen's observations as both a reader and
hearer of sermons tends to verify it. Unfortunately, there
appear to be no surviving sermons of her father, George, or
of her brother, James,23 and Henry's published sermons proba
bly were not written or delivered before his ordination in
1816, a year before Jane Austen died. Nevertheless, her com
ment in the Letters on Sherlock’s sermons is comparative— she
"preferfs] them to almost any, "2i— which strongly suggests
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that she could draw on a wide knowledge of sennon literature
for such comparisons.
In contrast to her admiration of Sherlock, Austen ex
presses dislike for her cousin, Edward Cooper’s, "new
Sermons■ as "fuller of Regeneration and Conversion than ever-with the addition of his zeal in the cause of the Bible
Society."25 The "British and Foreign Bible Society" was
founded by the Evangelical Anglicans who had formed what came
to be known in 1812 as the "Church Missionary Society, "2S and
this object of Edward Cooper's "zeal" reflects the
Evangelical focus of his Practical and Familiar Sermons.
Designed for Parochial and Domestic Instruction (1809), which
went through eight or more British and an 1817 American edi
tion, testifying at least to the existence of a more recep
tive audience than Jane Austen. The titles tend to confirm
the Evangelical approach to piety: "The Unfruitfulness and
Misery of Sin, * "Mortification of Sin a Reasonable Duty," and
"The Day of Account." Austen's distaste for the subject of
"Conversion" may have been stimulated by a sermon entitled
"Description and Danger of Conviction When not Followed by
Conversion.”27
Volume one is dedicated to "The Reverend Thomas
Gisborne," whom Overton identifies as a leading Evangelical,
and whose sermons his "contemporaries" regarded as "models .
. . of that much neglected art."28 In an 1805 letter, Austen
thanks Cassandra for having "recommended 'Gisborne'," and
"having begun," expresses pleasant surprise that she is en

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

joying it.29 Chapman guesses that she refers to An Enquiry
■into the Duties of the Female Sex, which as conduct litera

ture avoids the religious exhortation of Evangelical sermons.
Although Cooper's dedication to Gisborne suggests his own
self-identification with the Evangelicals, Austen's enjoyment
of Gisborne's conduct book does not, it seems to me, undercut
her later professed dislike for the Evangelical sermons pub
lished by her cousin.
In the absence of surviving sermons by James or her fa
ther, sermons collected in the nine volumes of The English
Preacher (1773) suggest that Austen might have heard a pre

vailing concern with doctrine as reflected in conduct, repre
senting the growing taste for •practical'' preaching identi
fied by the compiler, William Enfield.30 The index to this
work groups sermons by six "Subjects':
I Virtue and Vice in General
II Religion and the Duties of Piety
III Social Virtues and the Opposite Vices
IV Personal Virtue and the Opposite Faults
V Christianity
VI Historical Subjects [from the BibleJ31
Within these subject headings, at least four sermons address
•charity* as the single most important Christian virtue, re
inforcing the principle of benevolence and good works.
These categories contrast with what Reverend Overton, a
mainsteam Anglican and admittedly negative toward the
Evangelicals within the Church of England, gives as his sum
mary of the content of Evangelical preaching.
They insisted upon the total depravity of human na
ture. The image of God was not only defaced but ef
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faced by the Fall. Restoration to Divine favour was
effected by Christ not only on behalf of man, but in
stead of man, who of his own will had no power to
turn himself Godward.32
This summary of human powerlessness for self-help is clearly
the doctrine against which Sherlock inveighs. What makes
Overton useful in his combined capacity both as an historian
of the established church, as well as a committed cleric, is
the struggle against his evident bias as he attempts to ac
knowledge the positive influence of Evangelicalism, not much
more than a century after the events and writings he dis
cusses. In some ways, I feel his prejudice may be an indica
tor of likely attitudes for and against the Evangelicals in
Jane Austen’s clergy-dominated family.
The dialogue between Hutcheson's theories and Sherlock’s
advice also suggests the interplay of motive and conduct in
the novels, which reflects the importance Austen evidently
attaches to sermons in the spiritual and temporal life of the
parish. In Pride and Prejudice, when Wickham recalls a desire
for a clerical life, Elizabeth's immediate question is, "How
should you have liked making sermons?" Wickham is equally
quick to respond "Exceedingly well," but Elizabeth reminds
him that "there was a time when sermon-making was not so
palatable to you as it seems to be at present; . . . "

(328-

29) .
In Mansfield Park. Edmund and Fanny include sermons in a
wider view of clerical duties, but the Crawford siblings re
veal indeed that they see little more than sermon-making
among the clergyman's functions (92-93, 341). Echoing his
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son's feelings, Sir Thomas rebukes them with observations on
Edmund's duties that seem modelled on Sherlock's Charge to
the Clerov of the Diocese of London (1759), reportedly the
only one of these annual pastoral charges that Sherlock al
lowed to be printed. Henry Crawford tries to advance a scheme
for his renting the parsonage at Thornton Lacey, on the as
sumption that Edmund can discharge his clerical offices while
he continues to live at Mansfield Park. Sir Thomas, however,
informs him in no uncertain terms that Edmund will reside on
his living.
It is perfectly natural that you should not have
thought much on the subject, Mr. Crawford. But a
parish has wants and claims which can be known only
by a clergyman constantly resident, and which no
proxy can be capable of satisfying to the same ex
tent. . . . [Edmund] knows that human nature needs
more lessons them a weekly sermon can convey, and
that if he does not live among his parishioners and
prove himself by constant attention their well-wisher
and friend, he does very little either for their good
or his own. (247-48) .
Sherlock considered residence as "the Foundation of all other

Duties and it would be absurd to speak of any other without
presupposing this."
Can you deliver the Message of Christ, as his
Ambassador, to Persons to whom you have no access?
Can you oversee the Flock, or Feed the Church, which
you have forsaken? Can you dispense the Mysteries of
God to those whom you neither see nor speak to? Can
you watch for their Souls, to whose Persons, as well
as to their spiritual Wants, you are a Stranger?33
Austen comes close here to putting Sherlock's words in Sir
Thomas's mouth to denounce, as Sir Thomas cannot do in the
confines of polite social discourse, the principles and con
duct of the Crawfords, as Fanny Price also speaks the Ian-
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guage of Sherlock's sermon text to condemn the erring Henry
and Maria Bertram in the wilderness at Sotherton.
The terms "wants and claims" of Sir Thomas, and
Sherlock's rhetorical insistence that the health of "their
Souls" requires attention to the "Persons" as well as the
■spiritual Wants" of parishioners in order for the priest to
"Feed the Church" are the vocabulary of "good works," which
latitudinarian Anglicans endorse as fundamental to the
Christian life. Sherlock and Sir Thomas condemn as pastoral
negligence the focus on spirituality as an excuse for neglect
of human needs. Even worse for Sherlock is transforming the
vice of such neglect into a virtue, which Sherlock accuses
"the enthusiasts" of doing in arguing that faith alone is re
quired for salvation.
There is, in the language made use of to explain
the doctrine of grace, something liable to be abused
by ignorant or crafty men. We say, that of ourselves
we can do nothing; whence they conclude, that we have
nothing to do. We say, that it is the grace of God
which enables us to do every thing; from whence they
conclude, that every thing must be left to the grace
of God, and that we need only work ourselves into a
strong persuasion that God is at work for us, and may
still ourselves. And this persuasion, which is gener
ally mere enthusiasm, they dignify with the name of
Christian faith.
To convince his reader of the need to join faith and works,
Sherlock offers an allegorical parable of a person who
. . . wanted to move a weight, that required double his
strength to move. If a friend came to his assistance,
would it not be properly said, that his friend enabled
him to do what he did? but would it follow that his
friend did all, and he nothing?
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Should there remain any doubt as to his meaning, Sherlock
drops the rhetorical questioning and states an unambiguous
conclusion.
Now then works are necessary to salvation; and it
matters little in what degree they are necessary, or
how they are to be named: if they are necessary, you
must do them; and that is enough to secure the prac
tice of virtue and holiness in the world.34
Sherlock's position on faith and works stands in sharp con
trast with the Reverend Cooper's list of topics, and
Overton's summary of the content of Evangelical preaching.
Benevolence and gratitude link the faith versus works
debate, whose concern is "salvation,11 with the concerns of
Hutcheson's moral philosophy. Both benevolence and gratitude
are feelings that originate in the moral sense, but are fo
cused on tangible benefits leading to the happiness and well
being of others. This pragmatism suggests the cooperation of
head and heart that Blair commends in his comments on
Hutcheson's last published work, which appeared in the 1755
Edinburgh Review, where he also praises Sherlock's
Discourses. Earlier, Hutcheson himself had contributed to
philosophical discussions in the London Journal and The
Dublin Weekly Journal.
In his biography of Henry Mackenzie, Harold Thoirpson ar
gues that the posthumous Hutcheson philosophical discourse
continues in Henry Mackenzie's The Mirror (1779-80), which
Catherine Morland's mother in Northanaer Abbev prescribes for
her despondent daughter (241),35 and in its successor, The
Lounger (1785-87). Thompson also notes that both Walter Scott
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and later Leigh Hunt recognized Mackenzie's debt to
Hutcheson.36 Further, The Loiterer (1789-90), a journal of
Oxford vignettes and collegiate satire edited and largely
written by Jane's brothers, James and Henry Austen (and to
which Jane Austen may have contributed at age 15) claims lit
erary kinship with "The Mirrour" in its first edition. Thus
it seems that Austen may have encountered Hutchesonian phi
losophy directly in an early edition of his Inquiry, and also
through the sentimentalism of Mackenzie's journals, as well
as through the playful satires on sentiment in The Loiterer.
But the philosophy reflected in Mackenzie's stories seems to
have degenerated, from the union of head and heart that Hugh
Blair approves, into pure feeling and emotionalism. The
figure of the "sentimentalist'' who substitutes words for ac
tions recurs, both in Lounger stories and in James and Henry
Austen's, The Loiterer, where the division of head and heart
becomes apparently irreversible, and which seems to end the
Hutchesonian conversation as philosophical discourse. Jane
Austen's novels, however, reclaim this discourse, and re-con
nect the "head and heart" that the earlier Edinburgh Review
applauds.
According to Brian Vickers, Austen "mocked the figure of
The Man of Feeling in Sand iton."37 the novel left unfinished
at her death.

Austen also reveals a kind of exasperated ad

miration of Walter Scott, who both dedicates Waverlv (1814)
to Mackenzie as "Our Scottish Addison," and who later praises
Emma highly in an important review.33 However, what Austen im
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plicitly criticizes in The Mirror is not Hutcheson or
Mackenzie, but a patronizing essay about proper educational
influences on young women, attributed to ‘Mr. Alex.
Abercraniby," later a judge "of the Court of Session in
Scotland.*39 It seems more likely that Austen “mocks* the sen
timental figure of the abused Harley in The Man of Feeling,
who is victimized by his emotional sensitivity, rather than
the work itself. Comically, Austen seems to affirm both
Hutcheson and Mackenzie against "sentiment."
Mackenzie uses the genre of sentimental fiction to dis
close its menace to happiness and, indeed, to survival, but
his essay "On Novel Writing" in The Lounger is didactic crit
icism, in the style of Samuel Johnson's Rambler #4, of that
very genre.
In the enthusiasm of sentiment there is much the
same danger as in the enthusiasm of religion, of sub
stituting certain impulses and feelings of what may
be called a visionary kind, in the place of real
practical duties, which, in morals, as in theology,
we might not improperly denominate good works. In
morals, as in religion, there are not wanting in
stances of refined sentimentalists, who are contented
with talking of virtues which they never practice,
who pay in words what they owe in actions; or per
haps, what is fully as dangerous, who open their
minds to impressions which never have any effect upon
their conduct, but are considered as something for
eign to and distinct from it.40
Robert D. Mayo observes that "ultimately Mackenzie the novel
ist says nothing about prose fiction of which Johnson the
moralist could possibly have disapproved,"41 and joining reli
gious belief with good works is a consistent theme of
Sherlock's Discourses.
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In The Mirror, the shift toward sentiment in the
discourse of Hutcheson's philosophy after his death seems
particularly relevant to the "Story of LaRoche," a fable of
the conversion to Christianity of a nortorious skeptic,
identified subsequently by Mackenzie himself as David Hume,
who had been Hutcheson's student in Edinburgh. When shown the
story by Mackenzie, Adam Smith, who had been an Edinburgh
Review contributor, "immediately recognized its subject (or
target) as David Hume,*42 and he must also have recognized
that this story continues posthumously the earlier
correspondence between Hume and Hutcheson, which records the
widening gulf between their philosophies.43 "The Story of La
Roche" appeared three years after Hume's death, and for John
Mullan, "It is a fiction which, though it cannot quite make
Hume into a Christian, is an attempt to exorcise the spirit
of his philosophical reputation."44 The Hume threat to reli
gious belief cannot have gone unnoticed by Austen, although
he is only acknowledged, again in Northanaer Abbev (109), as
the author of The History of England.
By degrees the mind of the philosopher surrenders to the
fervent and emotional piety of La Roche. "His parishoners
catched the ardour of the good old man; even the philosopher
felt himself moved, and forgot for a moment, to think why he
should n o t ."
La Roche’s religion was that of sentiment, not
theory, . . . A philosopher might have called him an
enthusiast; but if he possessed the fervour of the
enthusiasts, he was guiltless of their bigotry. "Our
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Father, which art in heaven!" might the good man say-for he felt it— and all mankind were his brethren.45
This careful distinction of LaRoche's version of "sentiment"
from "enthusiasm* is echoed in Lounger 20 (above), and re
flects distrust at the individualism of the "enthusiasts"
claim for a direct relationship with God, versus the social
nature of religion in benevolent feelings toward "all
mankind," manifested by good works.
But the sentiment which pulls the erring philosopher
back to religion in the "Story of La Roche," seems to be
quite different from the Hutchesonian philosophy "dictated by
the heart, no less than the head" that the Edinburgh Review
editor found so commendable. The conclusion of Mackenzie's
fable notes that the sentiment triggered by "remembrance
overcame him [the philosopher] even to weakness," which cer
tainly is not characteristic of Hutcheson's socially involved
moral agent. It is not even a quality of the good La Roche,
who through all his trials is a faithful shepherd to his
flock of parishioners. Sentiment seems to drive out reason,
at least during moments of "remembrance, ■ and the result is a
loss of vitality, to which indeed the man who "excelled all"
others in "the development of abstract subjects"46 may, be
cause of living in the world of thought, be constitutionally
vulnerable. This is hinted at by the narrator's comment,
"[t]he truth was, that indolence was the habit most natural
to him. "47
I suggest that this "indolent" and "weak" figure is a
product of the separation of "head" and "heart," and that he
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is recognized as a sort of “species" in the first number of
The Lounger. "Introduction— Character of the Author, indolent
with Feeling, and Vacant with Observation."48 Hie piece is not
self-mocking, contrary to what one might expect, nor does it
invite an ironic reading. Rather, it privileges "the lounger"
as an observer and commentator. Nevertheless, "the lounger"
warns of the "passive feelings of sensibility," after he lis
tens to a mutual friend tell about a certain Mr. Woodfort who
is moved to tearful sympathy with distress "in a tender
novel" or "the representation of a tragedy," but "in real
life" his "feeling and generosity unaccountably forsake him."
Scarcely ever has he been known to relieve the dis
tresses he is so willing to pity, or to exercise the
generosity he is so ready to applaud. The tenants on
his estate are squeezed for rents higher than their
farms can afford; his debtors are harassed for pay
ments, in circumstances which might often plead for
mitigation or delay. Nay, I know some of his pretty
near relations, for relief of whose necessities I
have applied with success to others, after having in
vain solicited Woodfort's assistance to relieve
them.49
Not only is Woodfort incapacited by feelings of sentiment, he
also has lost touch with the morality of his own life. In
many ways, he suggests a prototype for John Dashwood in Sense
and Sensibility, who seems moved by the idea of fulfilling
his father's dying request to provide for his mother and sis
ters, but whose generous feeling quickly evaporates when
faced with the impact on his own situation.
The "lounger" adds his own observations to his friend's
story:
To this it may be proper to add, that the very in
dulgence in the passive feelings of sensibility has a
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tendency to produce indolence, langour, and fee
bleness, and to unfit the mind for anything which re
quires active and firm exertion.50
This observation is appropriate to the speaker in “Characters
of Dr. Villars, and Mr. Sensitive," created for The Loiterer
by W. B. Portal, family friend and school mate of James and
Henry. This tale seems almost an elegy for Hutcheson in the
figure of the venerable Dr. Villars and his somewhat sickly
nephew, Mr. Sensitive.
In all their views of things, the Doctor is sanguine,
the other inclines to Despondence, and while both
wish to find things better than perhaps their Nature
will admit, the one fancies he sees in the world less
Defect, the other less Excellence than realy exist. .
. . [wjhile the Doctor's Heart expands with a thou
sand Projects for fostering Virtue, nothing enters
Mr. Sensitive's Brain but how more effectually to re
press Vice.51
This comparison captures the degeneration from the elderly
Villars* benevolent sensibility to the morose romanticism of
his alienated nephew's sentimentality, who perhaps reappears
in Persuasion as the forlorn widower and sentimental Byron
worshipper, Captain Benwick. The Loiterer also associates the
benevolent Villars with the position represented by Sherlock
and the latitudinarians on the importance of good works,
while Mr. Sensitive clearly is identified with the “enthusi
asts,* whom Mackenzie accuses of “bigotry" in "The Story of
La Roche.“
By personal example, the Oxford student who narrates
this tale in The Loiterer seems to show that one may ratio
nalize inaction, as John Dashwood rationalizes moral inaction
in Sense and Sensibility when confronted with the desperate
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needs of mother and sisters. The thought processes of both
are alike in justifing their non-involvement, whether moral
action or the pursuit of knowledge.
I account myself, therefore, singularly fortunate,
who have fallen upon such valuable Friends; . . .
from whom I may acquire Information without the te
diousness of Research, and arrive at Truth without
the Exertion of Reflection. . . . And thus I imbibe
more real and efficient Knowledge extended at ny Ease
on the Doctor's Sofa, than toiling through the close
stowed Learning in the Library of ny College, bewil
dered among Titles and Indexes, and enveloped in
Dust. (10)
Hutcheson's steady focus on moral behavior has been converted
to little more than the idle furniture of the academic mind,
and "the lounger's" warning has become a fulfilled prophecy.
Drained of energy and desire, the academic is all mind, but a
mind passive and inert.
In The Loiterer's story, the "head" and the "heart" have
become permanently divided, which defines the barely viable
organism represented by the narrator passively absorbing aca
demic knowledge on Dr. Villar's sofa. The elderly doctor,
however, looks back to the philosophy applauded by The
Edinburgh Review in Hutcheson that combines head and heart,
and whose goal is human happiness. But The Loiterer's mock
fin de la ohilosoohie is the challenge Austen picks up, and
she shows in her novels that benevolence and gratitude belong
to the world of the present and future, not to miscellaneous
intellectual acquisitions of the acadeny, or to the decayed
sentiment of Mr. Sensitive. The supine figure of split and
de-energized values in The Loiterer symbolizes the spiritual
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sickness caused by the failure of heart and head to work to
gether.
Before concluding my discussion of "the texts of
virtue," I would like to address the argument that Austen re
veals the influence of Bishop Joseph Butler, Hutcheson's near
contemporary, more than that of any other moralist. J. A.
Kearney concludes that "[c]losest to her position is that of
Bishop Butler . . .*52, a relationship also suggested earlier
by D. D. Devlin, Philip Drew, and Park Honan. Honan dismisses
Hutcheson as “the eighteenth-century philosopher of happi
ness,*53 and Devlin merely acknowledges him as the apostle and
echo of Shaftesbury.54 Drew, like Kearney, ignores Hutcheson,
and instead argues for Butler against Gilbert Ryle's attempt
“to establish her affinity" with Shaftesbury.55
My argument for Hutcheson and Sherlock as more important
does not necessarily exclude ideas attributable to other
moral philosophers, including Butler. However, I feel that
these three studies have, collectively, two serious flaws.
The first is that slight consideration is given to
Hutcheson's texts, when in fact their publication dovetailed
with the appearance of Butler's major works, and each ac
knowledged the other, approvingly by Hutcheson, critically by
Butler.56 Further, Loveridge's brief essay is strongly persua
sive of Austen's knowledge of Hutcheson, although his article
in Notes and Queries was published after Devlin's and Drew's
studies. The case built by Loveridge would seem to require
some modification of earlier studies, particularly since no
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comparable textual link between Austen and Butler has yet
been offered.
In the preface to An Essav. Hutcheson actually claims
for his moral sense theory the support of Butler.
I hope it is a good Omen of something still better
on this Subject to be expected in the learned World,
that Mr. Butler, in his Sermons at the Rolls Chapel,
has done so much Justice to the wise and good Order
of our Nature.57
Butler, however, does not return the compliment. Although he
never cites Hutcheson by name, he does seem to attack the
idea that all virtue is summed up in benevolence. In
Dissertation: Of the Nature of Virtue, he conflates
Hutcheson's “moral sense" with his own idea on "conscience"
under the general category of a "moral faculty,"58 which is
more responsive to the intrinsic morality of decisions as de
termined by Christian revelation and influenced by tradi
tional Christian sanctions of reward and punishment. Such
considerations make morality more a matter of the individu
al's relation to God's commands and gives less weight to
Hutcheson’s standard of the promotion of people’s happiness.
Therefore, for Butler, "benevolence and the want of it,
singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and
vice."59

The significance of Butler's devaluation of benevo

lence is that it also devalues gratitude by breaking
Hutcheson's dynamic union of the two, and, in fact, Butler
has little to say about gratitude. The distance between
Austen and Butler is proportional to his neglect of grati
tude. For Butler, gratitude would be considered a "duty," the
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first definition in Johnson's Dictionary cited earlier in
this study, and "duty" needs little discussion, only compli
ance with external authority. Since the exchange of benevo
lence and gratitude in relationships is basic to the growth
of love in Austen's novels, Butler's different concerns seem
almost irrelevant.
Butler, on the other hand, does not reject happiness,
but insists that it is more a spiritual satisfaction from
following conscience as our duty. Those who shirk this duty
shall at last find, that he who has given up all the
advantages of the present world, rather than violate
his conscience and the relations of life, has in
finitely better provided for himself, and secured his
own interest and happiness.60
Nothing could be farther from Austen than this invitation to
take up the Cross and find happiness in sacrifice. Anne
Elliot in Persuasion endorses "a strong sense of duty" (246),
but her referent is the child-parent relationship, and by im
plication the spousal relationship in marriage, and neither
Austen nor Hutcheson challenges the mandates of these social
institutions. In Austen, however, the authority of gratitude
is always the authority of one's feelings, Johnson's second
definition of gratitude as "desire.''
Hutcheson's focus is benevolence and gratitude as the
two faces of virtue's coinage, whose value is stated in the
quantity of human happiness they bring, and this also seems
to be Austen's standard of value, not Butler's advice to look
beyond privation in "the present world" for an ultimate "hap
piness." But neither is Hutcheson's emphasis on feelings and
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happiness an excuse for hedonism, since the moral sense may
give wrong readings, and "reason often corrects the report of
our senses." In my discussion of Mansfield Park. I argue that
Sherlock's sermon that Kearney quotes, offers a commentary on
the sexual frolic of Henry Crawford and Maria Bertram in the
"wilderness" of Sotherton, where reason is lost in the indul
gence of passion. Sherlock addresses conduct and its conse
quences, whereas Hutcheson's concern is the instinctive mo
tive to virtue or vice, leading to the threshold of action,
where the sermon takes over.
Although in some ways, Sherlock's ideas are not unlike
Butler's, particularly in their concern with conduct, he
differs importantly from Butler in lamenting the acrimonious
divisions among Anglicans, freethinkers, and deists.
You see how nearly natural religion and the Gospel
are allied in the foundation of their hopes and ex
pectations. It is a pity such near friends, who have
but one common interest, should have any disputes.
But disputes there are.61
By contrast, Overton points out that Butler wrote The Analogy
of. Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and
Course of Nature (1736) "to counteract the practical mischief
which he thought the Freethinkers . . . were doing.■62 As I
have suggested, there is a rigidity and other-worldliness to
Butler that devalues the goal of human happiness for falliable beings in Austen, but with which Sherlock seems much
more in tune. Both Butler and Sherlock were products of
Cambridge, but Butler scholar Ernest Mossner sees him as a
minority view against the dominant "selfish or utilitarian
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school, basing itself on Locke and Newton," and he identifies
Sherlock with this “school."63 MOssner's choice of the term
"selfish" is unfortunate and suggests a misleading connection
with the diametrically opposed ideas of Hobbes, Mandeville,
and Hume. However, "utilitarian" does seem to apply to
Sherlock's concern with the practical benefits of Christian
principle, such as charity, as well as to Hutcheson's
standard that virtue is measured by its contribution to human
happiness.
"Happiness" for Austen is, indeed, "salvation" for her
characters, and her dramas seem to work like Sherlock's
parables, whose homely examples illuminate larger truths.
Even an apparently trivial incident in Austen's incomplete
1804 work, The Watsons, contrives to make a larger statement
about benevolence, gratitude, and happiness. A fine, ten-year
old boy, "uncommonly fond of dancing," is allowed by an
indulgent mother to join the adults at a ball. Emma, the
heroine, observes that his delight at securing a young,
pretty partner is quickly dashed when the partner seizes a
better opportunity.
If the poor little boy's face had in it’s [sic] hap
piness been interesting to Emma, it was infinitely
more so under this sudden reverse;— he stood the pic
ture of disappointment, with crimson'd cheeks, quiv
ering lips, & eyes bent on the floor. His mother,
stifling her own mortification, tried to sooth his,
with the prospect of Miss Osborne's second promise; —
but tho' he contrived to utter with an effort of
Boyish Bravery "Oh! I do not mind it"— it was very
evident by the unceasing agitation of his features
that he minded it as much as ever.— Emma did not
think, or reflect;— she felt and acted— . "I shall be
very happy to dance with you Sir, if you like it."
said she, holding out her hand with the most unaf
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fected good humour.— The Bey in one moment restored
to all his first delight— looked joyfully at his
Mother . . . The Thankfulness of Mrs. Blake was more
diffuse;— with a look, most expressive of unexpected
pleasure, & lively Gratitude, she turned to her
neighbour with repeated & fervent acknowledgements of
so great & condescending a kindness to her boy.64
A great deal is packed into this little story to make it a
crystalline parable of virtue that exemplifies unimpeachable
benevolence and gratitude. Emma's action is utterly sponta
neous feeling— "she felt and acted"— unlike Cicero's and
Fanny Dashwood's careful weighing of benevolence against cal
culations of reciprocal gratitude. Her action is pure benevo
lence, free of any taint of self-interest or (presumably)
sexual attraction, since the lad is too young for banter such
as Henry Tilney's flirtatious comment to Catherine Morland in
Northancter Abbev that "I consider a country-dance as an em
blem of marriage" (76) . Finally, gratitude is felt both by
the beneficiary and his mother, the observer of Emma's in
stinctive compassion, which testifies to the propagation of
virtue by example.
Austen's parable draws on the commonplace to reveal
virtue in action. Sherlock provides the moral commentary,
based on his reading of the biblical commandment to "love thy
neighbour as thyself" (Matthew 22:39). For Sherlock, "love,
with respect to our equals, is friendship and benevolence:
towards inferiors it is courtesy and condescension:, . . .6S
Austen erases the distinction between "equal" and "inferior"
in her story. Emma’s gesture in addressing her young partner
as "Sir" may only be gallantry, but it bridges any inequality
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of status due to age, and offering herself as the bey's dance
partner qualifies as the ■benevolence" that Sherlock consid
ers an act of Christian love, and reflects that "democratiza
tion" of virtue that Scott finds in Hutcheson.
Austen's opposition to the genderization of virtue is
demonstrated when she re-writes this parable in Emma, in
which virtually the identical scenario is repeated in a more
complex version with gender roles reversed. Mr. Knightley
steps to the rescue of this later Emma's proteg£, Harriet,
who has been cruelly snubbed at the Crown Inn ball, and
dances with her, for which Emma is "all pleasure and grati
tude" (328). Further, Mr. Knightley's benevolent act encour
ages Harriet to consider their inequality of station not so
formidable as to preclude thoughts of marriage— a backfire of
benevolence that, of course, creates comic problems of hor
rendous proportions. Hutcheson does acknowledge that reason
may be needed to correct the false report of our senses,
butit deserts Harriet to give an ironic twist to the rather
"pat" version of the benevolent dance partner tale unfolded
in the earlier work.
Dancing, however, stops short of being a metonymy for
married life in Austen, although Henry Tilney seems to argue
that it is, with the exception that the duties of dance
partners to each other are reversed in marriage.
I consider a country-dance as an emblem of marriage. .
. . In marriage, the man is supposed to provide for
the support of the woman; the woman to make the home
agreeable to the man; he is to purvey, and she is
tosmile. 3ut in dancing, their duties are exactly
changed; the acreeableness, the compliance are
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expected from him, while she furnishes the fan and the
lavender water. (76-77)
By accepting him as a dance partner, Henry claims that the
woman exercises the power to make the dance happen, whereas
in marriage the husband provides for the needs of the union.
Tilney‘s theory implies, then, that the reciprocal response
of gratitude is owed by the man in the dance and by the woman
in marriage, but the literal-minded Catherine seems
instinctively to reject, not Henry's logic, but the
fundamental premise that any connection exists between
dancing and marriage.
People that marry can never part, but must go and keep
house together. People that dance, only stand opposite
each other in a long room for half an hour. . . . I
cannot look upon them at all in the same light, nor
think the same duties belong to them. (77)
Paradoxically, Henry later finds himself bound by gratitude
even more strongly in proposing marriage than in offering his
hand in the dance, as Austen turns his own simile against
him.
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CHAPTER III

DISCOVERING GRATITUDE: THE SEARCH FOR MORAL GUIDANCE
IN NORTHANGER ABBEY AND SENSE AND. SENSIBILITY
Northanaer Abbev reveals that growing up as a young
woman in Regency England is to experience brutality and de
ception, and that the lessons learned are one's own power
lessness in the face of hostile force end violence, expressed
as restraint, constraint, assault, and intrigue. Claudia
Johnson observes that "bullying of various sorts is rampant"
in Northanaer Abbev and that characters "resort even to phys
ical compulsion."1 Gratitude is also shown to be moral compul
sion which, however, may be a peaceful alternative to the at
tainment of objectives by physical force, although at first
it seems to serve the ends of oppression. Gratitude is liber
ated from serving tyranny by the claim on Henry Tilney that
Catherine Morland successfully opposes to the demands of his
father, General Tilney, who can claim the authority of filial
gratitude.
I must confess that his [Henry's] affection origi
nated in nothing better than gratitude, or, in other
words, that a persuasion of her partiality for him
had been the only cause of giving her a serious
thought. (243)
Nevertheless, Austen's narrative explanation that grati
tude is Henry's motive for proposing marriage seems gratu
itous. What purpose is served by this reader enlightenment? I
suggest that behind the story of Henry as the center of a
gratitude conflict between Catherine and his father, and be-
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neath his veneer of a civilized, worldly, mentor, Austen sees
Henry as sexually abusive and violent toward Catherine. His
■gratitude* may or may not be read as remorse, but does seem
to represent sort of a quid pro quo acknowledged toward his
victim. The narrative assurance of "perfect felicity* await
ing them (250) is heavy irony, since Austen has already in
terposed the obligation of gratitude for a scoundrel whose
offense reveals him incapable of love.
Austen, then, is telling two stories at the same time,
and she superimposes the lighthearted story of Catherine's
awakening from a gothic dreamworld on the nightmare of a
young woman's sexual victimization by adapting the genre and
traditions of the fable. Gratitude can be seen as the link
between the stories and genres.
In Northanaer Abbev. gratitude seems drained of emo
tional content. Instead, it means obligation, conduct, and
behavior, and seems to have little to do with the feelings.
The concept is that of a manifest "duty," Samuel Johnson's
first definition in his 1755 Dictionary, and not that of a
powerful "feeling," Johnson's second definition. In all other
Austen novels except for Northanoer Abbey and Sense and
Sensibility, gratitude is feeling, and a necessary ingredient
in love. Gratitude is also feeling in Samuel Hutcheson's phi
losophy, and the absence of any suggestion of Hutcheson's
philosophy suggests that Northanaer Abbev (originally Susan)
was composed before First Impressions (later published as
Pride and Prejudice), possibly even earlier than Elinor and
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Marianne,

the epistolary version of Sense and Sensibility,

written in Jane Austen's twenty-first year.2 Jan Fergus seems
to accept the chronology that places Susan as a later canposition than the original versions of the other two novels,
but contends that "in it Austen reverts to the inodes of bur
lesque and parody that she had enjoyed in the juvenilia."3
Although Susan clearly was revised, both before its sale to
Crosby in 1803 as well as prior to its contemplated publica
tion as Northanaer Abbev in 1813, I believe the role of grat
itude places it, not as a "reversion," but as a composition
much closer to Austen's Juvenilia, where there is a continu
ing challenge to the authority of gratitude, which is bur
lesqued and spoofed, as a kind of youthful rebellion against
an imposed and burdensome duty.
The germ of Austen's plot seems to be found in the epis
tolary Ladv Susan, dated by Chapman as probably composed in
1793 or the following year. The ogre in the earlier work cor
responding to the widower General Tilney is the widowed Lady
Susan, who holds her terrified daughter, Frederica, in fear
ful and abusive bondage, a bondage implied in the iron grip
of the General on his children in Northanaer Abbev. Lady
Susan's sister-in-law schemes to free Frederica from her
mother by attaching her to Reginald, a young man whom the
mother happens to have set her sights on as well. The sisterin-law describes her observations of the pair, and the quali
ties of the intended husband which she counts on for the plan
to work.
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I cannot help fancying that she is growing partial to
[Reginald], I so often see her eyes fixed on his face
with a remarkable expression of pensive admiration! .
. . I am much mistaken if a syllable of his uttering,
escape her.
I want to make him sensible of all this, for we
know the power of gratitude on a heart such as his; &
could Frederica's artless affection detach him from
her Mother, we might bless the day which brought her
to Churchill.4
Although there is gender reversal of characters, the plot
still relies on the power of gratitude to encourage a mar
riage proposal, and to free Frederica from her mother's
clutches, as it also releases Henry from his father's
tyranny. The erotic symbolism of Frederica's “eyes fixed on
his face’ also recurs in Catherine Morland's gaze of surren
der on Henry Tilney before his attack.
As I have suggested, claims to gratitude may empower the
powerless, but this power is costly. In Northanaer Abbev. the
quid pro quo of gratitude can also be seen as, perhaps, even
more like a pay-off to Catherine.

Gratitude is probed and

satirized in other works from the Juvenilia, and the chal
lenge always seems to be that the price, whether in moral
values or personal integrity, is too high.’ In “A Letter from
a Young Lady" in the miscellany collected as "Scraps,"5 the
writer willingly gives perjured testimony to support a fraud
ulent plaintiff, who "in gratitude waited on me the next day
with an offer of his hand" (MW 175). "Evelyn" (1792) is an
extended burlesque of excessive gratitude, which is pushed to
reductio ad absurdum. and

In "Jack and Alice" (1787-90),
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Lucy declines an offered life of comfort and security because
of the burden of gratitude.
Your Ladyship’s kind wish of my always remaining with
you, is noble and generous but I cannot think of be
coming so great a burden on one I so much love & es
teem. That one should receive obligations only from
those we despise, is a sentiment instilled into my
mind by my worthy aunt, in my early years, & cannot
in ny opinion be too strictly adhered to. (MW 27)
These youthful challenges to gratitude suggest an effort to
degrade its sacrosanct status, or at least to convert it from
a childhood burden to a resource for rebellion. The authori
tarian targets may be the law, as in "A Letter, • or parents,
as in Ladv Susan and Northanoer.
The burden in Northancrer Abbev that bears on the Tilney
children, as well as on Catherine, is General Tilney. Why
should Catherine’s claim to gratitude be superior to that of
Henry’s father? The General can also marshall gratitude’s
heavy artillery on his own behalf to demand that Henry obey
his directive to drop Catherine. The difference seems to be
that gratitude may create a constructive engagement to marry,
and therefore prior claims are subordinate to the performance
of this covenant. The child’s duty of gratitude to a parent
as inherent in the relationship itself is affirmed by a long
line of literary and philosophical texts. After humiliation
by Goneril, King Lear turns in pathetic desperation to her
sister, Regan.
Thou better know'st
The offices of nature, bond of childhood,
Effects of courtesy, dues of gratitude.
(Act 2, Scene 4, 169-71)
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What are the "dues of gratitude" owed under the "bond of
childhood?" Sir William Blackstone gives filial obligation
the force of law for the eighteenth century, based on "a
principle of natural justice and retribution.........For to
those who gave us existence we naturally owe subjection and
obedience during our minority, and honour and reverence ever
after.“6
Conversely, violation of the "bond of childhood" with a
parent is ingratitude, which David Hume denounces as a crime
that aggravates offenses against parents.
Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of
committing, the most horrid and unnatural is ingrati
tude, especially when it is committed against par
ents, . . .7
The paradigm for filial gratitude is found in an eighteenthcentury Anglican sermon to be the Christian's relationship
with God.
Our blessed Lord . . . represented his Father as al
together good, and kind, and lovely, and enjoined
obedience to him as a free tribute of gratitude and
love; as the homage of affection, not of fear; as the
duty of a son, not the work of a servant.8
Although fear does seem present in the Tilney children's
“homage* to their father, the General nevertheless has a
strong practical claim, in addition to cultural support, to
Henry's gratitude, since he owns the parsonage property and
controls the living at Woodston, where Henry now serves as
parish priest.
The house stands among fine meadows facing the south
east, with an excellent kitchen-garden in the same
aspect; the walls surrounding which I built and
stocked myself about ten years ago, for the benefit
of my son. It is a family living, Miss Morland; and
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the property in the place being chiefly my own, you
may believe I take care that it shall not be a bad
one. Did Henry’s income depend solely on this living,
he would not be ill provided for. (176)
Thus Henry's recognition of a ■superior" gratitude owed to
Catherine must overcome the formidable opposing claims of his
father. Further, the gratitude that motivates Henry, as well
as that invoked by Shakespeare and Blackstone, is recognized
as obligation or "duty, * unrelated to the "feelings." At
most, Henry's gratitude is a reasoned response to Catherine's
feelings, and a reversal of Dr. John Gregory's analysis of a
woman's response to a man's love.
— What is commonly called love among you, is rather
gratitude, and a partiality to the nan who prefers
you to the rest of your sex: and such a nan you often
marry, with little of either personal esteem or af
fection. Indeed, without any unusual share of natural
sensibility, and very peculiar good fortune, a woman
in this country has very little probability of marry
ing for love.9
Gregory's theory is based on the widely shared assumption
among his contemporaries that men are more passionate and ca
pable of love than women, and Austen seems determined to con
test this premise. After Catherine's first meeting and dance
with Henry, the narrator speculates on whether Catherine will
dream of him that night.
Whether she thought of him so much, while she drank
her warm wine and water, and prepared herself for
bed, as to dream of him when there, cannot be ascer
tained; but I hope it was no more than in a slight
slumber, or a morning doze at most; for if it be
true, as a celebrated writer has maintained, that no
young lady can be justified in falling in love before
the gentleman's love is declared, it must be very im
proper that a young lady should dream of a gentleman
before the gentleman is known to have dreamt of her.
(30)
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Hie “celebrated writer* is revealed in a footnote to be “Mr.
Richardson," writing in “Rambler“ #97, but the relationship
of initiative and response attributed to him shares the same
assumptions as Gregory's essay. Hie unvoiced comment in
Austen's humorous sally, of course, is how little these male
"authorities" know about women's feelings, and the absurd
logic which subjects the unconscious to a rule of behavior
mocks their assumptions, despite Austen's admiration for both
Richardson and Johnson.
Austen frequently presents gratitude as a sort of obli
gation incurred in response to the love of another, but she
seems to argue that it may equally well define man's response
to woman's affection, as it does for Henry Tilney, or indeed
be the precursor of love for both. In Persuasion, her last
novel, Frederick Wentworth speculates to Anne Elliot on the
possible explanation for the unlikely engagement of Captain
Benwick to Louisa Musgrove.
Had it been the effect of gratitude, had he learnt to
love her, because he believed her to be preferring
him, it would have been another thing. But I have no
reason to suppose it so. (182-3)
Gratitude here is seen as sufficiently powerful to overcome
the contrasts in temperament and character that would seem to
make their union improbable, but it does not necessarily
speak well for future happiness, or for the concordance of
feeling that eventually joins the hearts of Anne and
Frederick, and which readers are encouraged to believe will
also unite Henry and Catherine. Indeed, as obligation, grati
tude may be a potent threat to future happiness, as Wentworth
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himself realizes with dismay that, because of his own earlier
attentiveness to Louisa, he “was hers in honour if she wished
it."
He found too late, in short, that he had entangled
himself; and that precisely as he became fully satis
fied of his not caring for Louisa at all, he must re
gard himself as bound to her, if her sentiments for
him were what the Harvilles supposed. (242)
He is, fortunately, rescued by “the astonishing and felici
tous intelligence of her engagement with Benwick* (243).
Narrative

explanation of Henry Tilney's gratitude discloses

that he, too, recognizes the same constraints that Wentworth
acknowledges.
He felt himself bound as much in honour as in affec
tion to Miss Morland, and believing that heart to be
his own which he had been directed to gain, no unwor
thy reaction of a tacit consent, no reversing decree
of unjustifiable anger, could shake his fidelity, or
influence the resolutions it prompted. (247)
Since filial obedience to his father's directive turns out to
have been the basis of Henry's courtship, the argument seems
to be that the General must live with the consequences of
Henry’s success. Legal terms such as "bound,“ “tacit con
sent," and "decree" invest the argument with the judgment of
the moral court that General Tilney has waived his rights to
gratitude and assigned them to Catherine.
Austen, however, leaves final judgment of competing
claims to the reader, to whom she presents the moral question
that the novel is supposed to address, and which readers may
answer as they interpret the facts.
I leave it to be settled by whomsoever it may con
cern, whether the tendency of this work be altogether
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to recommend parental tyranny, or reward filial dis
obedience. (252)
But implied in the subtext is an equally sweeping moral ques
tion, "what price gratitude?" Catherines claim to Henry's
gratitude is power for the powerless, but she has gained it
at substantial personal cost. The form of the didactic moral
question that ends the novel also is characteristic of fables
and biblical parables, such as those enployed for moral or
religious instruction, texts with which Austen, who may have
been still in her teens, would be better acquainted than with
the works of moral philosophy that seem to inform her later
novels.
Another "fable" in Catherine's schooling is John Gay's
■The Hare and Many Friends," which "she learnt . . . as
quickly as any girl in England* (14). Gay's fable teaches a
lesson about human nature through bestial allegory just the
reverse of the biblical Good Samaritan parable.10 A hare, be
set by hounds, exhausts herself in evasive action, and begs
to be carried out of danger by, successively, a horse, bull,
goat, sheep, and calf. Each claims some kind of incapacity to
help, but says that the next animal to follow will surely
give the hare a ride. The calf, however, although the hare's
last hope, pleads that he would offend the others by helping
her after they had declined.
Should I presume to bear you hence,
Those friends of mine may take offence.
Excuse me, then. You know my heart,
But dearest friends, alas! must part.
How shall we all lament! Adieu.
For see the hounds are just in view.11
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The reader turns with the hare to see violent death at hand,
more terrifying in anticipation than the event itself. And
this fable is what Catherine "learnt as quickly as any girl
in England"? Although Austen may be seen as making some kind
of joke about moral instruction, I think the significance
lies in the meaning of "learnt." The mock drama of the novel
is that the adolescent Catherine is "training for a heroine"
(15), and "learnt" may mean that she learns the truth of this
fable in her own experience, not necessarily that she memo
rizes Gay's verse. Catherine, although not threatened by
hounds, finds herself regularly betrayed, forced, dropped, or
neglected by those in whom she places her trust. All of these
parables and fables inform Catherine's story, and their vio
lence represents a subtext commentary on what usually passes
for innocuous horseplay in Austen's comedy.
Catherine herself is the hare, but Austen's comic drama
masks forces that threaten her happiness quite as deadly as
the hounds and reveals the defenselessness of a young woman
against the

brutality of the ethical system she encounters

growing up. This system also unites the animals in their com
mon refusal to help the hare, who clearly cannot escape her
"space" that she shares with oppressors and presumed friends.
Gay's hare is female, but except for the generic labels of
"sheep* and "goat," all the other animals who might help her
are identified as male. The significance of this gender dif
ferentiation seems to be not that men are evil or ruthless,
but that their moral inertia, which sacrifices an innocent
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victim, is supported by a common system of values. There
seems to be almost an invisible fence that encloses the
hare's world, and she can only double back and zig-zag to
throw off the hounds and the ethical system that conspires
against her.
Like the hare, Catherine, too, must share the same space
with friend and foe. A seventeen-year old of Catherine's so
cial class does not expect freedom of movement, nor does she
hunger for it. Her social class is surrounded by an invisible
fence, quite as impenetrable as that which confines the hare.
In such confinement, where can Catherine look for guidance
and help in the personal choices that open up to her? At home
her father, the clergyman, says not a word throughout the
novel, nor are any thoughts attributed to him independent of
his wife, whose concerns are more with the health and school
ing of the six younger children. Both parents are only too
happy to have their family friends, the Allens, take their
eldest daughter off their hands. From Fullerton, Catherine is
conducted to Bath, chaperoned by the the Allens. Catherine
seeks direction from others, but Mrs. Allen, however, turns
out to be totally laissez faire, and Mr. Allen is too preoc
cupied with allieviating his gout and pursuing his own inter
ests to intervene, except with retrospective comments. Mrs.
Allen declines to advise Catherine on the propriety of ac
cepting invitations from the Thorpes for excursions from
Bath, leaving Catherine with no excuse to follow her con
flicting inclination to join the less insistent Tilneys, who
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nevertheless turn out to be manipulating her through polite
manners as she is overtly bullied and lied to by the Thorpes.
Her brother, James, might be expected to be an authoritative
source of guidance, but he is befuddled by love of Isabella
Thorpe, and reinforces their demands against the wishes of
his sister.
Catherine’s education at home is delegated to books, and
allowed wide latitude in her reading, she avoids "books of
information" (15), but gobbles up an eclectic diet of poetry,
gothic romance, Shakespeare, and Gay’s Fables. Ironically,
this mix seems to offer a more faithful foreshadowing of the
near future them morally instructive "books of information."
Catherine brings heme with her the mental cruelty she suffers
at the abbey, but finds no solace in her family's bosQm for
the rental anguish she betrays, which her mother attributes
to a let-down after enjoying the elegant life with the
Tilney's. In yet another parental abdication to textual in
struction, her mother runs off to fetch volume one of The
Mirror, which contains, she states, "a very clever Essay . .
. about young girls that have been spoilt for home by great
acquaintance,"12 which she expects will cure Catherine's
malaise (241). The real cure, of course, is presented as
Henry’s unexpected arrival and marriage proposal.
As is obvious to any reader, the novel both praises and
spoofs the popular gothic romance, in particular Ann
Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udoloho (1774), whose heroine is
pulled and pushed violently through a labyrinth of medieval
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geography, before emerging intact and happy. Claudia Johnson
argues that the “physical compulsion" in Northanaer Abbev
“emphasizes the political subtext of gothic conventions: her
[Radcliffe's] villain, General Tilney, is not only a repres
sive father, but also a self-professed defender of national
security.*13 Johnson seems to see the novel more as a politi
cal and cultural critique of Regency England, but I suggest
its principal concern is with the psychological anxieties of
a young woman, dependent on others for both security and hap
piness. Uncertain of her authority to make her own decisions,
as well as lacking the power to do so, she writes herself
into the scripts of the gothic novels she devours.
Both readings, however, are commonplace, and there is no
doubt that Catherine's predicaments reflect a political and
cultural context. Claudia Johnson also argues against inter
pretations that find that “Austen's parody in Northanaer
Abbev debunks gothic conventions out of an allegiance to the
commonsense world of the ordinary, where life is sane and de
pendable, if not always pleasant."
But by showing that the gothic is in fact the inside
out of the ordinary, that the abbey does indeed pre
sent a disconcerting double image, particularly for
bidding and arrogant to one who, like Catherine, does
not have an entree. Northanaer Abbev does not refute,
but rather clarifies and reclaims, gothic conventions
in distinctly political ways.14
As I have suggested, I think Johnson veers off hastily toward
a political interpretation, but I do agree that the novel re
veals "the gothic" to be more reality than fiction in
Catherine's experience. Nevertheless, I would argue that
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Catherine’s life is an overlapping of many texts, including
both ancient fables and biblical parables as well as Gay's
mo d e m satiric versions, and their biblical parable counter
parts.
Marilyn Butler sees "[a] 11 of Jane Austen's novels" as
■fables which act out traditional concepts of the qualities
and the role of the gentry, ■ specifically "a pointed adapta
tion of the Cinderella nyth."15 Butler's sweeping theory needs
more support than she provides, but certainly a number of fa
bles are combined in Northanaer Abbev. Like Radcliffe, Austen
eventually offers explanations that explain the apparently
marvelous in terms of the commonplace and probable, such as
Henry Tilney's debunking of Catherine's gothic fantasy about
the fate of his mother. For Mark Loveridge, the reader also
is expected to learn from the debunking of the marvellous.
The reading mind must be led to make an inference from
the narrative— the "fable"— to the moral that the fa
ble is designed to reveal (Austen reminds her readers
that novels and fables share interests, in her dis
creet reference in the first chapter to John Gay's fa
ble of "The Hare and Many Friends)."16
As I have suggested Catherine learns from experience that
there is no escape from the vicious "hounds" of life, unlike
gothic novels that find a safe haven for heroines.
Certainly if any safe haven were to beckon Catherine,
she should find security among the powerful and close-knit
Tilneys in the shelter of their "abbey." Yet Austen uses the
verb "seemed" to describe Catherine's impressions of the
Tilneys on the first two occasions of seeing them en famille,
which lends mysteriousness and a sense of illusion to her ex-
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periences, heightened by her feeling of "awe" in the
General's presence, whose progressive "metamorphosis* for
Loveridge includes transformation into a "repressive and ra
pacious ogre."17 "Awe" is the eighteeth-century response to
"the sublime" that suggests the immanence of supreme and per
haps occult power, dangerous even if not an immediate threat
to one’s personal safety, and Catherine's awe foreshadows the
evidence of that power, later to be directed at her. When the
mystery of the General's inexplicable volte-face is unrav
elled, Catherine is revealed to have been identified as a
suitably wealthy prospective bride for Henry, and maneuvered
into visiting Northanger Abbey under a strategy masterminded
by the General and executed by his children. Leaving Bath,
the caravan of coach and four, followed by Henry's curricle,
is like a troop movement. The trip is referred to as "their
journey into Gloucestershire," and the preposition "into"
seems to emphasize that Catherine is leaving one enclosed
space, only to enter another as captive, albeit a willing
one, of her hosts. Her path leads into increasing confinement
and restricted movement, until she is face-to-face with the
agent of her undoing, at the point of her least ability to
resist.
Her approach to the abbey grounds penetrates deeper into
a series of further enclosures, as she "found herself passing
through the great gates of the lodge into the very grounds of
Northanger," thence "actually under the Abbey walls," "be
neath the shelter of the old porch," and "passed on to the
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hall, . . " (161). Her survey of the grounds, conducted the
morning after her arrival, confirms that indeed she is cap
tive in a beautiful prison.
The whole building enclosed a large court; and two
sides of the quadrangle, rich in Gothic ornaments,
stood forward for admiration. The remainder was shut
off by knolls of old trees, or luxuriant plantations,
and the steep woody hills rising behind to give it
shelter, were beautiful even in the leafless month of
March. (177)
The setting is remarkably like another luxurious prison, the
Happy Valley in Samuel Johnson's fable, Rasselas. with which
Northanaer Abbev shares other similarities, as noted by Mark
Loveridge18 and Frederick Keener.19
The place . . . was a spacious valley . . . sur
rounded on every side by mountains, [from which]
rivulets descended that filled all the valley with
verdure and fertility, . . .
The sides of the mountains were covered with trees,
the banks of the brooks were diversified with flowers;
. . .All the diversities of the world were brought
together, the blessings of nature were collected, and
its evils extracted and excluded.20
Northanger Abbey is really a self-contained kingdom, and the
General impresses on Catherine the scope of his reign, which
extends to Henry's living and vicarage at Woodston, twenty
miles from Northanger. Enlarging on his philosophy that "every young man" should have "some employment," he notes that
"[e]ven Frederick, my eldest son, you see, who will perhaps
inherit as considerable a landed property as any private man
in the county, has his profession" (176).
Having drawn this vaguely defined but impressive map of
the kingdom, the General conducts Catherine on an inspection
of its attractions, particularly the "kitchen-garden."
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The walls seemed countless in number, endless in
length; a village of hot-houses seemed to arise among
them, and a whole parish to be at work within the in
closure. (178).
The whole domain, however, is a vast, comfortable, prison, as
the "countless walls" suggest, presided over by a master ar
tificer who creates botanical wonders such as pineapples
(178) in the hot-houses and kitchen-garden.
But only the wizard of fable could transform himself
once more into the ogre who inexplicably evicts Catherine,
even though a plausible explanation is later offered of the
General as the dupe of John Thorpe, who misled him about
Catherine’s wealth. Catherine is jolted into new proof of her
powerlessness, and even Eleanor again seems enchanted into
powerlessness as well, when she pleads with Catherine to for
give her for bearing the message of her expulsion.
. . . yet, I trust you will acquit me, for you must
have been long enough in this house to see that I am
but a nominal mistress of it, that iry real power is
nothing. (225)
Throughout the novel, Catherine’s powerlessness is re
vealed. Henry reminds her that in both "matrimony and dancing
. . . man has the advantage of choice, woman only the power
of refusal;" (77), but the sententious gravity of the state
ment is masked as flirtatious banter and dismissed by the
literal-minded Catherine, who is not disposed to look beyond
her enjoyment of the dance. John Thorpe lacks Henry’s grace
and sense of scene, but physically demonstrates Catherine's
powerlessness when he

contrives to get her into his car

riage. Catherine, however, finds that Thorpe has misled her

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

that the Tilneys had called off a prior engagement with her
when she sees them from the carriage.
"Stop, stop, Mr. Thorpe, . . . How could you tell me
they were gone?— Stop, stop, I will get out this mo
ment and go to them.* But to what purpose did she
speak?— Thorpe only lashed his horse into a brisker
trot; . . . Catherine, angry and vexed as she was,
having no power of getting away, was obliged to give
up the point and submit. (87)
If Catherine is indirectly restrained from leaping by fear of
injury, on the next occasion she is physically held back from
keeping her postponed date with the Tilneys. Further, her
brother, James, backs up the Thorpes by an appeal to sisterly
loyalty.
Isabella, however, caught hold of one hand; Thorpe of
the other; and remonstrances poured in from all three.
Even James was quite angry. (100)
But Catherine insists she will not be "tricked" into violat
ing her promise to the Tilneys, "[a]nd with these words she
broke away and hurried off" (101). Catherine must use her own
physicality to free herself from the combined holds of the
Thorpes.
Claudia Johnson argues that Henry Tilney is no better
than the other bullies, only "more polished" (37), and I also
think that Henry's toying with Catherine's unsophisticated
openness, under orders from the General to woo her, amounts
to manipulation little different from the use of force. But
his most severe assault is the reproof he administers to
Catherine's gothic novel reconstruction of the fate she con
cocts for General Tilney's deceased wife, whom she imagines
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either murdered, or possibly even alive but hidden away in
captivity.
Catherine finally penetrates to the innermost recesses
of the abbey in her clandestine investigation of the room
Mrs. Tilney had occupied. Her wide-ranging earlier surveys of
the premises obscured the reality that these chambers offered
only greater confinement, but this final compartment proves a
cul-de-sac when she is surprised by Henry’s unexpected re
turn. Using the same back stairs that gave Catherine access
to his mother's apartment as a shortcut to his own quarters,
he catches her red-handed at her most powerless moment, with
no way out.
For the reader of their ensuing conversation,
Catherine's efforts to change the subject from the true rea
sons for their unanticipated encounter are hilarious, but
Henry sees through the awkward efforts of an unskilled pre
varicator and fills her in on the sad but commonplace circum
stances of his mother's illness and death nine years earlier.
After dispelling her illusions, he turns to Catherine’s lurid
imaginative version.
"And from these circumstances," he replied, (his
quick eye fixed on her's,) "you infer perhaps the
probability of some negligence— some— (involuntarily
she shook her head) — or it may be— of something less
pardonable." She raised her eyes towards him more
fully than she had ever done before. (196)
What is this meeting of "his quick eye" with hers, "raised .
. . towards him more fully than she had ever done before?"
Why should this be the occasion for Catherine to deliver her
self, body and soul, with the symbolic sexuality of direct
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gaze? At this point, Catherine still clings to her psycholog
ical investment in the idea of General Tilney having aided or
abetted his wife's death in some way. Her illusions are her
clothes but, unlike the nythical deluded Emperor, she senses
the imminent threat of nakedness. By “rais[ing] her eyes to
wards him more fully than she had ever done before, ■ she
pleads with Henry, he of the "quick eye," who has the power
to cover or expose her shame. His response is to disrobe her
ruthlessly.
"If I understand you rightly, you had formed a sur
mise of such horror as I have hardly words to— Dear
Miss Mbrland, consider the dreadful nature of the sus
picions you have entertained. What have you been judg
ing from? Remember the country and the age in which we
live. Remember that we are English, that we are
Christians. Consult your own understanding, your own
sense of the probable, your own observation of what is
passing around you— Does our education prepare us for
such atrocities? Do our laws connive at them? Could
they be perpetuated without being known, in a country
like this, where social and literary intercourse is on
such a footing; where every man is surrounded by a
neighborhood of voluntary spies, and where roads and
newspapers lay every thing open? Dearest Miss Morland,
what ideas have you been admitting?" (197-8)
Mark Loveridge sees this verbal "assault* as "closer to bul
lying," echoing Claudia Johnson's view of the whole novel,
but he seems to minimize the damage to Catherine.
She may be an object of burlesque and ironical humor,
and she may be the abused and distressed good-hearted
heroine; at the end of the previous chapter, abused
and distressed by Henry himself.21
However, Catherine’s purgation of gothic fantasies seems to
disguise a text of sexual violence, whose vocabulary intrudes
into the civilized discourse. Henry begins his attack with
"Dear Miss Morland," a familiarity that degrades her from the
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respectful salutation of “Miss Morland, “ and closes with her
further degradation to “Dearest Miss Morland, “ accused of
“admitting," a term with overtones of unchastity, “ideas"
which Henry replaces as he assumes possession and authority.
Catherine's roam is at hand by the end of this assault, to
which she flees “with tears of shame, “ exposed and wounded.
Next to Henry's violation of Catherine, her eviction by
the General is minor punishment that leaves her person un
scathed. Gratitude succeeds in securing her abuser as her
husband, but at the same time seems to validate abuse.
Austen's didactic “either-or“ question at the novel's end
plays on the authority of the morally instructive fable or
parable, but it may also reveal that Austen herself is unsure
of the true worth of gratitude. Her questioning of gratitude
continues in Sense and Sensibility, before she grants it in
Pride and Prejudice the positive role for human happiness ar
gued by Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Sherlock. Although grat
itude also leads to love and marriage in later novels, it
never again serves the ends of sexual oppression.
In Sense and Sensibility22. Jane Austen directly con
fronts the question of whether firm adherence to the stoical
virtues can lead to personal happiness, and her answer to
that question is "no.“ She seems to present a “what if"
world— "what if" our lives were ruled by the stoic values,
which among eighteenth-century moralists are encoded in the
moral philosophy of John Balguy and the so-called “intellectualists." These values seem to offer philosophical support
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for the contemporary views of woman’s passion and sexuality
offered in Dr. John Gregory's 1774 A Father's Legacy to his
Daughters.23 The consequences of Austen's exploration of a
stoic world are so grim that she seems to waiver, unable to
leave Marianne Dashwood a sacrifice to their logic, and the
hurried patching together of relationships at the end of the
novel suggest a distancing from the world she has created.
Why, then, do scholars such as Park Honan claim that
Jane Austen “absorbed a strict Christian and stoic morality, “
and that “a stoical Christian faith underlies all of Jane
Austen's comedies.“24 The reason may be that such readings
confuse Austen's moral philosophy with that of Sense and
Sensibility's heroine, Elinor Dashwood, who does espouse
stoic principles, and who even seems to reach back to early
classic stoic ideals that underlie their Christianized adap
tation. The well-known model for texts of classical philoso
phy is that of the master who guides his students in the
search for wisdom. This model is particularly apparent in
Stoic philosophy, such as Epictetus, and it also character
izes the role and comments of Elinor.
Elinor . . . possessed a strength of understanding,
and coolness of judgment, which qualified her, though
only nineteen, to be the counsellor of her mother, . .
. [H]er feelings were strong; but she knew how to gov
ern them: it was a knowledge which her mother had yet
to learn, and which one of her sisters [Marianne] had
resolved never to be taught." (6)
Elinor's role as "counsellor," supported by the verbs "learn"
and "taught," reinforce the narrative stoic model of mentor
and students, and anticipate the classroom tone of much of
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Elinor's direct commentary.25

Elinor's views closely reflect

those implicit in the writings of John Balguy/ who in turn is
representative of the eighteenth-century "rationalist" or
■intellectual" school, which incorporates Stoic absolutism.
For the intellectuals, deductive reasoning leads to the proof
of absolute moral truth and virtue. 26
What the intellectualists want to assert is . . . that
there are certain acts, or classes of acts, which are
virtuous or vicious in all relations and circum
stances. They instance 'keeping faith and performing
equitable covenants and equity' [Samuel Clarke],
'making a virtuous agent happy' [Richard Price], and
gratitude.27
Elinor demonstrates her wholehearted commitment to all these
principles, even when they seem to dash her own hopes of per
sonal happiness.
Selby-Bigge's example of "gratitude" as always "virtu
ous" for the "intellectualists" is found in John Balguy's The
Foundation of Moral Goodness (1728), which is an extended re
sponse to Hutcheson's An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good or
Evil (1725) . Gratitude is a point of controversy between the
■intellectualists" and the "moral sense* or "sentimentalist"
philosophy championed by Hutcheson. If gratitude is always
virtuous, then it must command our responses, even where
obeying the dictates of gratitude seems to conflict with per
sonal happiness. This issue is dramatized in Elinor's
predicament, and places Austen in the thick of this philo
sophical controversy.
The opposition implied in the novel's title is mislead
ing. Austen does not personify in Elinor and Marianne "head"
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and “heart" alternatives. Rather, “sense* seems to mean “un
derstanding through the senses, “ and “sensibility" the judg
ment of emotions that guides understanding. Events of the
novel contradict and challenge Elinor's espoused principles,
creating a series of paradoxes so incredible that her ideas
and principles, however well motivated, ultimately are dis
credited. I see this conflict of events with Elinor's princi
ples as Austen's dialogue with her heroine, which implicitly
affirms that principles must be tested by their contribution
to happiness, a central tenet of Francis Hutcheson's “moral
sense- philosophy. The verdict of events, then, seems to deny
that Elinor's stoic values can heal the troubled soul of her
sister Marianne.
Since the dialogue between Austen and her "heroine"
picks up a continuing philosophical debate, Honan correctly
places Austen in that same Christian-based moral discourse,
but he fails to see that the authorial presence distances it
self from classic principles which clash with the Christian
ethic, even though the debt to classical philosophy is ac
knowledged. The marriage of Marianne and Colonel Brandon may
be seen as Elinor's victory in this debate, but I believe
that Austen wishes to show the reader that the victory is a
Pyrrhic one, and that Marianne pays a terrible price for
Elinor's triumph.
This conflict between Austen and Elinor requires that
the reader infer the moral or philosophic authorial point of
view from the clash of events -with Elinor's principles, un
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like Pride and Pre-iudice. where I argue that reader, author,
and heroine seem to move together, not always in the right
direction, but ultimately guided to moral knowledge and a
happy ending by the informing presence of Francis Hutcheson
and Thomas Sherlock. However, not until Persuasion, the last
published novel, is there an explicit statement that suggests
consequences may render the final moral verdict on decisions.
When Anne Elliot reflects that following the advice to break
her youthful engagement may have been "one of those cases in
which advice is good or bad only as the event decides" (246),
Austen seems to confirm her commitment to the test of ulti
mate happiness that Hutcheson urges as the standard of moral
evaluation. Hutcheson's philosophy in Sense and Sensibility
is less convincing, because the stoic-rationalist school,
through Elinor, attacks his “moral sense" and theory of
•Affections" where he is most confused and vulnerable.
Instead of the reconciliation of events with principle
in Pride and Pre-iudice through the testimony of disinterested
witnesses, Sense and Sensibility relies on complex plots and
subplots, as well as the use of "surrogates," to establish
the emotional distance necessary for sound judgments of char
acter. Consequently, characters destined for future union are
forbidden most direct contact with each other. Elinor
Dashwood and Edward Ferrars barely brush each other on their
way to the altar, unlike Elizabeth Bennet and Fitzwilliam
Darcy who, although separated for an important interval, nev
ertheless are joined in a personal history of direct negotia-
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tions. The pre-marital relationship of Marianne and Colonel
Brandon is even more remote than that of Elinor and Edward,
who at least share an unsaid mutual affection throughout.
Colonel Brandon's love for Marianne, however, is both unde
clared as well as unreciprocated, and ultimately relies on
encouraging the latter's "esteem" to bridge the gap.
Marianne's "sensibility," driven only by her emotions,
does not represent a philosophical alternative to stoicism.
Her headlong plunge toward disaster, however, raises the
question of

passion's role in love, a question avoided by

moralists. Here Austen seems both to acknowledge and chal
lenge the observations of Dr. John Gregory, who argues that
passion is both a quality as well as a burden generally af
flicting men rather than women. By setting Marianne's tumul
tuous passion against Elinor's cool, if flawed, philosophy,
Austen seems to demand that moral philosophy address, not
dodge, woman's passion. The term that links the moral philos
ophy issues and the gender views of Gregory with the novel is
•esteem.•
"Esteem" appears to be the product of gratitude and a
moral response which may or may not lead to "romantic" love,
but if not is offered as an acceptable surrogate. Without es
teem, however, no enduring love is possible. Elinor's consis
tently authoritative and pedagogical voice supports this the
sis, which is contested by her pupils, her mother and
Marianne, in their discussion of the budding relationship be
tween Elinor and Edward Ferrars. In a conversation organized
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like schoolroom instruction, Mrs. Dashwood contrasts him fa
vorably with his miserly sister, Fanny.
■It is enough," said she; "to say that he is unlike
Fanny is enough. It implies everything amiable. I love
him already.■
■I think you will like him,* said Elinor, "when you
know more of him. ■
■Like him! * replied her mother with a smile. "I can
feel no sentiment of approbation inferior to love."
■You may esteem him."
"I have never yet known what it was to separate esteem
and love." (16)
"Love" clearly is the higher valued term and swallows esteem
in Mrs. Dashwood's conflation. But the even more impulsively
romantic Marianne rejects esteem altogether in condemning
Elinor for the inadequacy of her affection for Edward.
"I do not attempt to deny," said she [Elinor],
"that I think very highly of him— that I greatly es
teem, that I like him. *
Marianne here burst forth with indignation—
"Esteem him! Like him! Cold-hearted Elinor! Oh!
worse than cold-hearted!" (21)
This issue is played out in the pages of the novel and appar
ently resolved when Marianne finally is offered as a sacri
fice to those principles which Elinor affirms as moral men
tor. By word and exaitple, Elinor attempts to rescue Marianne
from the nearly fatal enslavement to her passions, but
Elinor's instruction proves helpless to convert Marianne and
finally irrelevant as well to her own happiness. Instead of
learning from Elinor, Marianne gets deathly sick, and Elinor,
committed to the mind's transcendence of the body's passions,
also fails to recognize the gravity of Marianne's physical
afflictions. Her "care" for her sister is really blindness to
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the language of the body, which almost causes Marianne’s
death.28
Elinor’s consistent supression and denial of romantic
love seems to reflect the discomfort of the moral philosopher
who attempts to deal with the relationship of passion and
virtue. Francis Hutcheson finds it necessary to exclude
erotic attraction in distinguishing the forms of virtuous
love and assigning a place for "esteem."
The Affections which are of most Importance in
Morals, are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but
different Modifications of these two original
Affections. Now in discoursing of Love toward rational
Agents, we need not be caution’d not to include that
Love between the Sexes, which, when no other
Affections accompany it, is only Desire of Pleasure,
and is never counted a Virtue. Love toward rational
Agents, is subdivided into Love of Complacence or
Esteem, and Love of Benevolence.29
Hutcheson's classifications do little to clarify the ambigui
ties in this passage. Is “Esteem" an alternative to
“Complacence" as the object of the preposition "of," or is it
an alternative to "Love?"

Further, Hutcheson’s introduction

of "Complacence" complicates the already murky discussion.
The confusion seems to arise from Hutcheson's insistence that
all forms of love are broadly included among the
"Affections," even though he tries to exclude "that Love be
tween the Sexes."
The "rationalist" John Balguy seizes on Hutcheson's con
fusion to attack his "moral sense" philosophy in The
Foundation of Moral Goodness. Starting from the primacy of
reason and the mind, rather than "affections" produced by
“instinct," Balguy claims that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

we esteem Virtue or moral Rectitude upon its own
Account; that our Affection for it [virtue], is not an
instinctive Determination, but raised and produced in
the Mind by the intrinsick Worth and Goodness of the
Object.30
Having made "Affection* a product of, and subject to, reason,
he has no trouble locating "Esteem" as an identifiable and
separate "Affection" in its own right and not as part of
Hutcheson's

messy continuum of "instinct," at one end of

which is the troublesome "Love between the sexes." Balguy
asks rhetorically "whether that Esteem, Admiration,
Complacency which Virtue produces, be no Affection?", and
concludes that "[a]n Object that is and appears Self-good, or
intrinsically excellent, must necessarily produce Esteem and
Admiration in all minds capable of perceiving it."31 Although
he disclaims their influence on his thought, Balguy*s eleva
tion of reason as the highest faculty for ascertaining moral
truth closely resembles the classical stoic principle of
virtue as an end in itself, a guiding principle for Elinor
without regard to the conflict of compelling personal selfinterest .
Austen, however, widens this debate among moralists into
the very nature of love as passion, from which Hutcheson dis
tances himself, but on which Marianne insists, at the great
est peril to her health, virtue, and chastity. But her pas
sion fails to find a philosophical "home," and Marianne's
claim for the legitimacy of passion seems denied in the con
trived marriage tw Brandon. In later novels, Austen salvages
and stengthens Hutcheson's philosophy as a modus vivendi, but
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here her objective primarily seems to be to expose Elinor's
rationalist system as lethal to personal happiness.
Austen must contend, not only with the texts of moral
philosophy, but with received wisdom about woman's passion,
and its relationship to marital choice, as authoritatively
presented by the Edinburgh physician and moralist, Dr. John
Gregory, in A Father's Legacy. Gregory bases his observations
and advice on perceived emotional differences between men and
women.
The natural hardness of our hearts, and strength of
our passions, . . . make us less susceptible of the
finer feelings of the heart. Your superior delicacy,
your modesty, and the usual severity of your educa
tion, preserve vou. in a good measure from any tempta
tion to those vices to which &£ are most subjected.32
Austen seems to offer Marianne as a flat contradiction of
Gregory, and even Elinor's outward composure disguises that
"her feelings were strong," although "she knew how to govern
them." Uncontrolled passions lead to folly and dangerous in
discretions for all principal characters of both sexes, with
the exceptions of Elinor and her invidious rival, Lucy
Steele.
Given his assumed emotional dichotomy between men and
women, Gregory goes on to trace the process of courtship.
Some agreeable qualities recommend a gentleman to your
common good liking and friendship. In the course of
his acquaintance, he contracts an attachment to you.
When you perceive it, it excites your gratitude; this
gratitude rises into preference; and this preference,
perhaps, at last advances to some degree of attach
ment, . . .33
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This process by which "gratitude" is the initial "exciting"
affection is exactly mirrored in all Austen's works, but
where it leads is less clear. Gregory, too, waffles on the
results of gratitude and acknowledges only that it leads to
"preference," and then to "some degree of attachment."
Esteem, however, is recognized as a product of the process
for women.
A man of taste and delicacy marries a woman because
he loves her more than any other, a woman of equal
taste and delicacy marries him, because she esteems
him, and because he gives her that preference: . . *34
Gregory, then, recognizes a clear distinction between "love"
and "esteem," which is consistent with the difference im
plicit in the connotation of these terms as deployed by moral
philosophy, whether “moral sense" or "rationalist."
Elinor has no problem with the role of esteem that
Marianne violently rejects, and for Elinor it is a source of
emotional support, while Marianne is drowning in passion. In
contrast with her appraisal of Marianne’s despair at
Willoughby's faithlessness, Elinor's "own situation gained in
the comparison; for while she could esteem Edward as much as
ever, however they might be divided in future, her mind might
always be supported" (179). italics in the text emphasize
that Elinor's esteem succeeds in overcoming her repugnance at
the approaching marriage of Edward and Lucy Steele, because
it is based on the greater moral value she recognizes in his
doing his "duty" by respecting an engagement to a woman
Elinor is confident he no longer loves.
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It would seem that the novel's task, through its moral
mentor, Elinor, is to redirect Marianne's affection to a
stronger support through the development of esteem for the
worthy Colonel Brandon, a formidable challenge with
Marianne's expressed contempt for that affection. The oppor
tunity is what I call the "surrogate" seduction, as Colonel
Brandon unveils it in an extended narration (205-10) to
Elinor. The story told by Brandon reveals that Willoughby has
a prior history as a seducer of Brandon's former ward and
daughter of Brandon's once-loved and wayward cousin. In con
trast to this convoluted plot and the bathos of Brandon's
narration, the "real" seduction of Lydia by Wickham in Pride
and Prejudice directly involves the principal players and
throws Elizabeth and Darcy together.
Why does Austen choose this roundabout off-stage drama
involving Willoughby and two characters who figure only in
this subplot? First, it clearly will not do for Marianne ac
tually to be seduced by Willoughby. The experience might be
instructive, but her future would be destroyed. The lesson is
not lost on Marianne, although she acknowledges to Elinor the
danger only in the somewhat tangled syntax of her post-illness discussion: "'— What in a situation like mine, but a
most shamefully unguarded affection could expose me to'— "
(345). But more important than the lesson in life, learned
without personal cost, is that the knowledge not only in
volves a victim unknown to Marianne, but is inparted to her
via Elinor, to whom it is already second-hand information.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117

Marianne thus is called upon to judge virtue and vice from as
disinterested a perspective as Austen can contrive.
Since this knowledge comes to Marianne after she already
has learned of Willoughby's marriage, her mental attitude is
affected only to the extent of becoming "settled in a gloomy
dejection" (212) . The plus side of the experience, however,
is that Elinor "saw with satisfaction the effect of it, in
her no longer avoiding Colonel Brandon when he called, in her
speaking to him, even voluntarily speaking, with a kind of
compassionate respect, . . . "

(212). Marianne is edging

closer to "esteem, “ although she must undergo a symbolic
death and resurrection to cast aside her old repugnance, and
accept esteem as the basis of a relationship, and the path
leads through gratitude.
When Mrs. Dashwood observes the convalescent Marianne as
she expresses gratitude to Colonel Brandon for his "fetching
her mother" during her illness, the mother "persuaded herself
to think that something more than gratitude already dawned"
(340). Mrs. Dashwood's ready romanticism, which she shares
with Marianne, leads her to impetuous and usually wrong con
clusions. Elinor, who also is present, seems only to be ana
lyzing Brandon's motives, and we are not given her thoughts
about Marianne, who seems to be emerging from illness with a
revised outlook. Filtering an ambiguous observation about the
changed Marianne through the unreliable, and scarcely disin
terested Mrs. Dashwood, makes any conjectures about meaning
almost hopelessly problematic. All can agree on Marianne's
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gratitude, since she acknowledges what the circumstances call
for. But has "somthing more than gratitude already dawned?"
And if so, what is it? We can be fairly sure that the "some
thing more" for Mrs. Dashwood is her version of love, but it
later becomes clear that the "something more" indeed is es
teem.
There seems to be no disagreement among Hutcheson,
Balguy, and Austen that esteem is highly prized. All would
support the idea that gratitude leads to esteem, which Austen
sees as a step in the growth of love that must not be by
passed, unlike Mrs. Dashwood, who seems to look on gratitude
as more of a hurdle than a stage in a process. But where
Austen parts company with moral philosophy, and with Elinor,
is on the acceptability of esteem as a "surrogate" for that
love on which future happiness depends in marriage. Dr.
Gregory, on the other hand, offers physiological support to
moral philosophy in suggesting that passionate love such as
Marianne's is uncharacteristic for women, and instead claims
that *[w]hat is commonly called love among you, is rather
gratitude," leading to marriages "with little of either per
sonal esteem or affection."35 Gregory suggests that the rela
tionship may stop at the level of gratitude, and if so the
marriage offers little in the way of permanent happiness or
satisfaction to the partners. However, if gratitude leads to
"personal esteem" gr "affection," the physician's prognosis
is more favorable, and thus it is not surprising that Mrs.
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Dashwood is encouraged to see the growth of ‘something more
than gratitude" in Marianne’s feeling toward Colonel Brandon.
As I suggest in ny discussion of Northanaer Abbey.
Gregory’s Legacy seems even more overt in Henry Tilney's mar
riage proposal to Catherine Morland (243). In both novels,
Austen reverses the emotions Gregory assigns to men and
women. She leaves open, of course, the possibility that
■something more" may ‘dawn" for Henry, as Mrs. Dashwood hopes
for Marianne. But to the extent that "passions" and "affec
tion" are linked by Gregory with men, the options for
Marianne’s response appear limited to "esteem." However, de
spite Marianne’s revulsion at "esteem," there seems to be no
philosophical or psychological "space" for woman's passion in
love. Cultural attitudes, moral philosophy, and Gregory’s
medical authority join in a powerful phalanx that eventually
crushes Marianne, a conclusion toward which Austen appears
reluctantly driven.
She was b o m to overcome an affection formed so late
in life as at seventeen, and with no sentiment supe
rior to strong esteem and lively friendship, voluntar
ily to give her hand to another! (378)
The encoded message seems to be “she was b o m to be hanged,"
and the term "voluntarily" is subverted and undermined by the
determinism of "was b o m to.■
But Austen again seems to be dissatisfied with the way
her own story keeps denying Marianne a vital role in her fu
ture, and she ends her concluding remarks on the marriage
with Brandon by giving us, once again, the old Marianne.
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Marianne could never love by halves; and her whole
heart became, in time, as much devoted to her husband,
as it had once been to Willoughby. (379)
These internal contradictions, which follow each other in
closely connected paragraphs, leave the moral meaning ambigu
ous. The didactic narrator seems to be saying on the one
hand, "believe this," and on the other offering contradictory
evidence. "Show" fails to confirm "tell," "head" to rule
"heart." As I have suggested earlier, this conflict of events
with stoic philosophy is Austen's dialogue with Elinor, and
the severest commentary on Elinor's stoic moral view is
Marianne's victimization. Indeed, she is reduced to the sta
tus of a commodity “by general consent, to be the reward of
all" in the settling of "obligations" to Brandon (378).
Janet Todd argues that Marianne's fate in marrying
Colonel Brandon is itself a kind of death.
Sense and Sensibility, which, in
Marianne and the shadowy Elizas,
ing the Clarissa plot, mocks and
the female victim: ultimately it
scream of Marianne into sensible

the stories of
comes close to invok
stifles the agony of
socializes the near
rational discourse.36

Todd seems to read Austen's approval of this ending. Instead,
I believe that Austen pleads for Marianne's rescue from the
disaster which is facilitated rather than prevented by the
faulty principles of Elinor's stoic philosophy, and the rapid
narrative reversals on Marianne's later history reflect, if
anything, authorial unhappiness at Marianne's victimization.
In a sense, Elinor "wins" the contest of values with
Marianne, by seeing her married (after her own, ironically,
"romantic" marriage) "with no sentiment superior to strong
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esteem and lively friendship." Power, therefore, is on
Elinor’s side, allowing her and others virtually to ■sell’’
Marianne to satisfy "obligations." However, the body's de
nial, which the stoic system endorses, not only is reflected
in Elinor's blindness to Marianne's near-mortal illness be
fore she is sacrificed in marriage, but also mandates that
Elinor sacrifice her own and Edward’s happiness to its prin
ciples. As in the gratitude that secures Henry Tilney for
Caterine Morland in Northancrer Abbev. Austen shows that the
triumph of virtue can exact a terrible price.
Elinor's self-identification with stoic values is nearly
overt in her reflections on Mr. Palmer's snide, affected, and
contemptuous manner, who otherwise displayed "no traits at
all unusual in his sex and time of life."
He was nice in his eating, uncertain in his hours;
fond of his child, though affecting to slight it; and
idled away the mornings at billiards, which ought to
have been devoted to business. She liked him, however,
upon the whole much better than she had expected, and
in her heart was not sorry that she could like him no
more;— not sorry to be driven by the observation of
his Epicurism, his selfishness, and his conceit, to
rest with complacency on the remembrance of Edward's
generous temper, simple taste, and diffident feelings.
(305).
“Epicurism" sums up this catalogue of Mr. Palmer's qualities,
and Elinor's "complacency" in noting Edward's opposite quali
ties, of course, is a refracted endorsement of her own
"Stoic" values.
The first instance of Elinor's commitment at all costs
to such values is her incredible respect for a "vow* of se
crecy, which Lucy Steele deviously extracts from her. Selby-
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Bigge calls attention, in the comments at the beginning of
this discussion, to "keeping faith" as among "acts which are
virtuous . . . in all relations and circumstances" for "intellectualists" such as Balguy. This is also a central stoic
virtue, and among those admired by Cicero, who models his Ds.
Officiis on the principles and practices of the Stoics.
But in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not
what one may have to fear in case of violation but
wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance
backed by religious sanctity; . . . For the question
no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is
no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good
faith.37
“Religious sanctity" as Cicero uses it is quite different
from vows sanctioned by their concurrence with Christian be
lief, where the nature and subject matter of the vow are sub
ject to their conformity with doctrine. An extreme but famil
iar example would be the "pact with the devil," but even a
vow that conflicts merely with future happiness would have
questionable religious authority, so long as the "happiness"
pursued was virtuous. For Cicero and the Stoics, no qualifi
cations can mitigate the absolute sanctity of vows, and their
model is the story of Regulus, which has an exact parallel in
Elinor's promise of secrecy to Lucy.
Cicero offers the story of Regulus as a praiseworthy ex
ample of the high value placed by stoicism on fidelity to the
absolute virtue of abiding by vows, despite the appeal of
"utilitas." translated in the Loeb edition of De Officiis as
"expediency" or "best interests." Regulus, whose name echoes
the Latin term "regula" or "a rule, pattern, model,"38 as a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

prisoner of war is sent by his captors, the Carthaginians,
■on parole, sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain
noble prisoners of war were not restored to the
Carthaginians, ■ who he knew would punish his failure by death
from torture. "His apparent interest was to remain in his own
country, to stay at home with his wife and children, ■ either
ignoring the vow, or at least using his influence to have the
prisoners released. Nevertheless, he refused to do either,
holding that "he was not a member of the senate so long as he
was bound by the oath to his enemies, ■ and he returned emptyhanded to his promised execution at Carthage where he was
■slowly put to death by enforced wakefulness.*39
Not only does this tale sanctify vows destructive of
family ties, it also appears that one can be put under oath
to an enemy merely by seeming to permit, through silence, an
assumption of compliance. Regulus goes through the motions of
his mission, performing the letter if not the spirit of the
tacit compliance assumed by the Cathaginians, and he knows
that the consequence will be death. Elinor also finds herself
drawn into Lucy's confidence almost by default, although she
does not as yet know where it will lead. Lucy prefaces her as
yet unrevealed disclosures with “I am sure I should not have
the smallest fear of trusting vou" (128), followed by the
revelation of her four-year engagement to Edward, and closes
the trap on Elinor by concluding "I never should have men
tioned it to you, if I had not felt the greatest dependance
in the world upon your secrecy" (129) . Lucy recognizes a
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stoic character when she sees one, and understands how to ma
nipulate it to the detriment of everyone's best interests and
happiness except her own.
Elinor knows that revealing this secret of an engagement
repellent to the Ferrars family might well wreck the marriage
plans and thus serve her own hopes, as well as rescue Edward
from his own unwise and youthful "vow" which engaged him to
Lucy. But Elinor seems unmoved by considerations of utilitas
in her single-minded commitment to confidentiality. When the
secret comes out anyhow because of the indiscretion of Lucy's
own sister, Elinor is free to reveal it to Marianne, who has
assumed all along the de facto engagement of Elinor and
Edward, and who thus finds incomprehensible Elinor's with
holding of such information for four months. When Marianne
asks wonderingly, "how have you been supported?", Elinor reples:
By feeling that I was doing my duty.— *ty promise to
Lucy, obliged me to be secret. I owed it to her,
therefore, to avoid giving any hint of the truth; . .
I have very often wished to undeceive yourself and my
mother, . . . but without betraying my trust, I never
could have convinced you. (262)
The reader is more likely to share Marianne's incredulity
than accept Elinor's extraordinary self-denial on behalf of
Lucy, who is quite as deadly an enemy as the Carthaginians.
Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) offers a view of stoic princi
ples which seems generally in accord with Marianne's mystifi
cation, as well as representative of eighteenth-century
moralist opinion, including Francis Hutcheson, who otherwise
more often differed with Clarke.
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For though virtue is unquestionably worthy to be cho
sen for its own sake, even without any expectation of
reward; yet it does not follow that it is entirely
self-sufficient. and able to support a man under all
kinds of sufferings, . . . Here therefore began the
error of the Stoics; who taught that the bare practice
of virtue, was itself the chief good, . . . And the
suitable practice of some few of them, as of Regulus
for instance, who chose to die the cruellest death
that could be invented, rather than break his faith
with an enemy; is indeed very wonderful and to be ad
mired. But yet, after all this, it is plain that the
general practice of virtue in the world, can never be
supported on this foot.41
Clarke, also a Christian moralist, even if opposed to "moral
sense" philosophy, cannot accept virtue as "entirely selfsufficient," or an end in itself, because it must emanate
from God and therefore mirror the Deity. Further, the example
of Regulus virtually justifies self-destruction in order to
respect the obligation of vows, which is anathema to
Christian doctrine, regardless of the sanctity of vows.
Elinor's sacrifice of her and Edward's mutual love and future
happiness to this same principle, in order to keep Lucy's se
cret, amounts to self-destruction of the spirit.
Interestingly, it is the recovered Marianne who recoils with
horror at what she sees as her own flirtation with suicide.
My illness, I well knew, had been entirely brought on
by myself, by such negligence of my own health, as I
had felt even at the time to be wrong. Had I died,— it
would have been self-destruction. (345)
Marianne's confession is laced with religious contrition, re
morse, and resolve to lead a more regulated, as well as a
Christian, life.
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Elinor, on the other hand, appears to look back at preChristian values. Indeed, in adhering to her promise to Lucy,
she seems to distance herself even from Balguy, who acknowl
edges that the "Stoicks . . . had noble Ideas of Virtue, . .
. but unaccountably forgot, or overlooked the Constitution of
Human Nature.":
And hence they fell into great Extravagance, and a
kind of Enthusiasm. Wrapt up in Admiration of moral
Good, they seemed not to regard any other. Had they
considered that they were sensible Beings as well as
moral, they could not easily have imagined that Virtue
alone was self-sufficient. Their Scheme therefore must
be unnatural and indefensible; I mean exclusively of a
future State, the only Support of Virtue in Adversity
and extreme Cases.42
Considerations of a "future State," of course, are expressly
rejected by Cicero when he says, in the passage quoted ear
lier on the sanctity of vows, that "the question no longer
concerns the wrath of the Gods (for there is no such thing)
but the obligations of justice and good faith."
Concern with a "future state," however, is central to
Judeo Christian belief. Milton presents the conflict between
"pagan" philosophy and Christianity in Christ's temptation in
the wilderness by the devil, who tries to persuade Jesus to
accept into his doctrine the received wisdom of the ancients.
Jesus rejects the authority of all these philosophical sys
tems as "Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm," and
saves his most explicit rebuttal for stoicism.
The Stoic last in Philosophic pride,
By him call'd vertue; and his vertuous man,
Wise, perfect in himself, and all possessing
Equal to God, oft shames not to prefer.
As fearing God nor man, contemning all
Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death and life,
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Which, when he lists, he leaves, or boasts he can,
For all his tedious talk is but vain boast.
Or subtle shifts conviction to evade.
Alas what can they teach, and not mislead;
Ignorant of themselves, of God much more,43
Elinor's stoic values appear even before she is made privy to
Lucy's and Edward's engagement, when she is disturbed by
Edward's "desponding turn of mind" manifested at the unex
plained

termination of his visit with the Dashwoods, and

which
left an uncomfortable impression on Elinor's feelings
especially, which required some trouble and time to
subdue. But as it was her determination to subdue it,
and to prevent herself from appearing to suffer more
than what all her family suffered on his going away,
she did not attempt the method so judiciously employed
by Marianne, on a similar occasion, . . . (104)
This total reliance on her own personal resources suggests
the self-referential stoic virtue criticized by Balguy and
decried by Milton as "Ignorant of themselves, of God much
more." The reference to Marianne's histrionics on
Willoughby’s departure as “method so judiciously employed"
is, of course, ironic, and contrasts with Elinor's successful
efforts to surmount her emotion by her combined denial of the
passions and

fidelity to absolute virtue.

Samuel Johnson offers in his Dictionary an apparently
non-committal definition of "Stoick" as “[a] philosopher who
followed the sect of Zeno: holding the neutrality of external
things," but his example suggests that he too shares a nega
tive view.
While we admire
This virtue, and this moral discipline,
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Let's be no stoicks. nor no stocks. I pray.
Johnson's fourth definition for "Stock" is "[a]man prover
bially stupid," and he uses the same Shakesperian quotation
to illustrate his meaning.44
But it could also be argued that Elinor's fidelity to a
vow made to her enemy becomes an empty gesture, since events
work in her favor with Anne Steele's indiscretion in disclos
ing the secret, unlike the fated consequences for Regulus.
Therefore, Austen devises a second exercise that puts her
stoic principles to a more severe test. Elinor is called
upon, by the dictates of gratitude to Colonel Brandon, to
play a key role in salvaging Edward's and Lucy's marriage,
apparently wrecked only a few pages earlier without involving
any breach of Elinor's obligation of secrecy. Elinor has just
received Colonel Brandon's commission to offer the living of
Delaford to Edward Ferrars, which she immediately recognizes
will remove the financial impediment to his marriage, due to
his mother's earlier threat to disinherit him when she learns
of his engagement with Lucy, and so must snuff the remnants
of hope for Elinor from postponement of the nuptials. Mrs.
Jennings, from another part of the room, observes but does
not hear the conversation with Brandon and assumes that
Elinor's emotional response is to a proposal of marriage.
Her [Elinor's] emotion was such as Mrs. Jennings had
attributed to a very different cause;— but whatever
minor feelings less pure, less pleasing, might have a
share in that emotion, her esteem for the general
benevolence, and her gratitude for the particular
friendship, which together prompted Colonel Brandon to
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this act, were strongly felt, and warmly expressed.
(283)
This lengthy narrative sentence encapsulates the key princi
ples of eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Brandon's benev
olence is "general"

because not tainted by "particular" re

gard or self-interest, since he scarcely knows Ferrars. His
friendship for Elinor, however, is allowably "particular,"
since presumably she is involved only as a messenger of his
"benevolence." Further, Elinor's "esteem" reflects the prin
ciples of the propagation of virtue in the response of a
“witness" to an act of benevolence, even though Brandon's
benevolence is at cross-purposes with her own desires.
Nevertheless, nothing in this scenario seems to explain why
Elinor's "emotion" compells her to be the messenger, whose
tidings pass the sentence of death on the messenger's hopes,
except the key responses of "esteem" and "gratitude," which
overwhelm "whatever minor feelings less pure, less pleas
ing. "45
How can gratitude alone propel Elinor to this distaste
ful mission? Elinor's response here puts her in the camp of
the "intellectualists," in particular Hutcheson's critic,
Balguy, whose credo is laid down in Part I of his work.
To be determined to the doing a good Action merely by
the Reason and Right of the Thing, is genuine
Goodness; this is the purest and most perfect Virtue
of which any Agent is capable.46
Elinor respects this principle in accepting her commission
from Brandon, answering in the affirmative Balguy's rhetori
cal question, "might we not possibly be induced to attempt
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the Relief of a Person in Distress, merely from the Reason of
the Thing, and the Rectitude of the Action?*47 The “induce
ment," or more properly the “command,* is Balguy*s key “al
ways right" virtue of gratitude: “Thus a Person obliged acts
rightly and reasonably, when his Actions are answerable to
the Relation of Gratitude between him and his Benefactor."48
Hutcheson finds a complex web of “exciting* or “justify
ing* “reasons* for actions,49 which would tend to interpose
the objections of Elinor's and Edward's undoubted love for
each other to Elinor's acceptance of Brandon's mission.
Balguy takes specfic objection in The Foundation of Moral
Goodness to Hutcheson's categories of “exciting reasons* by
asking “whether that esteem, admiration, complacency which
virtue produces, be no affection? and, whatever they may be
called, whether they may not excite to election?*
However pleasure may be the consequence or appendage
of virtue, yet, strictly speaking, it is not the end
of a moral agent, nor the object of a moral affection,
but virtue alone, antecedent to all considerations,
and abstracted from every natural good.50
Elinor's mission is totally alien to her self-interest and
can only be explained by an equally total commitment to the
imperative virtue of gratitude, as well as to her idea that
she is serving the cause of virtue by facilitating Edward's
unhappy duty to fulfill his misguided vows to Lucy Steele,
despite the endorsement of this ancient stoic virtue by
Balguy and other eighteenth-century rationalists.
Thus, Elinor's decisions mirror those “acts, which are
virtuous . . .

in all relations and circumstances," as Selby-
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Bigge describes "intellectualist" principles in the passage
quoted at the beginning of this discussion. Since the vow to
Lucy Steele, however, goes well beyond "keeping faith and
performing equitable covenants and equity, ■ it must be based
on pre-Christian stoicism, which Austen seems to argue is at
the root of Elinor's philosophy. A slavish obedience to the
■always right" virtue of gratitude, and to "making a virtuous
agent happy," are the only possible explanations for Elinor's
performance as messenger for Brandon (the "virtuous agent")
in conveying to Edward the news of the living which seems
guaranteed to push him into the marriage with Lucy so painful
to both him and Elinor. Austen's *exposure" of Elinor's moral
system also incriminates Balguy's absolutism, but Elinor is
unchanged at the end of the novel, even if Austen seeks to
discredit her stoic values. The conversion of her character,
and values, remains unfinished business for the novelist.
Elinor’s philosophy reappears in Fitzwilliam Darcy of
Pride and Pre-iudice. whose repellent personality sets him up
for the transformation he eventually undergoes, unlike the
invulnerable shield of goodwill that preserves Elinor, de
spite the flaws of her values. But between the acceptance for
publication of Sense and Sensibility in 1810, and the revi
sion of First Impressions into Pride and Prejudice which oc
cupied Austen during the following year, it seems that Austen
must have made, or greatly improved, her acquaintance with
the Hutcheson and Sherlock texts that inform the later nov
els. These texts offer the philosophical basis for the au
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thority of feelings against Elinor’s and Darcy’s stoic ratio
nalism. Feelings energize both the resentment that places
Elizabeth Bennet and Darcy in hostile opposition, as well as
the growth of their mutual gratitude which prepares the way
for the novel’s happy ending.
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CHAPTER IV

GRATITUDE TRIUMPHANT IN PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

Early in Pride and Prejudice. Elizabeth Bennet's disdain
for Darcy escalates into resentment, when she learns that he
has successfully blocked Jane's budding romance with Bingley,
and thus is responsible for her sister's unhappiness.
Elizabeth's refusal of Darcy's astonishing marriage proposal
triggers resentment in him as well, but by the end of the
novel, resentment has been converted into gratitude toward
each other. This shared "conversion'' is a measure of the
moral journey both must take to find love, since resentment
is the polar opposite of gratitude, although both "arise from
the same constitution of the passions," as Samuel Johnson
points out in Rambler #4.
Thus men are observed by Swift to be 'grateful in the
same degree as they are resentful.' . . . [Yet] it
follows not that they [resentment and gratitude] will
be equally indulged when reason is consulted; yet un
less that consequence be admitted, this sagacious
maxim becomes an empty sound, without any relation to
practice or to life.
Nor is it evident, that even the first motions to
these effects are always in the same proportion. For
pride, which produces quickness of resentment, will
obstruct gratitude, by unwillingness to admit that in
feriority which obligation implies; and it is very un
likely that he who cannot think he receives a favor
will acknowledge or repay it.1
Johnson incisively diagnoses the kind of "pride" that charac
terizes Darcy/ although Elizabeth’s resentment is more in
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sympathy with the injury to Jane, who herself is a moral
paragon, exemplifying the highest standards of benevolence,
itself the summit of virtue for Hutcheson as well as most
eighteenth-century sentimental moral philosophy-2
Further, Jane's benevolent disposition should make her
happy, and Francis Hutcheson contends that it should also be
recognized by others with responses of gratitude and approba
tion.
That disposition therefore which is most excel
lent, and naturally gains the highest moral approba
tion, is the calm, stable, universal good-will to
all, or the most extensive benevolence. And this
seems the most distinct notion we can form of the
moral excellency of the Deity.
Another disposition inseparable from this in men,
and probably in all beings who are capable of such
extensive affection, is the relish or approbation of
this affection, and a naturally consequent desire of
this moral excellence, and an esteem and good-will
of an higher kind to all in whom it is found. This
love of moral excellence is also an high object of
approbation, when we find it in ourselves by reflec
tion, or observe it in another. . . . This desire of
moral excellence, and love to the mind where it re
sides, with the consequent acts of esteem, venera
tion, truth, and resignation, are the essence of
true piety toward God.3
Yet Jane's demeanor hides heartbreak at the probable end of
her growing relationship with Bingley, although she struggles
to make her benevolence triumph over personal disappointment.
Instead of the "approbation,“ "esteem," and returns of grati
tude such behavior is supposed to encourage, Jane is dis
carded by the Bingley entourage, with the encouragement of
their moral custodian, Fitzwilliam Darcy.
Jane's behavior is analyzed by three close observers,
her sister Elizabeth, Darcy, and Charlotte Lucas. A compari
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son of their points of view tends to confirm Francis
Hutcheson's sentimental approach to benevolence and gratitude
as the novel's moral voice, particularly his 1725 An Inquiry
Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
For Hutcheson, virtue should manifest itself to an im
partial observer through a direct appeal to the "moral
sense." The obvious failure of observation as a reliable
guide to character assessment of Jane and others in Pride and
Pre-iudice seriously undermines this fundamental principle, by
the operation of which virtue is supposed to be propagated
and socialized through observation of its workings in others,
to the gratitude and happiness of all concerned.4 Austen sug
gests that a principle reason for the failure of observation
to give correct readings is that women are not seen as capa
ble of the highest benevolence and thus are denied full par
ticipation in the discourse of virtue.
But judgment based on observation is flawed, regardless
of gender. The sifting of evidence, particularly as offered
by reliable witnesses, must correct the false readings of the
senses. The truth of Darcy's benevolence is determined by
Elizabeth through a discovery process which simulates a
courtroom inquiry into the credibility of witnesses, followed
by an evaluation of testimony. Since the testimony of the
housekeeper at Pemberley, Mrs. Reynolds, is crucial, the in
quiry into credibility also suggests that Austen insists on
women's full participation in the discourse of virtue.
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Subject to the intrusion of key women, the moral philos
ophy apparently endorsed in these dramas concurs with the
•moral sense* theories of Francis Hutcheson. The exception to
this claim is Austen's implied questioning of the reliability
of human observations, which must be evaluated by the exer
cise of reason on the testimony of witnesses. Here the influ
ence of Austen's favorite sermon writer, Thomas Sherlock, is
evident, although Hutcheson also acknowledges that reason may
have a role, subject to the primacy of the ■moral sense,"
which should otherwise unerringly sniff out the presence of
benevolence.5 Nevertheless, the role of reason does not un
dercut the authority of feeling, and does not convert Austen
into the "rationalist* found by some scholars.6
Both Hutcheson and Sherlock ground their arguments and
examples in religious paradigms, which suggests the high se
riousness of the moral issues at stake in the novels.
However, the idea of benevolence advanced by Hutcheson, un
like that offered later by Bishop Butler and others, requires
no overt acts or “capacity,“ but only a state of mind or
■disposition" toward mankind, like God's love for His cre
ation. Nevertheless, this disposition should shine through
and be recognized by observers with “approbation.* Certainly
Jane has minimal opportunity to make a tangible impact with
her benevolent disposition. Her virtue, however, goes unrec
ognized and unrewarded, except by her sister Elizabeth.
"My dear Jane!“ exclaimed Elizabeth, “you are too
good. Your sweetness and disinterestedness are re
ally angelic; I do not know what to say to you. I
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feel as if I had never done you justice, or loved
you as you deserve. . . .
You wish to think all the world respectable, and
are hurt if I speak ill of any body. X only want to
think vou perfect, and you set your mind against it.
Do not be afraid of my running into any excess, of
my encroaching on your privilege of universal good
will. You need not. There are few people wham I re
ally love, and still fewer of whom I think well. The
more I see of the world, the more am I dissatisfied
with it; and every day confirms my belief of the in
consistency of all human characters, and of the lit
tle dependence that can be placed on the appearance
of either merit or sense. (135)
Some allowance must be made for Elizabeth's agitated emotions
at Bingley's sister's frigid letter, which announces their
departure from the neighborhood and dashes Jane's hopes of a
growing relationship with the brother, before we identify
Elizabeth as a bitter skeptic of human nature. Nevertheless
she does, like Hutcheson, see Jane's benevolence as other
worldly ("angelic") and uses Hutcheson's phraseology
("universal good will") to differentiate Jane's character
from her own.7
If Elizabeth understands Jane's benevolence, Darcy
misses it altogether. In his apologia letter to Elizabeth,
after she forcefully rejects his avowal of love and implicit
marriage proposal, he notes Jane's behavior, but attributes
it only to a well-mannered girl disinclined to encourage a
prospective suitor.
Your sister I also watched.— Her look and manners
were open, cheerful and engaging as ever, but with
out any symptom of particular regard, and I remained
convinced from the evening's scrutiny, that though
she received his attentions with pleasure, she did
not invite them by any participation of sentiment.—
. . . I shall not scruple to assert, that the seren
ity of your sister's countenance and air was such,
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as might have given the most acute observer, a con
viction that, however amiable her temper, her heart
was not likely to be easily touched.— (197)
Although Darcy claims that “the most acute observer" would
back him up in concluding that his observations of Jane
demonstrated her lack of “particular regard" for his friend
Bingley, his claim may testify as much to his own blindness
and insensitivity as it does to Jane's effacement of her emo
tions. Darcy is a stoic, even more than Elinor Dashwood of
Sense and Sensibility, and both his self-justification for
shielding Bingley from Jane, as well as his recantation at
the novel's end, give Austen smother opportunity to expose
stoic values as destqyers of human happiness.
Darcy does not deny Elizabeth's accusation of his inter
ference between Jane and Bingley, but instead prides himself
on his role in obstructing the progress of their relation
ship.
I have no wish of denying that I did everything in
my power to separate ny friend from your sister, or
that I rejoice in my success. Towards him I have
been kinder than towards myself. (191)
The stoic puts aside all merely sensual gratification to pur
sue what is seen as the course of virtue. Darcy is guided by
the central Stoic principle that virtue is its own reward, as
expressed by Epictetus.
“Is there no reward then?“
“Reward! do you seek any greater reward for a good
man than doing what is right and just?“
The Harvard Classics editor notes that "Epictetus is a main
authority on Stoic morals,

[and emphasizes] the importance of
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cultivating complete independence of external circumstances.'8
Darcy, of course, cares little for the feelings of those in
jured by his pursuit of what he sees as the greater good, as
he makes clear in his explanatory letter, which he delivers
to Elizabeth the next day.
If I have wounded your sister's feelings, it was un
knowingly done; and though the motives which gov
erned me may to you very naturally appear insuffi
cient, I have not yet learned to condemn them.
(199).
A 1675 collector of Stoic teaching writes approvingly that
■these generous Philosophers' insist that "their wise man'
should be 'as little concerned for his Neighbors afflictions
as for his own disasters," and ask 'Can we not be charitable
without being afflicted?'9 But Darcy's confidence that he can
both determine and act for the greater good is, for Milton's
Jesus, only “Philosophic pride / By him ['the Stoic*] call'd
vertue.■
Alas what can they teach, and not mislead;
Ignorant of themselves, of God much more,10
Milton focuses on the preeminence given by the Stoics to
teaching virtue, which Jesus condemns as worthless due to
their ignorance "of themselves" and "of God." Epictetus
states the Stoic position.
He that hath no musical instruction is a child in
Music; he that hath no letters is a child in
Learning; he that is untaught is a child in Life.11
Austen directs the Stoic reverence for teaching against Darcy
himself at the novel's end and thus educates him in the defi
ciencies of his own Stoic values. She seems to anticipate the
lessons he must learn in Elizabeth's early conversation with
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him at the piano, where Elizabeth responds to his claim to
lack "the talent" for sociability.
"My fingers," said Elizabeth, "do not move over
this instrument in the masterly manner which I see
so many women's do. . . . But then I have always
supposed it to be my own fault— because I would not
take the trouble of practising." (175)
Elizabeth seems to adapt Epictetus's mode of argument by
analogy, and she even plays with the connection of musical
and moral instruction, as she also simultaneously "plays" on
the piano and on Darcy.
As yet Elizabeth does not know of Darcy's agency in sti
fling the budding romance of Bingley and Jane, whose suffer
ing is unseen, even as it is unimportant, to the Stoic Darcy.
However, not only Darcy, but a modem critic also sees Jane's
be' wior as no more than “a struggle to suppress her love for
Bingley through many weeks when she believes that it is not
returned," ignoring the earlier clear explanation by
Elizabeth of Jane's benevolent disposition.12 But why must
Jane signal her partiality so flagrantly to Bingley himself?
Elizabeth argues with Charlotte Lucas that "[i]f X can per
ceive her regard for him, he must be a simpleton indeed not
to discover it too." Charlotte counters "that he does not
know Jane's disposition as you do" (22) . Charlotte has no il
lusions about the necessity of making one's preference known,
regardless of the virtuousness of "universal good will," or
the self-protection of emotional privacy.
If a woman conceals her affection with the same
skill [as she uses in public concealment] from the
object of it, then she may lose the opportunity of
fixing him; . . . There is so much of gratitude or
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vanity in almost every attachment, that it is not
safe to leave any to itself. . . . In nine cases out
of ten, a woman had better shew more affection than
she feels. Bingley likes your sister undoubtedly;
but he may never do more than like her, if she does
not help him on. (22)
Charlotte's wisdom seems like a follow-up to Austen's comment
at the end of Northanaer Abbev that Henry Tilney's "affec
tion" for Catherine Morland "originated in nothing better
than gratitude" (243), and the bottom line in Charlotte's ut
ter realism is that self-interest is the only sensible guide
for a marriageable woman. Bingley, like Darcy, appears to
find it impossible to discern affectionate partiality in a
woman who tries to practice the virtue so praised by
Hutcheson. Thus Charlotte advocates not hypocrisy but practi
cal wisdom in advising "a woman to shew more affection than
she feels."
What Austen seems to be suggesting is that a benevolent
disposition in a woman appears only as disinterest, where the
range of her allowable responses is acceptance or rejection
of an eligible suitor. In the passage quoted earlier from A
System of Moral Philosophy. Hutcheson conventionally employs
what appears to be the universal "in men" diction, but fol
lows this phrase with the clause "and probably in all beings
who are capable of such extensive affection, ■ that is, a
■disposition" toward benevolence. Hutcheson does not reveal
what "beings" he has in mind, but the addition of this quali
fying clause appears to make "in men" no longer a universal,
but gender specific. Darcy and Bingley, then, may be excused
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by the standards of moral philosophy if they fail to recog
nize and respond to Jane’s benevolence, since a woman may not
qualify as a 'being" who is 'capable' of such qualities.
Jane's stillborn benevolence, then, demonstrates that
the xnoralism which informs this world is gender skewed and
excludes women as participants in the process of observation
and the judgment central to moralist claims for the propaga
tion of virtue and happiness. For Hutcheson, this process
does not work unless benevolence calls forth gratitude, which
in Austen's novels requires that men and women participate as
full partners in the discourse of morality and virtue. Thus
Austen seems to showcase the moral blindness of Darcy and
Bingley in order to emphasize that Hutcheson’s theories earn
their validity only through full gender equity. This gender
equity is seen by Claudia Johnson as defiant.
In endowing attractive female characters with rich
and unapologetic senses of self-consequence, Austen
defies every dictum about female propriety and def
erence propounded in the sermons and conduct books
which have been thought to shape her opinions on all
important matters.
But shortly after this claim, Johnson comments on Austen’s
'device of centering her novels in the consciousness of unem
powered characters--that is, women."13 Johnson's reading of
Austen leads her into contradictions, since it is difficult
to polarize Austen in some sort of oppositional role in a
presumed "debate" (a term featured in Johnson). Johnson is
right, however, that the serious and complex moral issues in
these novels have tended to be neglected by critics, since
M[t]he fact that Austen is a female novelist has made assess-
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merits of her artistic enterprise qualitatively different from
those of her male counterparts.* Johnson cites as an early
example the 1821 review of Archbishop Whately, who 'praises
Austen for declining the didactic posture—

. . . and for

opting instead to hint at matters of serious concern inobtrusively and unpretentiously."14 More recently, C.S. Lewis
speaks up for Austen's moral assertiveness, but interestingly
his commendation is also couched negatively in charting the
moments of "undeception" for her characters. As I have dis
cussed, his observation that in her novels "[t]he great ab
stract nouns of the classical English moralists cire unblushingly and unconpromi singly used"is suggests a presumptuous
woman out of her element, and Lewis seems to be endorsing
Austen while at the same time claiming masculine prerogative
to limit the significance of her presence.
While claiming an equal role for women in shaping the
discourse of virtue, Austen does not seem to challenge the
discourse itself. For example, Johnson clearly recognizes
Elizabeth Bennet and Emma Woodhouse as "empowered," while
Jane Bennet is certainly "unempowered, * but these "empowered"
women only find happiness, not by distancing themselves, as
Elizabeth does from Jane's standards, but by recognizing, ac
cepting and responding to benevolence and gratitude. The pro
cess of joining the discourse, as I have suggested, requires
learning gratitude, while not rejecting "partiality." This is
the shaping of the discourse, because the "unempowered" Jane
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adheres to a standard of virtue which insists on “universal
good will" and the suppression of partiality.
Hutcheson's system does allow for “partiality* {or “par
ticular regard,* as Darcy terms it) as more focused benevo
lence, so long as the dictates of self-interest are subordi
nate, and not the “only* motive. Although the successor and
defender of Shaftesbury, in permitting partiality Hutcheson
allows a latitude in virtue which Shaftesbury rules out in An
Inquiry Concerning Virtue (1699).
But lest any shou'd imagine with themselves that
an inferior Degree of natural Affection, or an im
perfect partial Regard of this sort, can supply the
place of an intire, sincere, and truly moral one; .
. . we may consider first, That PARTIAL AFFECTION,
or social Love in part, without regard to a com
plete Society or Whole, is in it-self an
Inconsistency, and implies an absolute
Contradiction.16
It does appear that Jane aspires to emulate this
Shaftesburnian ideal of affectionate feeling for the
"species," or "universal good will," which she combines with
a sort of stoicism in the suppression of her feelings, seen
by Darcy as "the serenity of your sister's countenance and
air." These two value systems, sentimental and stoic, usually
are presented as incompatible, although each has been indentified by scholars with Jane Austen's point of view. Hoyt
Trowbridge traces philosophical influences, primarily as rep
resented in Pride and Prejudice.
The ethical and psychological premises which order
Jane Austen's depiction of character and action are
not stoical, for it is assumed that the capacity to
think and the capacity to feel are equally human.17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

Yet no definitive conclusion about Austen as "sentimen
tal* or "stoic" can be supported by the interpretations and
critique of Jane’s behavior offered either by Elizabeth,
Darcy, or Charlotte, since the observations of all are unre
liable or clouded with self-interest. Jane’s predicament
does, however, ask the question, can partiality work for per
sonal happiness within a system of virtue? Hutcheson offers
an affirmative answer, in which benevolence may be necessar
ily partial, and surrenders none of its power to generate
gratitude and love by being so focused.
But there is nothing will give us a juster Idea
of the wise Order in which human Nature is form'd
for universal Love, and mutual good Offices, them
considering that strong attraction of Benevolence,
which we call Gratitude. . . . Now because of the
vast Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habitations,
and the incapacity of any one to be remarkably use
ful to vast Multitudes; . . . whose Interests, at
vast distances, we could not understand, nor be ca
pable of promoting, . . . NATURE has more power
fully determin’d us to admire and love the moral
Qualities of others, which affect our selves, and
has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will
towards those who are beneficient to our selves;
which we call Gratitude; and thus has laid a
Foundation for joyful Associations in all kinds of
Business, and virtuous Friendships. . .
This universal Benevolence toward all Men, we
may compare to the Principle of Gravitation, which
perhaps extends to all Bodys in the Universe; but,
like the Love of Benevolence, increases as the
Distance is diminish'd, and is strongest when Bodys
come to touch each other.18
Hutcheson is notorious, if not unique, for applying mathemat
ical and scientific analogies to morality, and Newton is a
favorite, of course, because of his religious orthodoxy.
However, Hutcheson's claim to scientific method introduces a
relativism into virtue that "would hardly have satisfied
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Shaftesbury's demand for an *intire, sincere, and truly
moral• Affection to counter that 'imperfect partial‘ variety
. . ."19 Further, the scientific calculus of gravitation seems
to prove that benevolence and gratitude fuse in a kind of
unity when, under their combined pull, "Bodys come to touch
each other," without necessarily cancelling each other out.
That this is the product of such a calculus is suggested by
Hutcheson's inclusion of gratitude among the "nearer and
stronger Degrees of Benevolence," and then singling it out
for special emphasis in the above passage as "that strong at
traction of Benevolence, which we call Gratitude."
The proof of this calculus in Pride and Pre-iudice is
that Elizabeth's awareness and experience of Darcy‘s benevo
lence generates gratitude, which in turn is manifested by a
desire to return the benevolence,20 and this is the process by
which gratitude flourishes into love. Even the hard-boiled
Charlotte Lucas recognizes gratitude's role in prefacing her
advice with the observation that "[tjhere is so much of grat
itude or vanity in almost every attachment," although her
cynicism cheapens the more worthy sentiment with "vanity" as
an alternative motive. But yet, Elizabeth's feeling begins,
not in responding to Darcy's direct attentions, but from the
correction of her earlier flawed observations through the
testimony of witnesses.21 Before this process begins,
Elizabeth is in the clutches of resentment because of Jane's
shoddy treatment by the Bingley swells, aggravated by her
learning of Darcy's intervention. Had Jane's true nature been
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appreciated, gratitude would be the expected response and
would have been shared by an observer.22
Resentment, as I have suggested, is the basis for
Elizabeth’s rejection of Darcy's profession of love, even
though she recognizes that social convention seems to call
for a different response.
In such cases as this, it is, I believe, the es
tablished mode to express a sense of obligation for
the sentiments avowed, however unequally they may
be returned. It is natural that obligation should
be felt, and if I could feel gratitude, I would now
thank you. (190)
Indeed, Elizabeth’s first reaction is that "she could not be
insensible to the compliment of such a man's affection," be
fore she is fully "roused to resentment . . . "

(189). In re

jecting Darcy, and in holding gratitude to the test of her
feelings, Elizabeth also claims exemption from "the estab
lished mode," which seems to find that the award of "such a
man's affection" by itself creates an "obligation" in its re
cipient .23
Just as Elizabeth’s resentment arose, not from direct
offense to herself, but from the injury to her sister Jane's
feelings, her eventual conversion to gratitude begins with
the evidence of Darcy's kind and benevolent treatment of oth
ers, evidence which relies on the testimony of a key witness,
the housekeeper at Pemberley. Why does Austen choose this in
direct approach, in which the conversion of Elizabeth's feel
ings is accomplished without any direct contact with Darcy
subsequent to her reading his explanatory letter after his
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rebuff, until their awkward encounter in company with the
Gardiners at Pemberley? That the mind, informed only by the
passions of the moment, is an unreliable observer is a com
monplace observation on the theme of this novel. Reliable
knowledge of truth requires some degree of emotional dis
tance, and the importance of the truth bears a direct rela
tionship to the importance of the testimony of mediating wit
nesses, particularly where judgment based on direct observa
tion may be skewed by self-interest.
Clearly, “witnessing" is essential to knowledge of the
highest “truth." Jane Austen's favorite sermon writer, Bishop
of London Thomas Sherlock, wrote an enormously popular mock
courtroom drama, The Trial of the witnesses of_ the
Resurrection of Jesus. The Trial begins as a group of collegeal members of the London bar reflect on the recent con
viction of Thomas Woolston for publishing tracts denying the
miracles.24 They decide to argue among themselves, according
to strict rules of legal procedure, the credibility of the
witnesses to the greatest attested miracle, the Resurrection
itself.25 While the cosmic importance of this central event
for Christians may seem a long stretch from Austen's corned/,
there is nothing more central to Pride and Prejudice than the
“truth" of Darcy's character, and the penumbra of Christian
epistemology shadows the search for this truth.
Witnessing to the events and miracles of Christ's life
and death is stressed in the narratives of Christ's apostles,
recorded in the Bible as the "Gospels," as confirmation of
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their historical authenticity. Jesus himself, at his interro
gation by Pilate on the eve of the Crucifixion, also testi
fies to his role as a witness.
To this end was I bom, and for this cause came I
into the world, that I should bear witness unto the
truth.26
In Sherlock's work, a key argument of counsel defending
the witnesses distinguishes the Resurrection of Jesus from
that claimed for "Mahomet," on whose own affirmation alone
believers in his ascension must rely (349-50). Darcy's testi
mony in his own behalf, in the letter he hands Elizabeth the
morning after her spirited rejection, clearly is subject to
similar discounting as self-serving.
She put down the letter, weighed every circumstance
with what she meant to be impartiality— deliberated
on the probability of each statement— but with lit
tle success. On both sides it was only assertion.
(205)
But the substantive details Darcy's letter recites of
Wickham's villainy, Elizabeth's inability to recall any posi
tive contradictory information, and his offer of Colonel
Fitzwilliam as a corroborating witness, as well as Darcy's
own justifications for misreading of Jane's emotions, earn
him at least provisional credibility.
Yet even if Colonel Fitzwilliam or other witnesses were
to testify in Darcy's behalf, Elizabeth still must accept as
believable the possibility of his good character, just as
counsel attack the witnesses to the Resurrection by arguing
against the very possibility of such an event, so that the
defense must establish its consistency with natural law.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156

And what has the gentleman [counsel] said, upon
this occasion, against the resurrection, more than
any man, who never saw ice, might say against an
hundred honest witnesses, who assert that water
turns to ice in cold climates? (395)
Quite clearly, a continued insistence on the impossibility of
well-attested fact would require the maintenance of a blind
prejudice. Although up to this point in the novel Elizabeth
■had been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd" (208), there is
enough of a residue in her mind of directly gleaned informa
tion about Darcy, that she cannot reasonably dismiss testi
mony which is not inconsistent with her own knowledge.
[I]n farther justification of Mr. Darcy, she could
not but allow that Mr. Bingley, when questioned by
Jane, had long ago asserted his blamelessness in
the affair [of Wickham's money problems]; that
proud and repulsive as were his manners, she had
never, in the whole course of their acquaintance, .
. .seen any thing that betrayed him to be unprinci
pled or unjust— any thing that spoke him of irreli
gious or immoral habits. (207) .
Here, of course, Bingley is the witness, and his testimony
given not to Elizabeth but to her sister, which emphasizes
the impartiality of Elizabeth's judgment. Religion rarely is
foregrounded in this novel, but finding Darcy free of ■irre
ligious or immoral habits" calls attention to Trowbridge's
■Christian coloring," and connects Elizabeth's inquiry with
Sherlock's mock investigation.
Elizabeth undergoes no instantaneous reversal of feel
ing, although, as she reflects further on Darcy's letter,
■his disappointed feelings became the object of compassion.
His attachment excited gratitude, . .

but she could not ap

prove him" (212) . Yet the process of love has begun, because
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Elizabeth's compassion is itself a form of benevolence, and
evidence of the transformation of gratitude and benevolence
found by Hutcheson "when Bodys touch each other."27 The pro
cess receives a strong impetus with the visit to Pemberley#
and the warm testimony on Darcy’s behalf by the housekeeper,
Mrs. Reynolds, who offers unsolicited praise of her master's
benevolence, concluding that "[h]e is the best landlord, and
the best master . . . that ever lived" (249) Elizabeth evalu
ates the worth of this testimony highly, since "[w]hat praise
is more valuable than the praise of an intelligent servant?"
(250).
This entire inquiry, since Elizabeth received Darcy’s
letter, is conducted in his absence, with Elizabeth sitting
in judgment on evidence submitted to her. Austen seems to
"empower" her, as Claudia Johnson observes, for this judicial
role, although Sherlock, not surprisingly for the verisimili
tude of his courtroom drama, appoints a male judge to hear
the trial of the witnesses to the Resurrection. Austen also
"empowers" the housekeeper, whereas the issue of credibility
for a female witness remains highly problematic in Sherlock.
Counsel attacks the worth of women's testimony that they
found Jesus' tomb empty, except for "an angel, or angels"
(offered as the first witnesses), who "looked like men to
women who saw them," and the barrister attributes the un
likely ability to determine an angel's sex to the women's
•superstition, ignorance, and fear."
The next witnesses are the women themselves: The
wisest men can hardly guard themselves against the
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fears of superstition; poor silly women therefore
in this case must be unexceptionable witnesses; . .
(390)
Ihis heavily sarcastic ad hominem. or rather ad feminem. at
tack creates some real problems for the otherwise effective
defense counsel, who chooses not to address gender and credi
bility, but to argue that the women's testimony does not af
fect his case one way or the other.
But for the women, what shall I say? Silly as
they were, I hope at least they had eyes and ears,
and could tell what they heard and saw. . . . And
if men only must be admitted, of them we have
enough to establish this truth. (414-5)
This argument rests on the authority that designated apostles
were the "men1' who were Christ's "chosen witnesses," and this
proves persuasive in the summary of the case by the judge,
who nevertheless declines to express an opinion on the credi
bility of the women.
The objection to the women was, I think, only
that they were women,- which was strengthened by
calling them silly women. [But these women] are
none of the chosen witnesses; and if they were, the
evidence of the men cannot be set aside, because
women saw what they saw. (435)
Sherlock, at least, leaves the door open on the admissibility
of women's testimony in a legal proceeding on the truth of
Christianity's most important mystery, and Austen moves
through the opening to set up Mrs. Reynolds as the most reli
able of witnesses to Darcy's character.
In many respects, The Trial of the W itnesses shadows the
"trial" of Darcy conducted by Elizabeth, and the religious
shading can be seen in the reverential approach of Elizabeth
and the Gardiners as near-pilgrims in the hallowed precincts
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of Pemberley. In a sense, Darcy ia “dead, “ because he has
been out of sight since handing Elizabeth the letter, which
event has all the aspects of a final separation, particularly
since, until Pemberley, she has not “the slightest inclina
tion ever to see him again" (212). But Mrs. Reynolds as an
"intelligent servant" has the same status as the apostles who
were "chosen witnesses" of the Resurrection, and Austen seems
to demand that readers do not discount her authority because
of gender. The religious atmosphere is continued with
Elizabeth's contemplative study of Darcy's portrait, which
has all the aspects of icon worship, including adoration's
investiture of the icon with life.
[S]he beheld a striking resemblance of Mr. Darcy,
with such a smile over the face, as she remembered
to have sometimes seen, when he looked at her. She
stood several minutes before the picture in earnest
contemplation, and returned to it again before they
quitted the gallery. (250)
Absorbed in this meditation, Elizabeth and the Gardiners
stroll out in the garden-like grounds of the park, suggestive
of the garden location of Jesus' sepulchre after the
Crucifixion, where Mary Magdalene (one of the "silly women")
encounters Jesus, "supposing him to be the gardener."23 While
Elizabeth does not make this mistake about Darcy, his appear
ance to them on the narrow winding walk in one of Austen’s
most rhapsodic natural settings, after Elizabeth figuratively
has "given him up for dead," partakes of a reincarnation, and
is followed almost immediately by what amounts to a religious
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conversion, after hearing "testimony so highly in his
favour.“
But above all, above respect and esteem, there was
a motive in her of good will which could not be
overlooked. It was gratitude.— Gratitude, not
merely for having once loved her, but for loving
her still well enough, to forgive all the petulance
and acrimony of her manner in rejecting him, . . .
He who, she had been persuaded, would avoid her as
his greatest enemy, seemed . . . most eager to pre
serve the acquaintance, and without any indelicate
display of regard, was soliciting the good opinion
of her friends, . . . Such a change in a man of so
much pride, excited not only astonishment but grat
itude— for to love, ardent love, it must be at
tributed; and as such its impression on her was of
a sort to be encouraged, as by no means unpleasing,
though it could not be exactly defined. She re
spected, she esteemed, she was grateful to him, she
felt a real interest in his welfare; and she only
wanted to know how far she wished that welfare to
depend upon herself, and how far it would be for
the happiness of both that she should employ the
power, which her fancy told her she still pos
sessed, of bringing on the renewal of his ad
dresses. (265-6)
The elevation of Elizabeth's feelings is certainly appropri
ate to the close relationship insisted on by Hutcheson be
tween benevolence and “the DEITY“ that seems to hover over
the conversion of gratitude into benevolence "when Bodys
touch each other." Since the novel begins with Elizabeth's
"resentment" and her inability to "feel" gratitude, the com
plete reversal of those feelings confirms, as I suggested
earlier, that Elizabeth has completed her moral journey.
Further, all this has been accomplished, not by direct bene
fits to Elizabeth, but by her evaluation of evidence, partic
ularly the testimony of reliable witnesses, of Darcy's benef
icence to others. But her "verdict" is not a judicial find-
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ing, like the summary of the judge in the Trial, but her
■conversion" marked by the "feeling" of gratitude.
Throughout the process of Elizabeth’s conversion there
is a play between feeling and reason. In my discussion of
gratitude in Sense and Sensibility. I contrast Balguy's argu
ment that reason shows gratitude to be "right" in all circum
stances, with Hutcheson, who claims that virtue is revealed
and encouraged by the feelings or "senses." Bishop Sherlock,
however, brings feelings and reason together.
Nor do we teach that nature and reason cannot lead
to the speculative knowledge of divine truths; for
the evidence of all divine truth resolves itself
ultimately into either sense or reason; which are
the common gifts of God to mankind, by the princi
ples of which the truth of all things, depending
upon the deductions of sense and reason, may be
proved and examined.29
I submit that the interplay of sense and reason in Austen re
flects their status as "common gifts of God" and is addi
tional confirmation of the "religious coloring" of Pride and
Pre-iudice and, indeed, of all these novels.
Sense and reason, functioning in concert, also make pos
sible the interplay of benevolence and gratitude, "when Bodys
touch each other." For all their exchangeability, there is a
hierachical relationship which elevates benevolence, as a
mirror of God, above the humbler response of gratitude.
Therefore, for Hutcheson's "exchange" to take place, there
must also be a least a reasonable basis for a leveling of the
parties. After Darcy discharges the ultimate in benevolence
by arranging and funding Lydia's unlikely nuptials with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162

Wickham, Elizabeth reflects on Darcy's role, as revealed in
her aunt's letter.
It was reasonable that he should feel he had been
wrong; he had liberality, and he had the means of
exercising it; and though she would not place her
self as his principal inducement, she could, per
haps, believe that remaining partiality for her,
might assist his endeavours in a cause where her
peace of mind must be materially concerned. It was
painful, exceedingly painful, to know they were un
der obligations to a person who could never receive
a return. (326)
The crux of Elizabeth's personal predicament is that, if her
love is to be received as benevolence by Darcy, then he must
be humbled, a requirement not unwelcome to most readers of
the novel.
Hutcheson has supplied the moral reasoning, not only to
eliminate partiality as the obstacle it presents to Jane and
Bingley, but also to feature it in the mutual gravitational
pull of benevolence and gratitude. However, the occasion of
Darcy's humbling is still wanted. So that the romance doesn't
stop in its tracks, Austen has recourse to the hallowed de
vice of the deus ex machina. none other than Lady Catherine
De Bourgh, who in her stormy visit with the Bennets forces
the very engagement she demands that Elizabeth renounce. The
way is cleared, perhaps not too smoothly, for Darcy to con
fess that Elizabeth has improved his already "good princi
ples." As I have suggested, Austen makes Darcy see himself as
the subject of instruction, through his own Stoic commitment
to education.
What do I not owe you! You taught me a lesson, hard
indeed at first, but most advantageous. By you I
was properly humbled. (369) .
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The answer to Darcy's rhetorical question is, everything and
nothing. The stoic man of reason has learned the understand
ing that can only be "taught" by the feelings. His unreach
able benevolence has been overcome and converted to grati
tude, as Elizabeth's gratitude rises to benevolence. Each
brings to the other the gifts of themselves and their love in
a marriage of equals.
In transforming values and uniting opposites, gratitude
in Pride and Prejudice is at its zenith of power. But it
could be argued that, by creating assertive and independent
characters like Elizabeth and Darcy, Austen endows them with
the power to forge their own future by the force of personal
ity, funded by Darcy's bank account, more than through the
workings of gratitude. But true virtue cannot depend for its
authority on strong characters with the will and capacity to
drive their own destinies. Does gratitude also serve the
wants and desires for happiness of the weak and powerless?
Northanaer Abbev suggests that it might be a useful claim for
the unempowered Catherine Morland, but the condition prece
dent seems to be a kind of remorse by Henry Tilney for the
combined injuries to Catherine inflicted by himself and his
father. What happens when gratitude is urged by unimpeachable
authority figures against the wishes of the weak, but unin
jured?

Austen explores this question in Mansfield Park, and

the answer seems to be that personal happiness may require
that the manifest duty of gratitude be rejected, or rather
that one's own feelings determine where gratitude is to be
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placed, not the urgings of external authority. The conflict
of gratitude and personal happiness is also examined in Emma,
but comically complicated by suggesting that one may inter
pose one's own plans and desires to block gratitude's opera
tion between others. Both novels, then, represent Austen's
exploration of the limits of gratitude, whose power in Pride
and Prejudice seems nearly boundless.
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Chapter 4 Notes
1 Samuel Johnson: Selected Poetry and Prose, eds. Brady and
Wimsatt 158.
2 "The best state of rational Agents, and their greatest and
most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to imagine must
consist in universal efficacious Benevolence; and hence we
conclude the DEITY benevolent in the most universal impartial
manner. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name
of Perfection but Benevolence, and those Capacitys or
Abilitys which are necessary to make it effectual; such as
Wisdom, and Power: at least we can have no other valuable
Conception of it." Francis Hutcheson, vol. I, Works 276.
These thoughts conclude Hutcheson's treatise, and the
comments about "Capacitys of Abilitys" should not be mistaken
as suggesting that such qualities are integral components of
benevolence. Hutcheson makes this clear earlier in the
treatise: "Nor shall we find anything amiable in any Action
whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagagin'd; nor in
any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd
applicable to, and design'd for benevolent Purposes" (150).
Benevolence limited in extent may be "a smaller Degree of
Virtue, unless our Beneficence be restrain'd by want of
Power, . . . " (166), although the measure of "moral
Importance of any Character, . . . is in a compound Ratio of
his Benevolence and Abilitys" (168). Nevertheless, the
absence of "Capacitys or Abilitys" may make it difficult to
recognize a benevolent disposition.
3

Vol. 5, Works 69-70.

4 "And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as
flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study
of the good of others, and a Delight in their Happiness, . .
. we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise
its Author"This increase of Love towards the Benevolent,
according to their nearer Approaches to our selves by their
Benefits, is observable in the high degree of Love, which
Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in their own
Conntrys [sic], . . . and in all the strong Ties of
Friendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership; which
are exceedingly necessary to the Order of human Society."
Vol. 1, Works 110-11, 199. "Since benevolence is motivated,
for Hume as for Hutcheson, by the sight of another's
benevolence, and it issues in further acts of benevolence,
social virtues spread by a kind of contagion." Wills 253.
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5 "Our Reason does often correct the Report of our Senses, .
. . and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of the
Agent. . . . But whether our moral Sense be subject to such a
Disorder, . . . 'tis not easy to determine.* Vol. 2, Works
283.
6 Hoyt Trowbridge qualifies his own argument that "Jane
Austen is a rationalist" by adding that "principles are
dynamic and effective only when they become an inclination, .
. . a sense of duty, a 1something within,' as much a matter
of habit and feeling as of reason itself." Trowbridge 281.
That Austen sees a valuable role for reason does not make her
a "rationalist," particularly in the philosophical sense as
opposed to the authority of feelings. See analysis of John
Balguy and the "rationalists" or "intellectualists" in my
discussion of Sense and Sensibility and note below.
7 The phrase is not unique to Hutcheson and may be considered
a generic expression of "the language of virtue," which "just
about everybody" spoke in the eighteenth century. See Jack
Fructroan, Jr., Thomas Paine and the Religion of Nature
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993) 13.
8 "The Golden Sayings of Epictetus" [ca 90 A.D.], trans.
Hastings Crossley. In The Harvard Classics, Plato. Epictetus.
Marcus Aurelius (1909; New York: Collier, 1937) 156, and
"Introductory Note," 116.
9 Antoine Le Grand, Man without Passion: or, the Wise Stoick.
According to the Sentiments of Seneca. Cited in Crane 199200 .
10 The Complete Poetry of John Milton, ed. Shawcross 563.
11 Plato.-Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius 156.
12 Trowbridge 282.
13 Johnson xxiii, xxiv.
14 Johnson xiv, xv.
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15 Lewis, ed. Hooper 178.
15 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, An Inquiry
Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699: rpt. 1732), vol. 1, British
Moralists. ed. Selby-Bigge 40.
17 Trowbridge, 284.
18 Works. I, 197-99.
18 Stewart-Robinson 202.
20 Gratitude: "2. Desire to return benefits.■ Johnson, &
Dictionary of the English Language.
21 For many readers, Elizabeth seems persuaded rather too
easily to forgive Darcy for his role in breaking tip the
budding love between Jane and Bingley, but Hutcheson would
support both Elizabeth's as well as Darcy's motives. Having
been convinced of Darcy’s basic benevolence, Elizabeth "buys"
his explanation that he was entirely motivated by the best of
intentions for his friend's happiness, a "partiality"
specifically endorsed in Hutcheson's system. Further, Darcy's
benevolence is entirely "disinterested," the acid test of
benevolent purity, since he has nothing personally to gain.
Nor, as Darcy explains, was he at all aware that his
benevolently intended acts had the unintended effect of
wounding Jane.
22 Adam Smith seems to agree with Samuel Johnson and Swift
on the common source in the “passions" of gratitude and
resentment, and he finds their kinship in the idea of a
■spectator’s" "sympathy." Since *[r]esentment is commonly
regarded as so odious a passion," people recoil from sympathy
with the aggrieved party.
They will be more willing, perhaps, to admit that our
sense of the merit of good actions is founded upon a
sympathy with the gratitude of the persons who recieve
the benefit of them; because gratitude, as well as all
the other benevolent passions, is regarded as an amiable
principle, which can take nothing from the worth of
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whatever is founded upon it. Gratitude and resentment/
however, are, in every respect, it is evident,
counterparts to one another; . . .(The Theory of Moral
SentiPgPES/ in British Moralists, ed. Selby-Bigge, 294).
23 The idea that there is a required response of gratitude in
this situation can be attributed to the "rationalists," who
argue, unlike Hutcheson and other "sentimentalists," that
reason alone, not our "moral sense, ■ will show us the course
of virtue. John Balguy's The Foundation of Moral Goodness,
published three years after the first edition of Hutcheson's
An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil (Treatise II of M
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
[1725]), specifically disagrees with Hutcheson and argues
that even if we have "no kind Instinct toward
our
Benefactors: Would Gratitude, . . . have been absolutely out
of our Power? Might we not nevertheless, by the Help of
Reason and Reflection, discover ourselves to be under
Obligations, and that we ought to return good Offices or
Thanks, according to our Abilities." Later, Balguy returns
more firmly to the same idea: "But when a Man compares the
Idea of Gratitude with that of a Benefaction received, and
examines the Relation between them, he cannotavoid
inferring, or concluding that he ought to be grateful."Vol.
2, British Moralists, ed. Selby-Bigge 63, 188. Darcy's offer
of his love is the highest beneficience.
24 "ultimately Woolston was prosecuted for blasphemy on March
4, 1729, before Lord Chief Justice Raymond. . . . He was
found guilty on four counts, and sentenced to a year's
imprisonment and a fine of £100. This fine he was unable to
pay, and he lingered in prison till his death in 1733."
Overton and Relton 38-39.
25 The Trial of the Witnesses went through eighteen separate
editions between 1729 and 1830. It was also included with
other works published in multiple volumes as Discourses
preached at the Temple Church (etc.) in six editions and
twelve printings. An 1812 Clarendon Press edition is used in
this study and possibly may be the edition referred to byJane Austen in her letter of 28 September to Anna Austen.
Vol. 2, Letters, ed. Chapman 406.
26 Bible, John 18: 37.
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27 "Let us next consider another Determination of our Mind,
which strongly proves Benevolence to be natural to us, and
that is Compassion; . . . " Vol. 1, Works 215-6.
28 John 20:15. A number of readers have commented on the
Edenesque quality of the Pemberley park, and it is true that
God walks in that original garden, and is encountered by Old
Testament prophets in garden settings. Nevertheless, the
garden setting in Pride and Prejudice seems more a
Christianized version, informed by the Resurrection motif, as
Darcy is re-presented to Elizabeth and the reader. I also
cannot escape the association of this garden scene with the
presence of Elizabeth's uncle and aunt, the "Gardeners,"
although it would be difficult to establish an intentional
connection.
29 Discourse XVTI, vol. 1, Discourses. 325.
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CHAPTER V
GRATITUDE CHALLENGED IN MANSFIELD PARK AND EMMA

Fanny Price undergoes her most severe personal trial in
the extended interview with Sir Thomas Bertram, who accuses
her finally of "ingratitude" in her unshakable refusal to
marry Henry Crawford. The crushing force of this accusation
puts Fanny through an emotional wringer, and it is with re
lief that she listens to the comforting words of her cousin,
Edmund, for whom her true love is a closely guarded secret,
who assures her that " [y] ou did not love him— nothing could
have justified your accepting him."1
Although "Fanny had not felt so comfortable for days and
days," Edmund is not finished, because he feels this is only
a stage in Fanny's emotions, and he urges her to "let him
succeed at last, Fanny, let him succeed at last" (347),
adding, in surprise at her resistance,
I cannot suppose that you have not the wish to love
him--the natural wish of gratitude. You must have
some feeling of that sort. You must be sorry for
your own indifference. (348)
To Fanny's dismay, after raising her hopes of sympathetic un
derstanding, Edmund also appeals to her sense of gratitude on
Henry's behalf, and she again is plunged into despair.
Gratitude seems to be at odds with Fanny's quest for personal
happiness, yet she herself on other occasions is its most
committed advocate. Her moral education is the record of how
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she resolves this conflict between her affections and the
dictates of “gratitude,“ a term crucial to the moral issues
of all Austen novels, and whose twenty-six appearances in
Mansfield Park alone advertise its central importance.
The relation of gratitude to Fanny Price's moral educa
tion, and to the decisions she must make, bear directly on
the frequently argued critical issue of whether she demon
strates admirable growth in self-knowledge and moral develop
ment, or remains throughout an unchanged and insufferable
prig. For Gerry Brenner, Fanny is a “moral monolith, and her
failure to “develop" is read ironically by Brenner as
Austen's “sustained, oblique rejection of Fanny."2 On the
other hand, Avron Fleishman and Susan Morgan argue that Fanny
indeed does develop, and for Fleishman she "is a more complex
and changeful character" than Elizabeth Bennet of Pride and
Pre-iudice. “who merely changes her mind. “3 Morgan finds that
Fanny's growth process anticipates the nineteenth-century
bildungsroman, and that "[wjithout obvious events, without
natural gifts, Fanny still grows. It is the chance Austen of
fers to us all.“4
More recently, Nancy Miller has argued that Fanny "shows
admirable improvement by the end of the novel: she moves from
a passive morality that instructs no one to an active moral
ity that is beneficial to many."5 Miller finds the source of
Fanny's "improvement“ in Austen's commitment to Christian
values, as played out in the consequences of the seven deadly
sins, particularly sloth, that Miller feels afflict all
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Manfield Park characters, except Fanny, in one way or an
other. Christian values are indeed pervasive in Austen nov
els, but not as compelled by fear of retributive divine sanc
tions, which seems implicit in Miller's thesis. Rather, ethi
cal motivation for her characters is more a blend of reli
gious values with a pragmatic and flexible approach to daily
life.
Many of these critics, whether admirers or detractors of
Fanny, seem more interested in connecting the novel with lit
erary trends or cultural issues than in understanding Fanny’s
character and development in terms of the interplay of moral
dialogue and commentary, particularly discussions of grati
tude, with dramatic events. For instance, Morgan sees
Mansfield Park as foreshadowing the *bildungsroman,■ perhaps
reflecting the time frame of eight years in Fanny's life, the
only Austen novel to stay with a central character from
childhood to maturity as a young woman.6 Patrick Goold sug
gests that Fanny suffers at the hands of critics because to
day *[s]ubmissiveness is . . . quite out of fashion," and
that also the "claim" the novel makes "to 'educating the sen
timents' offends modern prejudices."7 Goold does consider
Mansfield Park in the setting of a moral discourse, but the
Kantian philosophical / psychological reading he offers has
little relevance to Austen's novels.
This chapter will try to show that Fanny indeed does de
velop morally, and that her educational process reenacts the
"moral sense" of Francis Hutcheson, and the practical
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Christian ethics of Thomas Sherlock, imbedded in Austen's
text. Gratitude is the rock that sustains Fanny from child
hood in her unswerving but unrecognized love for Edmund, but
she learns to subordinate if not reject this fundamental
principle when it is invoked against her in her refusal of
Henry Crawford.
Edmund suggests that eventually Fanny must give way to
gratitude, because it is a "natural wish, ■ and nothing would
seem more "natural" than for Fanny to follow her own "feel
ings." Where, then, is “nature" to be found, and how do we
recognize where it leads us? “Nature" also runs a school
Fanny attends in her moral education, but what she learns is
that nature is a dangerous and untrustworthy guide. The
changing role of gratitude mirrors Fanny's own moral develop
ment and reflects the plasticity given this virtue by
Hutcheson. Despite appeals to gratitude that seem to threaten
Fanny's happiness, and even challenge gratitude's authority,
it survives these tests intact as the most important opera
tive virtue in the novel.
For Hutcheson, virtue, measured by the standard of
"Benevolence," thrives best in close family relationships,
where it becomes identical with "natural Affection and
Gratitude; . . .8 He frequently singles out parental affection
as exemplifying the “stronger Degrees of Benevolence," and
also comments that "there is the same kind of Affection among
collateral Relations, tho in a weaker degree, . . ."9 In
Austen's novels, affection among siblings and cousins often
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is stronger than the parental bond, but this distinction for
Hutcheson is less significant than that virtuous love differs
only in degree, not in kind, between "universal benevolence"
and the "natural Affections" uniting close relations.
Virtuous love, of course defines the growth of Affection be
tween Fanny and her cousin Edmund Bertram.
Hutcheson’s oeuvre does, however, reflect an ongoing
struggle to account for and rationalize the influence of sex
ual love, which clouds our understanding, with the virtuous
love which is supposed to transcend passion. In my discussion
of Sense and Sensibility. I

attempt to show how this novel

tests the power of virtue in the presence of physical pas
sion, which Hutcheson tries to write out of hisphilosophy in
An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
The Affections which are of most importance in
Morals, are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but
different Modifications of these two original
Affections. Now in discoursing of Love toward ra
tional Agents, we need not be caution’d not to in
clude that Love between the Sexes, which, when no
other Affections accompany it, is onlyDesire of
Pleasure, and is never counted a Virtue.10
"Affections" is a term carrying a lot of freight in
Hutcheson, but in all its various manifestations, it is dis
tinguished from "the Passions," which are further distin
guished from "the Appetites," where we encounter sexual love.
So long as we form correct "Opinions," we exercise some con
trol over the "Passions," and the virtues are not threatened.
The Government of our Passions must then depend
much upon our Opinions: But we must here observe an
obvious Difference among our Desires, viz. that
some of them have a previous, painful, or uneasy
Sensation, antecedently to any Opinion of Good in
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the Object; nay, the Object is often chiefly es
teemed good, only for its allaying this Pain or
Uneasiness; or if the Object gives also positive
Pleasure, yet the uneasy Sensation is previous to,
and independent of this Opinion of Good in the
Object. These desires we may call Appetites. . . .
Of [this] kind are Hunger and Thirst, and the
Desires between the Sexes; to which Desires there
is an uneasy Sensation previous, even in those who
have little other Notion of Good in the Objects,
than allaying this Pain or Uneasiness.11
But these unruly passions clearly can be exacerbated by the
same proximity that also intensifies virtue, benevolence, and
gratitude. Hutcheson seems to argue that "nature,* in the
sense of sexuality, must be kept at a distance if virtue is
not to be threatened, and in Mansfield Park, the convergence
of nature with virtue and gratitude in the "wilderness" at
Sotherton, and in Henry Crawford's direct assault on Fanny in
the bosum of her Portsmouth family, prove exceptionally dan
gerous .
How, then, can the relationship of blood, most conducive
to the highest virtue, be protected from the "Appetites" of
sexual attraction, which has no respect for virtue? This
dilemma has intrigued scholars with the shadow of incest it
seems to cast across Mansfield Park, with its marriage of
first cousins, who grow up together as devoted siblings.
Indeed, Glenda Hudson suggests that Fanny Price marries
cousin Edmund as a "surrogate for her beloved brother William
toward whom she feels an intense personal attachment."12
However, Hudson sees Austen endorsing such intimate sibling
relationships.
These joint experiences, Austen shows, create a po
tent and sympathetic love, a commingling of frater
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nal and erotic feelings, which although the empha
sis is very much on the former, we must recognize
as a kind of incestuous love.13
I agree that Fanny's attachment to both brother and
cousin must be read as morally constructive, but feel that
Hudson has clouded her analysis by defining these loving re
lationships as "incest, * a term used pejoratively, then as
now, as legally and morally proscribed.14 Hudson notes that
“there was some sentiment against the practice [of first
cousin's marrying] in the eighteenth century, “1S and supports
her observation by citing Hutcheson, whose principal concern
seems to be that intra-family marriages work at cross-pur
poses to the propagation and dissemination of virtue in soci
ety.16 But in the same section of "The Rights and Duties in a
State of Marriage," Hutcheson recognizes no adverse evidence
against first-cousin marriages.
But it often happens that cousin-germans, and re
moter relations, are educated together in the same
intimacy [as siblings], and we see no dismal ef
fects from the permission of intermarriages among
them.17
This relationship, of course, parallels that of Fanny and
Edmund, as played out in Mansfield Park's plot, but Hutcheson
goes further to question cautiously the blanket condemnation
of marriage between blood relations.
But that there is not a necessary invariable
turpitude or moral inpurity in all these marriages
ordinarily called incestuous, antecedently to the
prohibition of them, must be owned by such as con
sider that God laid the immediate children of Adam
under a necessity of inter-marrying, and for some
political reasons ordered such marriages on certain
contingincies as were ordinarily prohibited.18
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Clearly, Hutcheson believes that "certain marriages," which
would include those of first cousins, are entitled to exemp
tion from the opprobrium associated with the label "incestu
ous, " and the basis for such a claim is the literal reading
of biblical scripture. Although Hutcheson argues that close
familial relationships offer opportunities for the develop
ment of virtue and its propagation, passionate love is cer
tainly implied in the development of Fanny's and Edmund's re
lationship. The latent eroticism that whispers "incest" cre
ates a tension and airibivilance which implicitly challenges
virtue's hold.
Austen seems to address this challenge by introducing
Edmund to his cousin when she is at the tender age of ten,
and Fanny immediately forges a felicitous bond of gratitude
with Edmund, when he alone of the Bertram children undertakes
positive acts of compassion and kindness to the homesick
waif, soon after her arrival at the Park, in getting her pa
per and pen to write her brother, and later in providing a
docile mare for gentle open-air exercise. "He had never know
ingly given her pain, but he now felt that she required more
positive kindness" (17). As Fanny matures, the "Appetites"
implicitly are acknowledged, but virtue has enjoyed a seven
or eight-year head start and is not about to be displaced.
Seven or eight years should be adequate for an educa
tional program in gratitude, but Alistair Duckworth finds
that Fanny's own example seems to subvert the moral message
of the novel.
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How, . . . are we to account for Fanny's in
stinctive morality, her innate qualities? . . . But
when all is said, there is a quality— an impulse—
which cannot be contained within the educational
hypothesis.19
Duckworth never successfully explains this "paradox, ■ as he
terms it, except as it affirms Austen's belief in "a natural
order stemming from God, ■ and that the required "affirmative
response" is "in Fanny1s nature."20 But "nature," as I have
suggested, seems at critical moments to point in directions
apparently in conflict with "instinctive morality," and if
Fanny urges resistance to nature at Sotherton, she also shows
that nature can lead her, and not unwillingly, as well.
Both Hutcheson and Sherlock are in accord on the process
of education in virtue, and understanding their approach may
clear up some of the mystification in the "paradox" posed by
Duckworth about Fanny's apparently "innate qualities." First,
Hutcheson specifically insists that his focus on the "moral
sense" as an "internal" sense expands on, rather than chal
lenges, Locke, and "no more pre-supposes an innate Idea, or
Principle of Knowledge, than the external [sense]."21
■Education" may clarify, inform, and direct the "internal
sense,* but
Education never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in
Objects, which we have not Senses capable of per
ceiving. . . . Education may make an unattentive
Goth imagine that his Countrymen have attain'd the
Perfection of Archictecture; . . . but he had never
form'd these Prejudices, had he been void of a
Sense of Beauty.22
With these somewhat chauvinistic thoughts, Hutcheson wraps up
his first Treatise, but picks up the analogy with the Sense

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179

of Beauty in the following An Incruirv Concerning Moral Good

and EvilIt remains then, that as the Author of Nature
has determin’d us to receive, by our external
Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects,
according as they are useful or hurtful to our
Bodies; and to receive from uniform Objects the
Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to
the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it;
. . . so he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct
our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures;
But Hutcheson adds, to make sure there is no misunderstand
ing, that "[w]e are not to imagine, that this moral Sense,
more than the other Senses, supposes any innate Ideas, or
Knowledge, or practical Proposition: We mean by it only a
Determination of our Minds . . .■ Thus, "Perception of moral
Good is not deriv'd from Custom, Education, Example, or
Study. These give us no new Ideas."23
Education, which supports and directs the moral sense,
enlists the aid of reason, which "does often correct the
Report of our Senses, "24 but which is similarily incapable of
revealing virtue independent of the moral sense. Thomas
Sherlock, writing from the perspective of a practical theolo
gian rather than that of the moral philosopher, holds that
both sense and reason function in concert as manifestations
of God’s grace.
Nor do we teach that nature and reason cannot lead
to the speculative knowledge of divine truths; for
the evidence of all divine truth resolves itself
ultimately into either sense or reason; which are
the common gifts of God to mankind, by the princi
ples of which the truth of all things, depending
upon the deductions of sense and reason, may be
proved and examined.25
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Fanny may be considered a composite of the complementary, if
not identical, views of Hutcheson and Sherlock. By God's
grace, she has a disposition to virtue, which is enhanced by
Edmund's personal example and counsel, an exemplary educa
tion. In sharp contrast are the Crawfords, whose defective
education, and the vicious example of the Admiral, their un
cle and guardian, allow vices to get the upper hand, and
their better principles to wither in childhood. Sherlock is
very emphatic on the widely shared belief in the importance
of childhood education, and his views might almost serve as a
preface or gloss on the role of education as played out in
Mansfield Park.
All wise men, legislators, and princes, have ac
knowledged, not only the use, but the necessity of
an early education to form the mind, whilst tender,
to the principles of honour and virtue; . . . Even
our unbelievers have seen how far religion depended
on this care; and, under a pretence of maintaining
the liberty of the human mind, and guarding it
against early prejudices, they have endeavoured to
persuade the world, that children should be taught
nothing of religion, but be left to form notions
for themselves. They have had but too great suc
cess, and we begin to see the fruits of it. The
children of this age grow soon to be men and women,
and are admitted to be partners and witnesses to
the follies and vices of their parents. Thus
trained and educated, . . . they are often a tor
ment to each other, and to themselves, . . .26
Echoes of Sherlock's language resonate in discussions of the
Crawfords' education, as well as in narrative commentary on
the deficiencies in the education of the Bertram children,
such as demonstrated by Julia Bertram's petulance at her
"duty of attendance on Mrs. Rushworth and exclusion from the
others' fun at Sothertor..
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[T]he want of that . .
ers, that knowledge of
ple of right which had
part of her education,
(91)

. just consideration of oth
her own heart, that princi
not formed any essential
made her miserable under it.

The consequence of neglecting such essentials, as Sherlock
observes, is that Julia is a "torment to" herself, and pre
sumably to others. Sir Thomas belatedly recognizes the short
comings of "his plan of education."
He feared that principle, active principle, had
been wanting, that they had never been properly
taught to govern their inclinations and tempers, by
that sense of duty which alone can suffice. They
had been instructed theoretically in their reli
gion, but never required to bring it into daily
practice. (463)
The "theoretical" instruction in religion proves to be no
better than the results Sherlock sees from being "taught
nothing, ■ and both Sherlock as well as Sir Thomas cite the
lack of education in "principles" as the common failing.
But Fanny's youthful responses at sixteen reflect more
her disposition than her later education and demonstrate a
kind of tunnel vision about gratitude, which is at war with
her own feelings. When Sir Thomas leaves for his West Indies
plantations, her reaction is one of "relief" at the removal
of his awesome benevolent paternalism, "but a more tender na
ture suggested that her feelings were ungrateful, and she re
ally grieved because she could not grieve" (33). "Feelings"
are distinguished from "more tender nature,“ which seems
rather to be the indoctrinated conscience. This kind of con
flict is also recognized by Elizabeth Bennet in Pride and
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Prejudice in her acknowledgment of Darcy's unwelcome marriage
proposal.
It is, I believe, the established mode to express a
sense of obligation for the sentiments avowed, how
ever unequally they may be returned, it is natural
that obligation should be felt, and if I could feel
gratitude, I would now thank you. But I cannot— .

n

Although the feisty and independent Elizabeth has no problem
discarding “the established mode," Fanny senses a flaw in her
character, which fails to make emotion subject to the implied
a priori virtue of gratitude.
Fanny emphasizes gratitude's morally imperative status
in her discussion with Edmund of Mary Crawford's derogatory
remarks about "the Admiral," uncle and guardian of Mary and
her brother. In a conversation about property "improvements,"
Mary volunteers that her uncle's improvements ruined the
charm of a cottage he had purchased. Later, Edmund asks, "was
there nothing in her conversation that struck you Fanny, as
not quite right?"
"Oh! yes, she ought not to have spoken of her
uncle as she did. I was quite astonished. An uncle
with whom she has been living so many years, and
who, whatever his faults may be, is so very fond of
her brother, treating him, they say, quite like a
son. I could not have believed it!
"I thought you would be struck. It was very
wrong— very indecorous."
"And very ungrateful I think." (63)
Edmund recoils from Fanny's verdict; "Ungrateful is a strong
word," and they wind up their conversation in his scramble to
exonerate Mary from ingratitude.
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It is quite true that the Admiral “was a man of vicious
conduct,“ who, after his wife's death, “chose, instead of re
taining his niece [Mary], to bring his mistress under his own
roof “ (41), a history of which Fanny is well aware. Yet for
Fanny, Mary's duty of gratitude is unaffected by the deprav
ity of her uncle, even though his latest act drove Mary from
his house. Although this incident occurs two years after
Fanny's remorse at her own feelings on Sir Thomas's depar
ture, her belief in the “stand alone* inviolability of grati
tude remains unshaken.
At this point in the novel, Fanny's attitude resembles
that of Elinor Dashwood in Sense and Sensibility, an attitude
that I have argued eventually is discredited, but Elinor goes
so far as to let gratitude dictate that she accept a sort of
emotional suicide mission, which facilitates the marriage of
her lover to a woman both detest. Fanny has yet to confront
such a direct personal crisis, but is brought face to face
with the choice between the duty of gratitude and personal
happiness when Henry Crawford, his uncle's moral heir, claims
her hand in marriage as the reward for his advocacy and the
Admiral's influence in securing the lieutenant's commission
for her adored midshipman brother, William.
Fanny's astonishing, and un-Elinor like, refusal of
Henry, calls forth the formidable persuasive efforts of Sir
Thomas, who triggers the emotional crisis of the novel by
asking, rhetorically, "But, Fanny, if your heart can acquit
you of ingratitude— ," an implied sin so appalling that the
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italicized incomplete thought testifies to the lack of words
to express it. Sir Thomas's lecture, for Fanny, has been
“rising in dreadful gradation! Self-willed, obstinate, self
ish, and ungrateful" (319), and she twice reflects on the
combination, “selfish and ungrateful, “ but her final thoughts
settle on ingratitude as the one truly inexcusable vice. “'I
must be a brute indeed, if I can be really ungrateful!' said
she in soliloquy; 'Heaven defend me from being ungrateful!'“
(323).
Fanny's interview with Sir Thomas, which culminates in
this fervent prayer, takes up ten pages in the Chapman text,
surely a measure of her ordeal, and the pain is intensified
when her uncle precedes their conversation by expressing sur
prise at the lack of a fire in her room, followed by his or
der that one shall be provided from then on. Such a kindness
under these circumstances adds to Fanny's burden a further
degree of gratitude to him, and intensifies the magnitude of
her rebellion when he speaks to her on behalf of Crawford's
suit. But even here, at her most ungrateful moment, there is
a suggestion that Fanny is growing morally, in Sir Thomas's
opening expression of confidence that Fanny will feel no “re
sentment," the reverse of gratitude,28 at being previously de
prived of a fire's comfort.
— You have an understanding, which will prevent you
from receiving things only in part, and judging
partially by the event.— You will take in the whole
of the past, you will consider times, persons, and
probabilities. (313)
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In the context of what follows, it could be argued that Sir
Thomas is only trying to flatter Fanny into accepting Henry
Crawford, because his rhetoric and clearly invokes the apos
tle Paul's famous letter to the Corinthians.
For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But
when that which is perfect is come, then that which
is in part shall be done away. When I was a child,
I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I
thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put
away childish things. For now we see through a
glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in
part; but then shall I know even as also I am
known.29
Although Paul seems to refer to a final revelation yet to
come, Sir Thomas suggests that Fanny's moral understanding in
this life has matured from the "in part" vision of childhood
to "tak[ing] in the whole." Further, he allows her the same
kind of growth that Paul seems to reserve for one's becoming
a "man."30 Sir Thomas may have intended that his appeal, with
its imbedded biblical text, would persuade Fanny of the irre
sistible force of his argument, but what he does is reveal to
the reader what the reader already knows, that Fanny sees
"the whole" in a different and more complete way than he
does.
The forces of gratitude bearing on Fanny in this scene
are overwhelming. Not only does she carry the burdens of Sir
Thomas's past and present benevolence, as well as of Henry
Crawford's successful assistance of the one she arguably
loves most in the world, she also must recognize that this
success would not have been possible without the willing help
of Henry's ur.cle, the Admiral. Fanny already is on record
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that the Admiral1s depraved morality is no excuse for the in
gratitude Mary Crawford betrays earlier. How can Fanny shel
ter herself, behind her abhorrence of their combined immoral
ity, from the obligations of gratitude due to both the
Admiral and his nephew, not to mention the claims of Sir
Thomas, whose perceptions may be faulty, but whose character
is unspotted?
The answer seems be that the duty of gratitude cannot be
a “stand alone* virtue, and in the moral conflicts of life
may be preempted or overruled when the claimant's character
can be condemned, and his motives shown to be ruled, not by
benevolence, but by pure self-interest, as Henry's are in his
pursuit of Fanny. This admittedly oversimplifies an important
philosophical debate, in which the inflexibility of the re
quirement of gratitude, and of acting accordingly, were
staunchly argued by the "rationalist* or “intellectualist“
school, as represented by John Balguy in his controversy with
Francis Hutcheson, which I discuss in the chapter on Sense
and Sensibility. Balguy insists that there are certain fixed
principles of virtue, including gratitude, that can be appre
hended by reason alone, without regard to Hutcheson's "moral
sense." What Hutcheson does is to argue that the moral char
acter and motives of benefactors determine the worth of their
benevolence, and that one's "moral sense" of these factors is
the best guide to conduct. It is true that "Gratitude arises
from benefits conferred from good-will on ourselves, or those
we love," but "neither benevolence nor any other affection or
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desire [which would include gratitude] can be directly raised
by volition.■
If they could, then we could be bribed into any af
fection whatsoever toward any object, even the most
improper: we might raise jealousy, fear, anger,
love, toward any sort of persons indifferently by
an hire, . . . 31
Hutcheson, then, is saying that where reason leads is, para
doxically, unreasonable in practical affirs, and he makes his
point cleverly, if somewhat deviously, by substituting the
term "bribe" for "reason." By attributing to her St. Paxil's
process of intellectual maturity, Sir Thomas suggests that
Fanny's reason should show her the merits of Henry Crawford,
but behind the arguments of reason is, of course, the “bribe"
of his influence on behalf of William.
Nevertheless, Hutcheson has some trouble proving that
his "moral sense" is not a smoke screen for self-love, in
which personal happiness, as opposed to his guiding principle
of "universal" happiness, justifies moral decisions.
Our Reason can discover indeed certain Bounds,
within which we may not only act from Self-Love,
consistently with the Good of the Whole, but every
Mortal’s acting thus within these Bounds for his
own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of
the Whole, and the Want of such Self-Love would be
universally pernicious; and hence, he who pursues
his own private Good, with an Intention also to
concur with that Constitution, which tends to the
Good of the Whole; and much more he who promotes
his own Good, with a direct View of making himself
more capable of serving God, or doing good to
Mankind; acts not only innocently, but also hon
ourably, and virtuously: . . . An thus a Neglect of
our own Good, may be morally evil, and argue a Want
of Benevolence toward the Whole.32
Hutcheson continues on with this tortuous argument to discuss
"when Self-Love breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd," but
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his obvious difficulty in articulating a logical and persua
sive case is the relativism he tries to incorporate in fixed
principles of virtue. His remarks would apply with equal
force to gratitude, which becomes synonymous with benevolence
in intimate personal relationships.33 However, the relativism
of gratitude which Hutcheson introduces seems to support the
latitude Austen allows Fanny to follow her own heart and
judgment.
That this kind of moral liberation challenges an ac
cepted order is implicit in Hutcheson's philosophical dis
course with Balguy, and the dispute seems to spill over into
the popular arena, as suggested by a piece that appeared in
Eliza Heywood's, The Female Spectator (1744-46), entitled
"Gratitude sometimes a Vice: the hard Fate of Two Sisters."34
In this little fable, a lover, faced with the choice of sav
ing one of two sisters from drowning, rescues out of grati
tude the one who had helped him win the affections of the
other, who therefore drowns. In despair at his loss, the res
cuer commits suicide, and thus is also lost to the surviving
sister.
The implausibility of this poignant scenario suggests a
tongue-in-cheek authorship, yet the “serious" question, which
perhaps could only be floated as a kind of dark humor, is
whether the inflexibility of gratitude may work against the
interests of women. Certainly this is the road block to hap
piness that Fanny confronts, and in the January chill of the
fire-less East Room, confronted with Sir Thomas’s "cold
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sternness" (318), she looks gratitude in the eye, and rejects
it, even as she prays for heavenly deliverance "from being
ungrateful!"
Lurking in Fanny'S heart, but revealed to no one, of
course, is her love for Edmund, but Edmund helps her plight
not at all, by invoking the claim on Fanny that "love" is the
•natural wish of gratitude, * a claim that Austen herself
seems to endorse. Gratitude is the basis of relationships
which lead to marriages in Northanaer Abbgv. Sense, and
Sensibility, and Pride and Prejudice, and at least in the
last novel, the mutual love of Darcy and Elizabeth grows out
of experiences that trigger gratitude toward each other. But
what actual evidence is there that nature operates in the
service of virtue?
Fanny already has had some experience with what looks
like the consequences of following a "natural wish, ■ which
apparently facilitates the workings of Henry's artful and un
scrupulous mind on Maria's unguarded passion in the "wilder
ness" of Sotherton. Sherlock condemns this evil collaboration
of the mind and passion.
Good principles are the seeds of good actions: and,
though the seed may be buried under much rubbish,
yet, as long as there is life in it, there is a
reasonable expectation of seeing fruit from it same
time or other: but, when reason and tinderstanding
are depraved, and as far corrupted as the passions
of the heart; when thus the blind leads the blind,
what else can we expect, but that both fall into
the ditch?" [emphasis in text]35
The converse of Sherlock's metaphor is that, in nature, bad
seed brings forth evil fruit. Austen seems to translate
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Sherlock into the language of allegory in Sotherton Park.
Fanny is left behind by the explorers Edmund and Mary
Crawford to muse in solitude on a bench in "the wilderness*
(actually a silvacultured woodland) . Her bench is located
next to the iron gate and fence which adjoins a ha-ha, and
both separate “the wilderness" from the deeper woods of the
■park" beyond. "Depraved" Reason, trifling with Passion, ap
pears in the form of Henry Crawford and Maria Bertram,
trailed by their dim-witted host and Maria's fianc6, Mr.
Rushworth. Finding the gate locked to the true wilderness of
the "park,■ Rushworth, the owner of these vast properties,
leaves to get the key, and in his absence Maria frets at the
delay.
But unluckily that iron gate, that ha-ha, give me a
feeling of restraint and hardship. I cannot get
out, as the starling said. ( 99)
Henry suggests insidiously to Maria that they might circum
vent the gate's symbolic authority and constraint.
. . . I think you
round the edge of
tance; I think it
allow yourself to

might with little difficulty pass •
the gate, here, with my assis
might be done, if you . . . could
think it not prohibited. (99)

Others have noted the connotations of Maria's lament in chaf
ing under the burden of her engagement vows,36 but have tended
to overlook Fanny's fluttered concern at this scheme. She
has, by her solitary occupation of the bench, become a sort
of moral woodland sprite.
"You will hurt yourself, Miss Bertram," she cried,
"you will certainly hurt yourself against those
spikes— you will tear your gown— you will be in
danger of slipping into the ha-ha. You had better
not cc." (99-100)
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Hie small voice of Fanny's distress echoes Sherlock's thun
derous denunciation of the alliance of “depraved" “reason and
understanding* with “corrupted" “passions." When she warns
Maria about the ha-ha, she seems to be seeing the perils of
Sherlock's “ditch" that awaits these “blind" adventurers.
The “natural* setting of these escapades suggests that
Austen sees in “nature* threats to virtue. But nature at
Sotherton is “Appetite," in Hutcheson's taxonomy. The “natu
ral wish of gratitude" implies that nature defers to moral
law in guiding the emotions, just as within the enclosed and
cultivated grounds one’s “natural* desires are, or should be,
constrained by the traditional moral order of the ancient
Sotherton estate,37 however emptied of content under present
ownership. The woods beyond the gate offer the opportunity
for Henry and Maria to escape moral confinement, but the es
cape is illusory, since Rushworth ownership, and the moral
authority of the marital engagement, extend even there, how
ever unenforced his proprietary rights. One may lose sight of
virtue in nature, but not escape its dictates.
When Fanny sides with Cowper in lamenting the destruc
tion of the "avenue" of oaks to make way for “improvements,"
(56), she does not embrace raw nature, but rather the mind
and hand of the planter, whose legacy is preserved in the an
cient trees, which modem taste would cut down. Fanny's com
ment, on sitting down on the bench to rest, that “to sit in
the shade on a fine day, and look upon verdure, is the most
perfect refreshment" (96), does imply innocent delight in na
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ture's "smiling scene, “ as Henry later presents it enticingly
to Maria. But Fanny’s refreshment turns to disappointment in
the negligent selfishness of Edmund and Mary, who desert her,
and to horror in the sexual frolic of Henry and Maria. Fanny
alone stays completely within the moral limits defined by the
bench, fence and locked gate, and the indiscretion of Edmund
and Mary lacks the turpitude of Henry and Maria, since they
themselves do not pass the boundaries of the fence.
The closest Fanny comes to being in a true state of na
ture herself is in the environment of her own Portsmouth fam
ily. Their covetousness, her siblings' scrambles for food,
and fights over possessions, are not far removed from a
struggle for survival, and Fanny recoils from the moral vac
uum of existence ungraced by gratitude. The most promising
child is Fanny’s sister, Susan, who is unrewarded for her ef
forts at order and economy in the family, since her mother
dotes on the youngest daughter.
The blind fondness which was for ever producing
evil around her, she [Susan] had never known. There
was no gratitude for affection past or present, to
make her better bear with its excesses to the oth
ers. (396)
The economic hardship of the Price family, of course, stands
in contrast with the Bertram's affluence, but even here
Nature can masquerade its moral poverty and offer a "smiling
scene" that also masks the real poverty which stalks the fam
ily. In perhaps the novel's most rhapsodic passage, Austen
describes the Price family Sunday outing on the Portsmouth
ramparts, v/ith Fanny on Henry Crawford's arm.
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The day was uncommonly lovely. It was really
March; but it was April in its mild air, brisk soft
wind, and bright sun, occasionally clouded for a
minute; and everything looked so beautiful under
the influence of such a sky, the effects of the
shadows pursuing each other, on the ships at
Spithead and the island beyond, with the ever-vary
ing hues of the sea now at high water, dancing in
its glee and dashing against the ramparts with so
fine a sound, produced altogether such a combination of charms for Fanny,as made her almost care
less of the circumstances under which
shefelt
them. (409). [Emphasis added].
This canvas is anything but Austen's "little bit (two Inches
wide) of Ivory on which I work with so fine a Brush, as pro
duces little effect after much labour,"38 and seems clearly to
invite the reader to share Fanny's pleasure, including the
relaxation of her moral scruples against Henry. Like the
flood tide that covers Portsmouth harbor's low-tide grime,
Henry's character and fortunes are now at their high-water
mark. But as the tide falls and nature's smile fades, the
stain on his true character is

revealed byhismoral perfidy

with Maria that follows soon after.
Nevertheless, gratitude does seem to possess a power to
dominate nature, which suggests that Fanny's rejection of its
commands, as voiced by both Sir Thomas and Edmund, might be
only a temporary rebellion against its authority. In fact,
gratitude's "natural wish" also operates in Mansfield Park
and has happened already in the growth of Fanny's secret love
for Edmund from her earliest child gratitude. Thus Edmund's
affirmation of "the natural wish of gratitude" is an accom-
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plished face, and Henry’s claims to gratitude apparently come
too late to weaken Fanny’s committed love.
Nevertheless, Austen refuses to deny that the power of
gratitude ultimately could sway Fanny's affection, had Henry
not thrown away his chances by the adulterous seduction of
Maria Bertram.
Would he have persevered, and uprightly, Fanny must
have been his reward— and a reward very voluntarily
bestowed— within a reasonable period from Edmund's
marrying Mary. (467)
One might dismiss this "what if" commentary as an example of
Austen's penchant for postscripts, except for its echo of
Edmund’s comments to Fanny, which immediately precede his
"natural wish of gratitude" affirmation.
I must hope, however, that time proving him [Henry]
(as I firmly believe it will), to deserve you by
his steady affection, will give him his reward.
(348)
Narrative commentary, by reinforcing the views of the drama's
most authoritative male figure, emphasizes that the fortunes
of Austen’s characters cannot, finally, obstruct the pro
cesses of gratitude. "The natural wish of gratitude," there
fore, must be strong enough not only to compensate for a life
of vice, but also to impose its own imperative on nature's
moral untrustworthiness. Despite its power, however, Fanny
has refused to be led by gratitude against her own heart and
has won her fight. The "what if" narrative commentary must
remain, not a prediction but only a hypothetical possibility.
Fanny's victory over coercion in the name of gratitude chal-
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lenges its ultimate authority, but Austen seems to tell us
that it will survive the challenge.
The authority of gratitude in Pride and Pre-iudice is
supremely powerful and drives the novel to a conclusion that
promises happiness for all. But in Mansfield Park, gratitude
paradoxically threatens Fanny Price, Austen's most grateful
character, with a morally and emotionally repellent marriage
to the scoundrel Henry Crawford. In Emma, gratitude operates
indirectly to threaten Emma with the loss of Mr. Knightley to
Harriet. Despite her position in Highbury at the pinnacle of
social and economic power, unlike the lowly Fanny at
Mansfield Park, Emma must learn the humbling, as well as use
ful, lesson of gratitude for her own happiness. This learning
process must work against the continuing, rather exotic, al
lure of Frank Churchill, who seems masterfully to accomplish
his goals without acknowledging any indebtednness whatsoever
to gratitude. But what Emma learns is something Frank can
never learn, and the penalty of his failure is eviction from
Highbury, as Emma's reward is both happiness and success in
achieving her objectives.
Nevertheless, gratitude seems a little sullied by Emma's
success in subverting its force, which might have driven Mr.
Knightley into the arms of Harriet Smith, and the novel ends
with an implied question hanging in the air: Is gratitude at
the service of self-interest? Austen does not answer the
question, but instead exiles Frank Churchill, whose personal
history might support an affirmative answer, and she also
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concocts a love-nest for Harriet with Robert Martin among the
yeomanry, social eviction if not geographical exile. By dis
tancing Harriet as far as possible, Austen seems to discour
age connections that might suggest unfavorable conclusions
about her treatment at Emma's hands.
But the first question leads to another, larger ques
tion: Is gratitude, perhaps, not the transcendant and power
ful virtue celebrated in Pride and Pre-iudice? If it is re
stricted to a closed system like Highbury that also evicts
nonconformists, then any link with •real1' world morality is
broken or severely strained. In Persuasion. Austen liberates
gratitude from the shackles of class and place and gives it
renewed power to work for personal happiness in a future that
is shaping itself, freed from a crumbling past.
Emma, however, comically subjects gratitude to its most
rigorous critical examination, and if this scrutiny reveals
its flaws, it also confirms its strength. Indeed, the moral
credibility of Persuasion gains authority by gratitude's acid
test in Emma. The test process is the comparison Austen in
vites between the parallel personal histories of Frank
Churchill and Emma Woodhouse, whose characters are similar in
many ways. Although their separate interests appear only ca
sually related, their lives do intersect, in ways often not
apparent at the time, but which the reader and Emma recognize
in retrospect.
Emma reflects on the lessons of their personal histories
in her last conversation with Frank before he spirits Jane
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Fairfax, his bride to be, away from Highbury forever, and she
claims that "I think there is a little likeness between us.*
He bowed.
"If not in our dispositions," she presently
added, with a look of true sensibility, "there is a
likeness in our destiny; the destiny which bids
fair to connect us with two characters so much su
perior to our own." (478).
Frank's bow signals his acquiesence in the "likeness" Emma
observes, and the novel1s protracted comparison of these two
blythe spirits supports the aptness of her observation. A
significant "likeness" that emerges in their parallel histo
ries is that gratitude appears to exercise little if any in
fluence on their personal decisions. Emma seems to have no
occasion for gratitude, since her wealth and autonomy at
Hartfield insulate her from dependence on another's benevo
lence. Frank, whose independence is more limited, neverthe
less rejects the dictates of gratitude, because gratitude ac
knowledges personal relationships, whose disclosure may
threaten the secrecy that shrouds his conduct.
Both Emma and Frank seem to defy the central importance
of gratitude to the virtuous life, emphasized by Francis
Hutcheson in his A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
Hutcheson lists the rights which others have to our "benefi
cence, " including "the good offices we formerly received from
them."
None of these considerations are [sic] to be ne
glected, and least of all the last one; since
there's no obligation more sacred than gratitude,_
none more useful in life; nor is any vice more odi
ous than ingratitude, or more hurtful in society.
When therefore in certain cases we cannot exercise
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all the beneficence we desire, offices of gratitude
should take place of other offices of liberality.39
Gratitude mediates between personal happiness and virtue, de
fined as one’s contribution to the happiness of others, and
links the individual with society. Hutcheson suggests that
gratitude not only is virtuous, but "useful in life." Emma
ironically discovers that her protege, Harriet Smith, already
has learned its usefulness, to the peril of Emma's own per
sonal happiness. Links with society, as his plotting reveals,
are exactly what Frank seeks to avoid, and it is not surpris
ing, then, that he shuns gratitude altogether.
Emma, however, does not say that she and Frank are
"like" each other, but rather that the likeness is "between"
them, and the reason for this detachment of image from body
is clarified by the conditional, almost hypothetical, expla
nation she next offers, "If not in our dispositions." Frank
could hardly escape Emma's critique implied in suggesting
different "dispositions," were it not that she then disavows
their personal moral agency by putting their lives, as it
were, in the hands of the gods, "the destiny" which will
unite them with their respective moral "superiors," George
Knightley and Jane Fairfax. Does Emma really believe that
"destiny" is in control? Our only clue is the "look of true
sensibility" that accompanies her spoken "If" clause.
But what credibility is added by "a look of true sensi
bility, " which had come under attack in the Francophobia of
the time as both feminine and “French," in contrast with "the
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manlier virtues," as exemplified in the Anti-Jacobin imita
tion of Pope's The Dunciad.
Next comes a gentler Virtue.— Ah! beware
Lest the harsh verse her shrinking softness scare.
Visit her not too roughly;— the warm sigh
Breathes on her lips;— the tear drop gems her eye.
Sweet Sensibility, who dwells enshrin'd
In the fine foldings of the feeling mind; —
With delicate Mimosa's sense endu'd,
Who shrinks instinctive from a hand too rude;
Or, like the anaqallis. prescient flower,
Shuts her soft petals at the' approaching shower.
Sweet child of sickly Fancy!— her of yore
From her lov'd France Rousseau to exile bore;40
Janet Todd reminds us of commonplace scholarly opinion that
■'[sjensibility' is perhaps the key term of the period," and
she includes Jane Austen with Coleridge and The Anti-Jacobin
as participants in "the most rigorous conservative attack on
sensibility" during "the alarmist and military years in
England, when sensibility was felt to be demoralizing, antiChristian, and childishly French."41 Todd, however, seems to
accept the anti-Jacobin version of the term's meaning,, rather
than its connotation of understanding mediated by heart and
mind working together. Sensibility, as this kind of under
standing, is never discredited in Austen's novels, although
the reference to Emma's “look" as "true sensibility" implies
an awareness of perhaps a false or counterfeit variety.
Emma's "look," however, may well convey a deeper under
standing and enlightenment, disguised by her graceful words,
than Frank Churchill or even Mr. Knightley can share. There
is no need to question her sincerity in acknowledging Mr.
Knightley as "superior," but it is Emma's own manipulation of
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events, not 'destiny,“ which accomplishes the satisfaction of
her heart*s desire.
This reading challenges the commonplace interpretation
of Emma as the scholar who surrenders her self-regard in ex
change for humilty and marries the mentor who has brought her
to moral maturity. Warren Roberts offers a fairly representa
tive version.
So the story proceeds towards its conclusion, with
Knightley assuming an ever more important role,
casting his shadow over the woman he was to marry
and whose transformation he had effected. By the
end of the story . . . she was assimilated by
Knightley.42
But feminist scholars consider that critical views which both
conclude and approve of Emma’s abasement are misreadings.
Agreeing that “Mr. Knightley carefully creates a wife for
himself in his own image,“ Jean Kennard argues that, “because
of Emma's strengths, not her weaknesses," their marriage is
“unsatisfactory.“
Jane Austen has suggested qualities in Emma . . .
which will find no outlet in this marriage. She
looks forward to the same life, even to the same
house.“43
This marriage, however, is no capitulation for Emma, but
rather essential to her objectives of uniting Donwell and
Hart field, and those plans require that Mr. Knightley also
live in “the same house," where his status is second to Mr.
Woodhouse pending the closer union she eventually contem
plates .
More recently,Wendy Moffat echoes similar feminist
reader frustration.
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And so it is rather unnerving to find this novel
repeating the familiar Austen formula of the future
husband chastening his mate in preparation for mar
riage, more unnerving still to find the narrator
herself echoing, even amplifying, Knightley's cen
sorious voice.44
My main objection to concluding that Emma submits to patri
archy is that her

self-love is intact at the end of the

novel, despite undoubted humbling experiences, and even sur
vives the deceit she employs to contend with the forces of
gratitude working for Harriet which threaten her aims. Robert
Uphau. marshalls evidence from three novels to challenge the
submissiveness of Austen heroines.
Elizabeth Bennet and Emma Woodhouse are very
strong-willed, but even as they later revise their
behavior they do not abdicate their will in order
to conform to the desires of their prospective hus
bands. Conversely, Fanny Price is very compliant,
and yet she rejects Henry Crawford's marriage pro
posal, failing to conform to Sir Thomas Bertram's
will.45
Emma's "true sensibility," feminine or not, gives her a depth
of understanding over other characters, which she employs to
her advantage.
Although Emma does suggest that there may be some dif
ference from Frank in their "dispositions," their close
"likeness" in other respects demonstrates that subtle differ
ences, not stark contrasts, define the choice of virtue or
vice, of good and evil. One difference emerges in Frank's to
tally insincere protest, to Emma's comment on their approach
ing union with "superior" partners, that she "can have no su
perior." Frank admits, however, that it is “most true" for
him since Jane is a "complete angel." He elaborates with en-
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camiums on her physical beauty, to be enhanced with the fam
ily jewels set in "an ornament for the head" he plans to com
mission (479). For Margaret Kirkham, Frank's praise actually
"reveals the shallowness of his regard for his future wife"
and "that he values her as a beautiful object."46 Deliberately
or otherwise, Frank misunderstands Emma, and his gloating
capture of Jane is confirmed by the crown hs. will create and
set on her head, symbolizing his possession as her "head."
Jane becomes his ornament, the reward of the good husband in
the Bible’s Book of Proverbs.
She shall give to thine head an ornament of grace:
a crown of glory shall she deliver to thee (4:8).
This and related passages are the subject of Sermon VII in
James Fordyce's Sermons to Young Women.47 the work selected by
the sententious Mr. Collins for the unreceptive Bennet sis
ters in Pride and Prejudice. Frank's character does not gain
lustre by his echo of these sentiments. In a sense, the
"likeness" Emma finds "between us, ■ Frank finds imprinted on
the prize he will carry away.
Emma distances herself from a "likeness" that can be ad
mired and possessed like an ornament. Emma's observations on
character address values, not appearance, such as her earlier
comparison of Mr. Weston, who cheapens friendship by trying
to be friends with all, with her ideal of male character.
General benevolence, but not general friendship,
made a man what he ought to be.— She could fancy
such a man. (320)
Mr. Knightley, of course, is the outstanding figure of "gen
eral benevolence" in Highbury. Bishop Joseph Butler, whose
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published sermons Hutcheson knew and approved, presents the
portrait of the "benevolent man, ■ in which we can recognize
the presence of power, and the capacity to exercise it.
The benevolent man . . . will be easy and kind to
his dependents, compassionate to the poor and dis
tressed, friendly to all with whom he has to do.
This includes the good neighbor, parent, master,
magistrate: and such behaviour would plainly make
dependence, inferiority, and even servitude, easy.
. . . [H]appiness grows under his influence. This
good principle would discover itself in paying re
spect, gratitude, obedience, as due."48
With the exception of "parent," Mr. Knightley shines in all
these roles, but years of unconscious and deep denial block
off Boraa's connection of him with the "such a nan" she could
"fancy,"

until walls of denial are blown away by the revela

tion that Harriet Smith not only loves Mr. Knightley, but has
persuaded herself that he returns her love. With this shock,
the truth "darted through" Emma, "with the speed of an arrow,
"that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but herself!" (408).
Emma's later musings about her prospective role in the inher
itance of Donwell, Mr. Knightley's estate, show that she also
plans to add "parent" to complete the his conformity with
Butler's list of qualities.
"Fancy" suggests not only the ideal Emma imagines, but
the desire to possess as well, and this desire suggests the
"likeness" Emma acknowledges with Frank, a similarity im
plicit in the exclusive claim she stakes to Mr. Knightley.49
But although she may assert a claim, she cannot possess him
as Frank asserts title to Jane Fairfax, whose financial inse
curity almost guarantees that she will be owned, either as a
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governess in virtual slavery, or by the man who will save her
from this fate.

The union of Emma and Mr. Knightley must

arise from the interchange of benevolence and gratitude, as
it does in all 'good* Austen marriages.
Unlike Frank Churchill, Emma does possess real creden
tials for benevolence, which Austen carefully develops in
Emma’s charitable visitations to the poor of the parish, with
Harriet in tow.
Emma was very compassionate; and the distresses of
the poor were as sure of relief from her personal
attention and kindness, her counsel and her pa
tience, as from her purse. (86)
But what role can gratitude have, where the two leading char
acters have no need of each other's benevolence? The problem
is, with her social equality and fortune of £30,000, Emma has
little occasion to feel, let alone express, gratitude to Mr.
Knightley. The chemistry of love, in Austen, must start with
some occasion of thankfulness, in which a *benefactor" estab
lishes a claim to gratitude. This chemistry appears to have
already started between Harriet Smith and Mr. Knightley, and
Emma fears that she must suppress the process to gain Mr.
Knightley for herself. Thus, gratitude seems to have the
power to frustrate Emma's own objectives as well as her own
role as a benefactor.
Harriet demonstrates appropriate gratitude for Mr.
Knightly's kindness in dancing with her at the ball, "when
Mr. Elton would not stand up with me; and when there was no
other partner in the room."
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That was the kind action; that was the noble benev
olence and generosity; that was the service which
made me begin to feel how superior he was to every
other being on earth. (406-407)
Until this revelation, Emma mistakenly assumes that Harriet's
previous testimony of gratitude was directed at Frank
Churchill for his service in rescuing her person and pocketbook from the gypsies, but that her awe and humility at his
higher social status precluded any thought of him as a possi
ble marriage partner.
Ohl Miss Woodhouse, believe me I have not the
presumption to suppose— Indeed I am not so mad.—
But it is a pleasure to me to admire him at a dis
tance— and to think of his infinite superiority to
all the rest of the world, with the gratitude, won
der, and veneration, which are so proper, in me es
pecially. (341)
Such an outpouring would be appropriate to escape from per
sonal danger and is not unlike Harriet Byron's effusive grat
itude for her rescue by the hero of Richardson's SirCharles
Grandison from the vile Sir Hargrave Pollexfen's evil de
signs.
But what shall I do with my gratitude? Oh my
dear, I am overwhelmed with my gratitude: I can
only express it in silence before them. Every look,
if it be honest to my heart, however tells it:
Reverence mingles with my gratitude.50
Austen would expect her readers to be familiar with Sir
Charles Grandison. and Emma's error shows that her idea of
Harriet's transcendent gratitude for rescue from the gypsies
is the creation of fiction. She now has the shock of learning
that, for Harriet, danger to her body is insignificant in
comparison with a cruel snub at a ball, which calls attention
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to her dependent and socially inferior status. Frank's timely
help pales in comparison with her rescue by Mr. Knightley
from public humiliation.
Harriet’s reversed priorities of importance suggest the
immature and shallow values of "the Fair" in Pope's The Rape
of the Lock, for whom to "lose her heart, or necklace at a
ball" (Canto II, 109) are equivalent disasters. But Austen
seems to say that women’s feelings are not to be trivialized,
because Emma recognizes with horror that she can blame only
herself for encouraging Harriet’s subservient expression of
gratitude to flower into love. The consequences may well be
that Harriet's love will encourage the response of gratitude
itself from Mr. Knightley, followed by marriage in the pat
tern of many Austen marriages.
Emma might well have recognized the looming danger of
this situation from the observations of Mrs. Selby of Sir
Charles Grandison to Harriet Byron, who not surprisingly
yearns to marry the novel's hero and her savior.
It is impossible, iry dear, to imagine that such a
man as Sir Charles Grandison should not have seen
the woman whom he could love, before he saw you; or
whom he had not been engaged to love by his grati
tude, as I may call it, for her love. Has not his
sister talk'd of half a score ladies, who would
break their hearts for him, were he to marry?— And
may not this be the reason why he does not?51
But Emma cannot rely on competitors in gratitude to forestall
marriage between her Harriet and Mr. Knightley, and as yet
does not know that he has already "seen the woman he could
love," who of course is Emma herself. Commenting later on his
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involvement with Emma's childhood moral education, Mr.
Knightley confesses:
I could not think of you so much without doating on
you, faults and all; and by dint of fancying so many
errors, have been in love with you ever since you were
thirteen at least. (462)
Emma's acknowledgment, in the course of this conversation, of
his beneficial influence seems to fall somewhat short of
whole-hearted gratitude.
"I am very sure you were of use to me," cried Emma.
"I was very often influenced rightly by you— oftener
than I would own at the time. I am very sure you did
me good." (462)
The repeated insistence “I am very sure" suggests just the
opposite, and after this hedged assurance, Emma trivializes
the subject by introducing the liklihood that Mrs. Weston's
new baby will also be spoiled and in need of Mr. Knightley's
corrective presence, "except falling in love with her when
she is thirteen." Emma is happy to share the benefits of Mr.
Knightley's moral instruction, of which she is "very sure, *
but she stakes exclusive claim to his love.
Gratitude, in fact, is seen by Emma as the enemy in her
campaign to win Mr. Knightley, and her only hope may be to
block its operation as a contender. That its danger is a real
one in Emma as in Sir Charles Grandison is confirmed by the
discussion of Mr. Weston's two marriages, the first to Frank
Churchill's mother, and the second to Emma's former governess
and mentor, Miss Taylor.
In the first marriage, we are told that Miss Churchill
“fell in love" with then Captain Weston, "whose warm heart
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and sweet temper made him think every thing due to her in re
turn for the great goodness of being in love with him; . . ."
(15). His response, then, and the basis given for his mar
riage, was gratitude for love. This relationship is reversed
in the happier second marriage with Miss Taylor, “a welljudging and truly amiable woman, • who "must give to him the
pleasantest proof of its being a great deal better to chuse
than to be chosen, to excite gratitude than to feel it" (17).
The implication is that Mr. Weston feels a love in his second
marriage he did not have for Miss Churchill. In addition to
his love, "choosing" the "portionless" Miss Taylor, and lib
erating her from even the gentle captivity of being a gov
erness to Emma, are clearly more than sufficient to "excite
gratitude."

The example of both of Mr. Weston's marriages,

then, supplies a joint affirmative answer to Emma's rhetori
cal self-question if this process might not work between
Harriet and Mr. Knightley: "Was it new for one, perhaps too
busy to seek, to be the prize of a girl who would seek him?"
(413), even where class inequalities seem both a formidable
obstacle for Harriet as well as protection for Emma.
Gratitude is also seen as the enemy by Prank Churchill
in the clandestine maneuvering of his secret engagement with
Jane Fairfax. Among the chatter before the ball at the Crown
begins, Mrs. Elton's voice rises above the others in praise
of Frank, so "that Emma could not but imagine he had over
heard his own praises." But Mrs. Elton has also been solici
tously attending to Jane Fairfax, and in the exchange that
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follows between Emma and Frank, he mistakenly assumes that
Emma refers to Mrs. Elton*s attentiveness to Jane.
"How do you like Mrs. Elton?" said Emma in a whis
per.
"Not at all."
"You are ungrateful."
•Ungrateful!— What do you mean?"
Frank fears, as he later reveals, that the suggestion he owes
gratitude to Mrs. Elton means that Emma has guessed his inti
macy with Jane. But "changing from a frown to a smile," he
immediately forces a change in the subject before Emma can
answer, and she is left mystified at his "odd humor" (32425). Later, after the engagement is revealed, Frank returns
to this brief conversation in his lengthy letter to Mrs.
Weston of explanation and apologia, in which he claims that
Emma had suspected the nature of his relationship with Jane.
You will find, . . . that it [the engagement] did not
take her wholly by surprise. She frequently gave me
hints of it. I remember her telling me at the ball,
that I owed Mrs. Elton gratitude for her attentions to
Miss Fairfax. (438-9)
In this case, gratitude for Frank seems to mean disclosure,
which would rend the veil of secrecy shrouding his conduct.
But his "frown" and immediate resistance to the accusation,
even if made playfully, of being "ungrateful" suggest a prej
udice against gratitude bordering on resentment, which may go
well beyond -the fear of disclosure.
The acknowledgment of a claim of gratitude means accept
ing one's subordinate position to another, as Emma does in
referring to the "characters" of their respective marriage
partners as "superior to our own," but which Frank chooses to
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interpret as physical beauty he can effectively purchase with
the jeweled hair “ornament." Mrs. Elton, as a character for
wham he feels only contempt, could not possibly earn his
"gratitude, “ regardless of what kindnesses and compliments
, she casts, whether at him or his beloved. Thus, it appears
that pride may be at the root of Frank's quick hostility to
suggestions of gratitude, which seems to contradict Emma's
early appraisal of a buoyant Frank Churchill, throwing him
self enthusiastically into arrangements for the Crown Inn
ball, and careless of the blurring of class distinctions
among the proposed guests.
Of pride, indeed, there was, perhaps, scarcely enough:
his indifference to a confusion of rank, bordered too
much on inelegance of mind. He could be no judge, how
ever, of the evil he was holding cheap. It was but an
effusion of lively spirits. (198)
But Emma's analysis of this master of masquerade's "pride"
proves incorrect, as betrayed fcy the stress of disclosure he
sees threatened by Emma's remarks on the gratitude due Mrs.
Elton.
Frank may, in fact subscribe to a value system in which
gratitude has no part and which invites comparison with the
philosophy of William Godwin, to whose adherents Austen ap
plies the adjective "raffish" in a letter to Cassandra.52
Godwin's Encruirv Concerning Political Justice (1798) rejects
gratitude from his utopian community governed solely by rea
son.
Gratitude, therefore, if by gratitude we understand a
sentiment of preference which I entertain towards an
other, upon the ground of my having been the subject
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of his benefits, is no part either of justice or
virtue.53
Godwin amplifies on the exclusion of gratitude from his sys
tem by claiming later that it "has already been proved not to
be a virtue, but a vice* and his reasoning is that the sole
criteria for determining an individual's worth should be use
fulness to society and *intrinsic qualities and capacities.*54
I take these quotations out of context, and it would be a
misreading of Godwin to suggest that Frank exemplifies his
philosophy in other respects, on the sole basis of apparent
similarities in Frank's character to Godwin's thoughts on
gratitude. Nevertheless, Godwin's faith in the supremacy of
reason to guide an enlightened society of virtue without the
need for "governments" identifies him closely with the
philosoohes of the French Revolution, a connection that in
trudes into the argument between Emma and Mr. Knightley over
Frank Churchill's moral standards.
When Emma describes Frank as "amiable, * Mr. Knightley
responds by linking the word's French roots with his charac
ter analysis.
No, Emma, your amiable young man can be amiable only
in French, not in English. He may be very 'amiable, ■
have very good manners, and be very agreeable; but he
can have no English delicacy towards the feelings of
other people: nothing really amiable about him. (149)
Frank Bradbrook argues persuasively that Mr. Knightley's com
ments are a critique of Lord Chesterfield’s Letters to his
Son and quotes Chesterfield that he “wished to make his son
'both respectable et amiable, the perfection of a human char
acter, '" but that the task was difficult since "1[t]he Graces
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. . . seem to have taken refuge in France. *"55 Frank's ties to
English values do seem weak. Frustrated and distressed at the
Donwell outing because of the imminent collapse of his secret
engagement with Jane, he raves to Emma, "I am sick of
England— and would leave it tomorrow if I could" (365). Mr.
Knightley no doubt would agree that France would be a more
appropriate home for him.
Mr. Knightley includes Frank's neglect of the "duty" to
visit his father in the broader condemnation of his behavior
as French. Emma equally consistently opposes the pragmatic
reality of Mrs. Churchill's claims on Frank's attendance and
his dependence on the Churchill fortune for his financial se
curity (145-46) . Contrasting Mr. Knightley's s t e m dictums
with Frank’s disadvantaged situation in the Churchill house
hold, Emma objects that he might find it impossible to exer
cise the independence of action Mr. Knightley would assert in
a like situation.
The Churchills might not have a word to say in return;
but then, you would have no habits of early obedience
and long observance to break through. To him who has,
it might not be so easy to burst forth at once into
perfect independence, and set all their claims on his
gratitude and regard at naught. (147-48)
Emma's preaching of gratitude due the Churchills at the ex
pense of Frank's attendance on his father may be more rhetor
ical, for the purposes of argument, than sincere, particu
larly in view of her own steadfast devotion to Mr. Woodhouse,
since she makes attention her father's needs a condition
precedent to her eventual marriage.56 Mr. Knightley, however,
dismisses these excuses as "expediency" and insists that
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"(a]s he became rational, he ought to have roused himself and
shaken off all that was unworthy in their authority" (148).
This position, however, appears paradoxical. Mr.
Knight ley does not dispute Emma's argument that Frank has a
duty of gratitude to his benefactors, but shrugs it off and
instead advocates rebellion against "authority." Is Mr.
Knightley a Godwinian or a "ohilosophe"? On the contrary, im
plicit in his moral position is the superior claim to filial
gratitude of parent over guardian, recognized in legal com
mentary by Blackstone.
For to those who gave us existence we naturally owe
subjection and obedience during our minority, and hon
our and reverence ever after.57
Edmund Burke uses the familiar eighteenth-century analogy of
parent-chiId with the relation of subjects to the monarch,
which Michael McKeon labels "patriarchalism."
The patriarchal analogy works because it is based on a
hierarchical notion of authority that is implicitly
analogical: as in the microcosm, so in the macro
cosm.58
Although allegiance to the monarch is not at issue in the
conversation with Emma, Mr. Knightley is firm that duty to a
father takes precedence over other claimants such as the
Churchills. Burke insists that "revolutionaries are miscreant
parricides," which in context with his parallel argument that
"ingratitude to benefactors is the first of revolutionary
virtues,"59 supports Mr. Knightley's priority of claimants to
Frank's duty. One would have to say that such views reveal
Mr. Knightley as, not surprisingly, a counter-revolutionary
and hostile to the example cf France.
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Mr. Knight ley's political contextualizing of Frank seems
to feed his scorn for Frank as a letter writer.
He can sit down and write a fine flourishing letter,
full of professions and falsehoods, and persuade him
self that he has hit upon the very best method in the
world of preserving peace at home and preventing his
father's having any right to complain. His letters
disgust me. (148-49)
How can Mr. Knightley know that Frank's letters are "full of
. . . falsehoods?" They reveal no such character defect to
other readers. It seems more likely that Mr. Knightley be
trays jealousy of Frank, to which he later admits, and by co
incidence comes close to the truth. "Disgust" may also re
flect Mr. Knightley's later appraisal of Frank's handwriting
as "too small— wants strength" and "like a woman's writing"
(297), thus joining “French" and “feminine" as does the AntiJacobin poem "New Morality," and at the same time suggesting
yet another "likeness" between Frank and Emma.
Letter-writing is privileged in most Austen novels, such
as the sanctity of Fanny Price's correspondence with her
brother, William, in Mansfield Park, where it is closely
bonded with gratitude, both in the humility of the letterwriter, and in Fanny's gratitude for Edmund's bringing her
the writing materials she lacks. Even Jane Austen's mock
gratitude for a long letter from Cassandra, when she mis
quotes the passage discussed earlier from Sir Charles
Grandison. shadows the true gratitude and humility of the act
of writing.
Tuesday— Dear me! what is to become of me! Such a
long Letter! Two & forty lines in the 2nd Page.— Like
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Harriet Byron I ask, what am I to do with my
Gratitude?— I can do nothing but thank you & go on.60
Patricia D. Davis notes that "Jane Austen's novels are filled
with memorable letters," which "do more than serve the plot."
More often than not, the content of a letter, . . .
does double or even triple duty in an Austen novel. .
. . Often a letter will reveal something of the char
acter of its writer; just as often, a letter will re
veal something of the character of the person who re
ports or discusses its content; and sometimes a letter
does both.61
When mis-used by the venial, letters often reveal the true
character they wish to conceal, whereas personal performance
in social situations may successfully deceive. Catherine
MOrland in Northanaer Abbev has no difficulty seeing the
hypocrisy and double-dealing in Isabella Thorpe's self-serv
ing and craven letter appealing for her restoration to favor,
and Fanny Price immediately sees the moral wasteland dis
closed by Mary Crawford's letter.
In Emma, however, letter-writing is both more critical
to plot, and more problematic in its moral role, than in the
other novels. Emma admits that the yeoman farmer, Robert
Martin writes "a very good letter" proposing marriage to
Harriet, which was "very much to the credit of the writer,"
and "expressed good sense" (51), but this may be the last
letter of the novel to join content unequivocally with the
writer's character. Emma, however, attempts to devalue the
evidence of merit her own sense confirms in order to dis
credit the writer and thus prevent an alliance for Harriet
contrary to Emma's plans. John Knightley terms letters "a
very positive curse" to Jane Fairfax, whose whole life at
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this time revolves around the post office in her secret cor
respondence with Frank, and he further considers "letters of
friendship" to be "the worst," because “ [b]usiness, you know,
may bring money, but friendship hardly ever does" (293), a
near paraphrase of Samuel Johnson's observation that in let
ters of friendship, "[i]t is easy . . . to glow with benevo
lence when there is none to be given."
Frank’s final letter to Mrs. Weston becomes a letter
about letters: Jane has written Frank terminating their en
gagement, after the quarrel at Box Hill.
I answered it within the hour; but from the confusion
of ny mind, and the multiplicity of business falling
on me at once, my answer, instead of being sent with
all the other letters of that day, was locked up in my
writing-desk; . . . (442)
Two days later, Jane returns all of Frank's letters and asks
for hers back. The truth which these letters, emblems of
love, should affirm, turns out to be reversible. Lives that
are knit through the agency of the post office unravel.
Finally, can we believe Frank's story that his conciliatory
letter to Jane got lost in the shuffle?
Mr. Knightley's disparagement of Frank's letters as im
plicitly cursed by French-like qualities may be Austen’s sug
gestion that Frank's letters are as much a mask of character
as his behavior has disguised motives and objectives. Frank's
letter-writing invites comparison with Samuel Johnson's ques
tioning of letters as a source of truth, which Johnson sees
as an outmoded and, perhaps worse, a French convention.
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It has been so long said as to be commonly believed
that the true characters of men may be found in their
letters, and that he who writes to his friend lays his
heart open before him. But the truth is that such were
the simple friendships of the Golden Acre, and are now
the friendships only of children.62
Johnson's target here, as George Birkbeck Hill suggests in
his note, seems to be Voltaire's opinion that it is in pri
vate correspondence, not intended for publication, "that one
sees the true feelings of men" [my translation]. By discred
iting Voltaire in particular, and French letter writing in
general (as he does in The Rambler No. 152),63 Johnson implies
that Voltaire's "veritables sentiments" is a sham and pre
tense. He goes on to make this contention explicit.
There is, indeed, no transaction which offers stronger
temptations to fallacy and sophistication than episto
lary intercourse. . . . [Unlike conversation] a
friendly letter is a calm and deliberate performance
in the cool of leisure, and surely no man sits down to
depreciate by design his own character.
Friendship has no tendency to secure veracity, for
by whom can a man so much wish to be thought better
than he is as by him whose kindness he desires to gain
or keep?
To charge those favourable representations, which
men give of their own minds, with the guilt of hypo
critical falsehood, would shew more severity than
knowledge. The writer commonly believes himself.
Almost every man's thoughts, while they are general,
are right; and most hearts are pure while temptation
is away. It is easy to awaken generous sentiments in
privacy; to despise death when there is no danger; to
glow with benevolence when there is none to be given.
While such ideas are formed they are felt, and selflove does not suspect the gleam of virtue to be the
meteor of fancy.64
Frank Churchill's role in Highbury is all "performance," in
cluding his final letter of explanation and apology to Mrs.
Weston. He remains perhaps the most opaque of all Austen
characters, but as Johnson suggests, "[t]he writer commonly
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believes himself,- and there is no reason to doubt Frank’s
expressed sincerity. Frank himself observes that ■[m]y
courage rises as I write- (437) .
Significantly, there is no explicit statement of grati
tude in Frank’s letter, except for the hyperbole of "a thou
sand and a thousand thanks" to Mrs. Weston for past unspe
cific "kindnesses,- multiplied to "ten thousand" for equally
unspecific future attentiveness to Jane Fairfax (443), an
empty gesture since she and Frank soon are to disappear from
Highbury. Further, Emma's argument in her debate with Mr.
Knightley that Frank is bound by ties of gratitude to conform
with the wishes of the Churchills is undercut by his subse
quent precipitate action in publicizing the hitherto secret
engagement to Jane Fairfax, upon the sudden and unexpected
death of Mrs. Churchill, whose objection to the engagement
would have been certain. His deference to the Churchills thus
is revealed to have been the moral weakness of acting from
"expediency," just as Mr. Knightley labeled it, without a
shred of the gratitude claimed for him by Emma.
Not only is gratitude unmentioned in his letter, Frank
disavows the humility from which gratitude arises, by citing
his good fortune and observing that " [i]t is very difficult
for the prosperous to be humble" (437). Professing some "anx
iety" for his deception and manipulation of Emma, he comments
that "my father perhaps will think I ought to add, with the
deepest humiliation" (438). Frank, however, does not say
whether he might share such an opinion, and in closing his
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letter, he again transfers to another, this time Mrs. Weston,
the appraisal of his character: "If you think me in a way to
be happier than I deserve, I am quite of your opinion" (443).
This closure may seem like a literary flourish or defer
ential gesture of humility, but its indirectness contrasts
with the playful yet serious remorse of Frederick Wentworth
in Persuasion for the pride which caused the "six years of
separation and suffering" before being reunited with Anne
Elliot: "I must learn to brook being happier than I deserve"
(247). Awareness of being, at least to a degree, undeserving
of one's good fortune, is essential to the humility inherent
in gratitude. Humility and gratitude, in turn are precondi
tions for self-knowledge. Pride, which prevents humility,
thus also prevents self-knowledge. Wentworth knows himself;
Frank can only defer to the opinion of others.
Since Frank rejects the way to self-knowledge through
gratitude, he cannot even know that he does not know himself.
His character, then, is incapable of moral choice. Highbury
is a world of moral choice, not of black and white alterna
tives, but of judging relative values, even to letting dubi
ous means serve the choice of ends. There is a "likeness" be
tween Frank and Emma in that both use deception to their ad
vantage. Emma even continues to deceive Mr. Knightley about
Harriet's love, but her choice of deception is nonetheless a
moral one, based on the self-knowledge which comes with hu
mility and gratitude.
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Emma seems to learn the meaning of gratitude through the
experience of pain, an experience unknown to Frank. After be
ing reprimanded by Mr. Knightley for her flip witticism at
Miss Bates's expense in the presence of others at the Box
Hill picnic, she makes a penetential visit to the modest
apartments of Mrs. and Miss Bates, with feelings of humility
as she is announced, quite different from her usual selflove.
■The ladies were all at home." She had never re
joiced at the sound before, nor ever before entered
the passage, nor walked up the stairs, with any wish
of giving pleasure, but in conferring obligation, or
of deriving it, except in subsequent ridicule. (378)
■Conferring obligation* arises from the class difference be
tween the Bates and Emma, and the unspoken assumption is that
the "obligation* is expressed as gratitude for Emma's conde
scension in visiting. On this occasion, however, Emma again
cannot be "in charity with herself, ■ and thus her self-love
is mortified. Her inquiries concerning the welfare of them
selves and their niece, Jane Fairfax, prompts Miss Bates to
insist that Emma is *[s]o very kind* and "you are always
kind.* For Emma, "[t]here was no bearing such an 'always;'
and to break through her dreadful gratitude" (380), Emma pro
ceeds to ask specific questions about Jane. Why does Emma
find Miss Bates's gratitude to be "dreadful?" The answer must
be Emma's consciousness that she is unworthy of it, and
"dreadful" expresses the pain she feels.
Despite the value of this humbling in Emma’s moral edu
cation, and the gain in self-knowledge which distinguishes
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her from Frank Churchill, Austen's creation of the benevolence-gratitude relationship between Emma and Mr. Knightley
seems contrived and lacks the affirmative endorsement of the
process in other novels, including Persuasion, the next to
follow Emma. Gratitude may be inferred in Mr. Knightley's re
lief from jealousy when he discovers that Emma never has.
loved Frank Churchill. In their conversation just before Emma
gives him the opening to declare his love, Mr. Knightley com
ments somewhat bitterly on Frank Churchill as "the favourite
of fortune" in obtaining the hand of Jane Fairfax.
■You speak as if you envied him. ■
■And I do envy him, Emma. In one respect he is the
object of ny envy." (429)
Of course, Emma fears that the "one respect" may be Mr.
Knightley's love for Harriet, but the misunderstanding is
soon cleared up. However, shortly thereafter Mr. Knightley
does confess that, with respect to his consistently unfavor
able opinion of Frank Churchill, "I was not quite impartial
in my judgment, Emma, * an admission of jealousy (445). Envy
and jealousy may not be admirable traits, but they bring to
gether the moral worlds of Knightley and Emma, and on Emma's
terms.
Even Emma's love for Mr. Knightley is less than ex
plicit, since her interest in him always seems paired with
her concern that the Donwell Abbey estate might get diverted
from the inheritance of "little Henry," who, as the eldest
son of Emma's sister and John Knightley, would be next in
line so long as Mr. Knightley remains childless. And this may
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be the only benevolence to him of which Emma is uniquely ca
pable; she may present him an heir which will preserve the
dynastic union of Hartfield and Donwell. Austen analyzes
Emma's musing on her own prospective agency in uniting the
estates.
It is remakable, that Emma, in the many, very many,
points of view in which she was now beginning to con
sider Donwell Abbey, was never struck with any sense
of injury to her nephew Henry, whose rights as heir
expectant had formerly been so tenaciously regarded.
Think she must of the possible difference to the poor
little boy; and yet she only gave herself a saucy con
scious smile about it, and found amusement in detect
ing the real cause of that violent dislike of Mr.
Knightley's marrying Jane Fairfax, or any body else, .
. . (449-50).
The scene suggested here is Emma standing at a mirror with
her thoughts, since "the saucy conscious smile" is one she
■gave herself." Austen's narrative and inplied setting seem
designed to call the reader's attention to the "saucy con
scious smile," which may reflect a previously sublimated
erotic fantasy. But Emma's anticipation of producing an heir,
in her dismissal of her nephew's potential interest, seems
very clear.
It seems to me that those who write Emma off as submit
ting meekly to Mr. Knightley's tutelage fail to recognize the
control she exercises over disclosures that might be danger
ous to her objectives, a control that undermines Knightley's
eloquent appeal to "the beauty of truth and sincerity." While
Austen singles out Emma's deception only to minimize it—
"Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human
disclosure" (431)— the fact remains that, after Frank
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Churchill's game of deception is revealed, she and not Mr.
Knightley is manipulating events.
The benevolent world of Highbury is still a kind of
closed system. Harriet eventually earns her place in that
world by attaching herself to Donwell's bounty in marrying
Robert Martin of Abbey Mill Farm, but Jane Fairfax and Frank
Churchill are effectively exiled. Many have pointed out the
similarity between Frank and Emma, to which Emma herself tes
tifies, and at least part of Austen's reason for evicting him
and his bride seems to be that there is room for only one ma
nipulator in town. For Beatrice Marie, Frank Churchill, "not
Emma, is the master-manipulator of others' desires."65
But Frank's exile, as I have suggested, may also symbol
ize the ejection of a value system incompatible with the
benevolent world of Highbury. Far more than from overt evil
or immorality, Highbury is endangered by the moral vacuum
created by the absence of self-knowledge. Frank Churchill's
opacity finally is seen to screen a vacuum, and he has no fu
ture in Highbury. We are left with the felt presence of an
other outside world, peopled by lawyers and by romantic,
selfish, adventurers like Frank Churchill. After Emma consol
idates Highbury's internal bastions of power, one still won
ders at the continuing strength of its benevolence to resist
the world which surrounds it. In Persuasion. Austen seems to
suggest that Highbury, as a moral universe, may not be worth
saving.
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While there is comic pleasure in the duplicity that Emma
employs to frustrate the ominous potential of marriage be
tween Harriet and Mr. Knightley, a certain insensitivity is
required to accept Harriet's emotional damage from Emma's
maltreatment. The inheritance of Donwell, which Enina succeeds
in controlling, even if at the likely expense of her nephew,
could turn out to be a blighted legacy. Kellynch, Sir Walter
Elliot's patronymic estate in Persuasion, may be a shriveled
version of Donwell and Hartfield on the verge of moral and
fiscal bankruptcy. Like Emma and her father, Anne Elliot's
sister presides with Sir Walter over their proprietary es
tate, but Elizabeth Elliot is Emma with all her vanity and
pride, but drained of moral feeling, compassion, and intelli
gence.
Although the reader may feel (as I do) same moral kin
ship or sympathy with the deceptions and self-serving machi
nations Emma employs to achieve her objectives, Austen may
feel that too many concessions to human weakness are neces
sary for the preservation of Highbury and its component es
tates, and that gratitude is at a dead end if it serves the
ends of selfishness and protects a derelict status

quo

.

It is

a commonplace that Frederick Wentworth in Persuasion symbol
izes the new modem entrepreneurial man, but more importantly
Anne's acceptance of him frees gratitude from the limitations
of place and ideology, where it seems confined after Emma,
and it expands to empower the lovers in an open-ended moral
universe.
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CHAPTER VI

TRUSTING PROVIDENCE: GRATITUDE REAFFIRMED IN PERSUASION
The plot of Persuasion seems to turn on critical acci
dents. As Anne Elliot prepares for the dreaded encounter with
Frederick Wentworth after their eight-year separation since
she broke off their engagement, her sister's child has "a bad
fall." Anne is willingly pressed into service as nurse while
the others leave to meet the new tenants of Kellynch,
Frederick's sister and her husband, Admiral Croft, whom
Frederick is visiting.
The child's situation put the visit entirely aside,
but she could not hear of her escape with indiffer
ence, even in the midst of the serious anxiety which
they afterwards felt on his account. (53)
Later, when concern for the lad has subsided, his grandpar
ents urge Anne to join them, but "both father and mother were
in much too strong and recent alarm to bear the thought; and
Anne, in the joy of her recent escape, could not help adding
her warm protestations to theirs" (55).
The boy's accident may have been bad luck for him, but
Anne clearly sees it as good luck for her. In the game of
luck, there is a loser for every winner, and the results are
morally neutral. But there is a bigger game or contest going
on in Persuasion between luck and "Providence" for control of
people's lives. Luck's strategy in this game is to delude
people into thinking that luck is their slave and that they
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deserve their rewards. Wentworth believes he controls luck:
■He had been Iu c Jq ' in his profession. . . . He had always
been lucky; he knew he should be so still* (27). But his last
speech, and the last words of any character in the novel,
show that he recognizes this fallacy.
■I have been used to the gratification of believing
myself to earn every blessing that I enjoyed. I have
valued myself on honourable toils and just rewards.
Like other great men under reverses,• he added with a
smile, *1 must endeavour to subdue my mind to my for
tune. I must learn to brook being happier them I de
serve." (247)
What Frederick's elegant irony discloses is that he has
learned gratitude for Anne's love and their reunion, bless
ings that his own personal success has had no power to com
mand. If he controlled his luck, he would "deserve* his "for
tune," and there would be no occasion for gratitude.
Gratitude is at once a more powerful force, but yet more
invisible, than in Austen’s other novels. The reason is that,
in Persuasion, the object of gratitude is "Providence." The
linkage of gratitude with a benevolent providence defines a
theocentric universe in which religion and morality reinforce
each other. Luck defines a deterministic world controlled by
"accidents" in which such values are irrelevant. This is the
world that Laurie Kaplan sees reflected in Persuasion, where
"one's fate (like happiness in marriage), was purely acciden
tal, purely a matter of chance."1 Kaplan relates the accidents
in Persuasion that mark crucial moments in the plot to popu
lar medical texts that address environmental hazards and
claims that these accidents teach the actors "that their
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sense of power is illusory, ■ and that “life is chaotic and
random" (162) . But Kaplan fails to recognize the unseen con
trolling agency of "Providence" in the novel.
On the other hand, Anne's bitterness at the misery she
has suffered in her eight years of estrangement from
Wentworth does acknowledge “Providence," and she reproaches
herself for actions which seem to have denied its premise.
She was persuaded that . . . she should yet have been
a happier woman in maintaining the engagement, than
she had been in the sacrifice of it; . . . without
reference to the actual results of their case, which,
as it happened, would have bestowed earlier prosperity
than could be reasonably calculated on. . . .
How eloquent . . . were her wishes on the side of
early warm attachment, and a cheerful confidence in
futurity, against that over-anxious caution which
seems to insult exertion and distrust Providence! (29—
30) .
The clinching self-accusation seems to be that hesitating to
cast their lots together is to “distrust Providence." In
other words, Anne sees a “rightness" in marrying Wentworth
that "Providence" will somehow bless. Their love should make
them specially favored people, a promised future thwarted by
"over-anxious caution." But Anne is making a mistake, not the
mistake of a false belief in a beneficent universal power,
but in feeling that happiness is, or should be, their enti
tlement, the same mistake that Wentworth recognizes in his
final testimonial.
His speech follows a thoughtful and lengthy apologia by
Anne which comments on her earlier rueful reflections and, I
believe, states the whole moral meaning of the novel.
Nevertheless, perhaps no passage in all the novels has been

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

235

so misunderstood as this final speech, and, in fact, it does
seem internally self-contradictory.
■I have been thinking over the past, and trying im
partially to judge of the right and wrong, I mean with
regard to myself; and I must believe that I was right,
much as I suffered from it, that I was perfectly right
in being guided by the friend whom you will love bet
ter than you do now. To me, she was in the place of a
parent. Do not mistake me, however. I am not saying
that she did not err in her advice. It was, perhaps,
one of those cases in which advice is good or bad only
as the event decides: and for myself, I certainly
never should, in any circumstance of tolerable simi
larity, give such advice. But I mean, that I was right
in submitting to her, and that if I had done other
wise, I should have suffered more in continuing the
engagement than I did even in giving it up, because I
should have suffered in my conscience. I have now, as
far as such a sentiment is allowable in human nature,
nothing to reproach myself with; and if I mistake not,
a strong sense of duty is no bad part of a woman’s
portion." (246) [Emphasis added].
After defending as "right" to Wentworth her submission to
Lady Russell's wishes, and the termination of their engage
ment eight years before, “much as I suffered from it," Anne
volunteers that "It was, perhaps, one of those cases in which
advice is good or bad only as the event decides; . . .• She
adds, parenthetically, her own personal disapproval of such
advice, and resumes her defense on the grounds that "I should
have suffered more in continuing the engagement than I did
even in giving it up, because I should have suffered in my
conscience," since Lady Russell has stood in loco parentis
for Anne, who considers filial obedience a "duty," and an ad
mirable one at that (246).
The passage has been seized upon by a number of schol
ars as a credo of a kind of stoic Christianity, which holds
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that conduct is judged by moral standards unrelated to its
consequences, and which further proves the influence of
Joseph Butler on Anne's moral philosophy. However, Anne's ap
parently digressive aside that their situation may be "one of
those cases in which advice is good or bad only as the event
decides" creates difficulties for advocates of a Butlerian
theory of stoic Christianity. D. D. Devlin, commenting on the
entire passage, claims that *[t]he language shows how close
Jane Austen's moral world is to that of Butler and [Samuel]
Johnson," but he avoids the problem for his argument of this
key clause by omitting it in his quotation of the text.2
Philip Drew acknowledges that the clause must be dealt with,
but disposes of it briefly.
It is clear that while advice may sometimes, as in
this case, be vindicated or condemned by its outcome,
conduct must be assessed differently: thus the unhappy
outcome of Anne's corrpliance has no bearing on the
moral status of her decision.3
I suggest that nothing is absolutely "clear" in this passage,
except its paradoxical ambiguity. Anne's argument is full of
qualifications, a consistent refusal to state a firm position
on grounds of principle, and finally an appeal that rests on
the avoidance of pain. Ultimately, Anne's summation affirms
personal happiness as the determinant of moral virtue, not
its sacrifice to some more austere concept of Christian duty.
The value system is that of Francis Hutcheson, not
Joseph Butler. For Hutcheson, "[T]hat Action is best, which
accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest
Numbers."4 Virtue is measured by happiness, and thus judgments
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of "good* and "bad" depend upon results. Anne's happiness may
be virtue on a small scale, but it is still a moral good.
Further, she demonstrates, in her intuitive negative feelings
about William Elliot, a Hutchesonian "moral sense" which is
entrusted with more authority than it is in earlier novels.
Persuasion represents, then, a complete commitment to
Hutcheson's philosophy, including the religious basis he
claims for it.
Hutcheson's system rules out a selfish hedonism, which
might justify one's happiness at the expense of others, and
moral worth also requires that favorable consequences be sup
ported by virtuous intentions.
[W]e often are conscious of the Desire of the
Happiness of others, without any such Conception of it
as the Means of our own; . . . The virtuous
Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would
subsist without view to private Good.5
I do not deny that Austen intends us to understand Anne as a
person with a "moral faculty," as Butler calls conscience,6 or
that not "submitting" to the wishes of a surrogate mother
would cause her the remorse of disobedience to what she sees
as "duty." However, the "event" which "decides" the rightness
or wrongness of her compliance is, finally, her reunion with
Wentworth, and the quality of happiness they feel on the walk
when they renew their vows is enhanced by their personal
growth during eight years of separation.
[S]oon words enough had passed between them to decide
their direction towards the comparative quiet and re
tired gravel-walk, where the power of conversation
would make the present hour a blessing indeed; and
prepare it for all the immortality which the happiest
recollections of their own future lives could bestow.
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. . . There they returned again into the past, more
exquisitely happy, perhaps, in their reunion, than
when it had been first projected; more tender, more
tried, more fixed in a knowledge of each other's char
acter, truth, and attachment; more equal to act, more
justified in acting. (240-41) .
Thus Anne’s ultimate happiness, not her previous suffering,
does seem to be the *event” that stamps approval, both on
Lady Russell ’s advice as "good, * not "bad, ■ as well as on
Anne’s compliance.
It is indicative of Austen’s priorities, I think, that
the terms "happy" and "happiness" together appear almost a
thousand times in the novels, far more than any other value
standard, as opposed to the vocabulary of a sterner morality,
such as the 115 appearances of "duty," for which Anne ac
knowledges respect in her compliance with Lacty Russell’s
wishes.7 But Lady Russell herself, we are told, "was a very
good woman, and if her second object was to be sensible and
well-judging, her first was to see Anne happy" (249).
Happiness, then, is also Lady Russell's objective, not the
satisfaction of making Anne put on the hair shirt of duty,
even if her earlier advice seemed to work against it for
eight years.
Austen mites past and future with the lovers’ reunion
and grants "immortality" to the "present hour," projecting
into "their own future lives" their "happiest recollections,"
while they also "returned again into the past." Thus, "as the
event decides" seems to have been prefigured in their past
history, as well as to foreshadow the future. The immanence
of a beneficent providence at work is also evoked in the hush
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of the "quiet and retired gravel-walk" and the "blessing" the
moment enjoys. The mood represents a complete reversal from
the bitterness and remorse of Anne's reflections on past suf
ferings, when she anticipates Frederick Wentworth's reappear
ance at Kellynch. Further, Wentworth

also refers to his hap

piness as a "blessing," which suggests the gift of God, the
ultimate source of benevolence for Hutcheson.
The best State of rational Agents, and their greatest
and most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to
imagine must consist in universal efficacious
Benevolence, and hence we conclude the Deity benevo
lent . . . 8
Such transcendent benevolence calls for "a sincere Love and
Gratitude toward our Benefactor,■ which includes "all the ra
tional Devotion, or Religion, toward a Deity apprehended as
Good, which we can possibly perform,"9 and Hutcheson's succes
sor, William Paley, claims that • [t]he love of God is the
sublimest gratitude."10 After her walk with Wentworth, Anne's
emotional state is elation, but her subsequent reflections
are more devotional.
An interval of meditation, serious and grateful, was
the best corrective of every thing dangerous in such
high-wrought felicity; and she went to her room, and
grew steadfast and fearless in the thankfulness of her
enjoyment. (245)
Anne's gratitude brings strength and makes her "steadfast and
fearless," since she recognizes that their destinies are in
the hands of a benevolent "Providence," which has proven that
it may be "trusted" by results. “As the event decides" is,
finally, the only possible proof.
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Hutcheson observes, however, that virtue and reward do
not march in lock step.
What should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? . .
. And what Ground have we from the Idea of a God it
self to believe the Deity is good in the Christian
Sense, that is, studious of the Good of his
Creatures? . . . A Manichean Evil God is a Notion
which Men would as readily run into as that of a
Good one, . . . unless we prov'd that the happiness
of Creatures was advantageous to the Deity.11
This "unless" clause is the challenge of the moral philoso
pher, and Hutcheson admits that "we shall perhaps find no
demonstrative Arguments a priori, from the Idea of an
Independent Being, to prove his Goodness." He finally relies
on what he sees as the evidence of "vastly prepollent Good"
over "casual Evils" to support "the great Agreement of
Mankind" on a benevolent "Deity."12 Hutcheson uses "Manichean"
in the Western Christian tradition "as a synonym for
•dualist,’ and any teaching that manifested a tendency toward
dualism was accordingly called Manichaean. "13 William Elliot,
the legal heir of Kellynch and promoted by Lady Russell as
the best choice of husbands for Anne, is an evil and threat
ening force, but the frustration of his objectives is evi
dence that satisfies Hutcheson's criteria of "vastly prepol
lent Good."
Hutcheson's leap of faith, as rhetorical argument, is
not quite so naive as it may appear, because it throws the
whole weight of proof not so much on events, as on humanity's
collective opinion about events. In a sense, happiness is the
judgment of feelings rendered on the evidence and depends on
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gaining confidence in how to work with Providence, learning
what Providence demands, and what it can do.
For Philip Drew, the author seems to merge with this
benevolent providence, and he claims that the ultimate "happy
ending" of Persuasion supports his argument that the novel as
genre tends to be constructed on a teleology that judges
moral choices by their outcomes. The author controls events,
and thus by its nature the novel subverts the idea that the
morality of decisions is independent of their consequences.
If Jane Austen believes, as I have argued, that right
actions are intrinsically virtuous, does she not com
promise her entire position by arranging for them to
be vindicated by results?14
Drew's solution to this dilemma is to advance the thesis that
"the happiness that follows is not the outcome of their [the
characters'] actions, but the gift of the author to the read
ers."
Jane Austen deliberately gratifies the reader's sense
of poetic justice and by the same device brings rather
closer together the two ethical systems which have so
far, for the sake of clarity, been kept as distinct as
possible.15
Nevertheless, Drew does acknowledge that the novelist's "ar
ranging" of "prosperous consequences" creates a "troublesome"
problem in supporting his argument, but he claims that, after
all, we as readers are expected to be aware we are reading
fiction and "moving in a constructed world."16 It seems to me
that Drew comes close here to writing an implied "real world"
ending less frustrating for the theory he advances. However,
if the author is the only power that can order events to con
form with "the reader’s sense of poetic justice," the world
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outside the novel is either Kaplan's universe of random acci
dent, or a system in which evidence of virtue or morality is
withheld until a final revelation in the hereafter.
Austen, I feel, does not subscribe to either belief. The
■Providence* whose presence is evoked in Persuasion works and
manifests itself in the world as it does in the lives and
comprehension of her characters, and can be understood with
out concluding that the "happy ending* is the fiction of an
omnipotent “author.* Instead, the reader is invited to see
that "Providence* is manifest in nature through the seasonal
imagery of weather and agriculture. On the November outing
through the Uppercross countryside, Anne has to endure the
flirtation of Wentworth with the Musgrove sisters as well as
his distant formality with her.
Her pleasure in the walk must arise from the exercise
and the day, from the last smiles of the year upon the
tawny leaves and withered hedges, and from repeating
to herself some few of the thousand poetical descrip
tions extant of autumn, . . . [emphasis in text]. (84)
This reverie is interrupted by her overhearing a particularly
intimate exchange between Wentworth and Louisa Musgrove.
Anne could not immediately fall into a quotation
again. The sweet scenes of autumn were for a while put
by— unless some tender sonnet, fraught with the apt
analogy of the declining year, with declining happi
ness, and the images of youth and hope, and spring,
all gone together, blessed her memory. (85)
As the party approaches its destination, farming activities
intrude on Anne's poetic musings, "where the ploughs at work,
and the fresh-made path spoke the farmer, counteracting the
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sweets of poetical despondence, and meaning to have spring
again, . . . "

(85).

Anne has been indulging herself in the fallacy of con
fusing art and life. Poetry presents a fall that is a perma
nent loss "of youth and hope, ■ like death. But the farmer is
■meaning to have spring again, ■ and fall plowing is an act of
trust in "Providence* that spring will indeed return, al
though there is no indication that as yet Anne shares this
insight from nature that corrects poetic art. Later, when she
urges the texts "of our best moralists" as a cure for Captain
Benwick's melancholia from a surfeit of romantic poetry, she
reflects that "she had been eloquent on a point in which her
own conduct would ill bear examination" (101), which reveals
her own growth in self-understanding.
The cycle of the seasons is Austen's metaphor for
■Providence.* Many have observed the loss and recovery of
Anne's "bloom," her improved appearance to Lady Russell,
which encourages hopes of "a second spring of youth and
beauty" (124), and the "spring of felicity" deservedly expe
rienced by Anne's mistreated friend, Mrs. Smith, when Anne
and Wentworth bring a return of fine weather through his help
with her property claims (252) . On her way to visit Mrs.
Smith, Arine's "musings of high-wrought love and eternal con
stancy" (at the expense of Frederick's jealousy) were "almost
enough to spread purification and perfume all the way* (192).
Jacqueline Reid-Walsh "detect(s) through the imagery the fig
ure of Persephone bringing an early spring to the February
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streets of Bath. “17 The imagery of seasonal cycles, and their
mythical personifications, seem to be Austen's way of divert
ing attention from the omnipotent author to perhaps the most
ancient symbol of a causal and purposeful “Providence," which
justifies the “trust" of farmers who plow, "meaning to have
spring again."
Jon Spence in a 1981 essay offers a close and perceptive
discussion of "Nature" in Persuasion, but declines to follow
the logic of his own analysis, which clearly points to na
ture's metonymic figuration of Providence. Instead, his the
sis is that *[n]ature itself, haphazard and incomprehensible,
presides over Anne's destiny."18 Addressing the scene of fall
plowing, Spence observes that "[t]he farmers, acting with a
knowledge of and trust in dynamic nature, exert themselves in
autumn in order to reap the fruits spring will make possi
ble." Contrary to what seems to me the plain meaning of this
passage, Spence draws the contradictory conclusion that it '
conflates nature and "chance" and supports the argument that
"Persuasion affirms that chance brings ends that do not re
sult from a rigorously controlled set of causal actions."19
Spence does not pursue the implications of the farmer's
plowing as testimony to confidence in a beneficent providence
because, I believe, he chooses not to lift "that veil which
Gilbert Ryle suggests Jane Austen draws between her art and
her religion."20 But it seems to me that the price of critical
reluctance to engage the religious implications of Austen's
"creative imagination" is to miss the tension between a
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beneficent providence and the role of "luck* that is played
out in the novel.
"Luck" is revealed as a kind of temporary possession
that deludes its possessors with the false sense of worthi
ness that Wentworth confesses in his last speech. Unlike the
testimony of the seasons to the reliability of Providence,
luck betrays the confidence of its believers. However,
Wentworth's own personal history does seem to testify that
Anne's termination of their engagement flies in the face of
fortune's promise.
It seems that Austen wants to fix the reader's eye on
"luck" and "lucky," which are mentioned five times in three
pages during the conversation about Wentworth's rising ca
reer. Admiral Croft claims that his brother-in-law was a
"[l]ucky fellow" to get command of the unseaworthy

As p ,

and

Wentworth concurs that "I felt ny luck, admiral, I assure
you" (65), which is proven by the absence of "foul weather,"
until he captures and pilots into port "the very French
frigate I wanted, ■ just ahead of a storm that "would have
done for poor old Asp" (66). Again on the Laconia his "same
luck" follows him, and Mrs. Musgrove chimes in that "it was a
lucky day for

when you were put captain into that ship"

(67), a reference to their son's service as midshipman under
Wentworth.
Luck, finally, really is chance, a roll of the dice, a
kind of adversarial economic exchange in which someone's loss
makes possible another's gain, like the boy's fall early in
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the novel that allows Anne to "escape" meeting Wentworth. The
losing adversary may be visible, like the French frigate, but
the invisible adversary is the approaching storm. Wentworth
puts himself in harm's way to win a "prize," and his "luck"
holds. Louisa Musgrove puts herself in harm's way in Lyme on
the excursion to the Cobb, but her luck, as well as
Wentworth's, fails them.
Hie shadow of some momentous future event for the visi
tors to Lyme seems cast by "the Cobb itself, its old wonders
and new improvements" (95), and the setting itself suggests
that this casual excursion is connected with forces, even
older than the medieval builders, that still repel the sea
and protect the harbor. After a painterly narrative sweep of
surrounding attractions, *[t]he party from Uppercross . . .
proceeded towards the Cobb, equally their object in itself
and on Captain Wentworth's account" (96), since his fellow
officer, Captain Harville, had rented a small house for his
family nearby. Before leaving Lyme the next day, the group
seems irresistibly drawn to the Cobb, where they indulge "a
general wish to walk along it once more" (108), particularly
since "Louisa soon grew so determined" to do so, and they
■proceeded to make the proper adieus to the Cobb" (109). The
narrative now moves in to focus on the vertical structure of
the Cobb through "antithetical images of high and low, up and
down, perfectly summed up in the antithetical image of the
'steep flight' of stairs."21
There was too much wind to make the high part of
the r.ev: Cobb pleasant for the ladies, and they agreed
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to get down the steps to the lower, and all were con
tented to pass quietly and carefully down the steep
flight, excepting Louisa; she must be jumped down them
by Captain Wentworth. (109)
Heights are dangerous, but “steps" offer safe passage for
those who will "pass quietly and carefully," like pilgrims to
a revered shrine, from the perilous altitude of the "new
Cobb" to the safety of the ancient structure.
There are no shortcuts in this pilgrimage, but Louisa
twice tempts Providence on the Cobb, showing contempt for the
hand which, literally, carved the safe passage in stone. Why
should she not? After all, Wentworth caught her the first
time, but "luck" deserts her second try.

Later, Anne resists

the even more serious temptation of marriage to William
Elliot, and the two "temptations* seem linked by Austen in a
modem parable of Jesus1 temptation by the devil.
Then the devil taketh him up into the holy city, and
setteth him on a pinnacle of the temple, and saith
unto him, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself
down: for it is written, He shall give his angels
charge concerning thee: and in their hands they shall
bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot
against a stone. Jesus said unto him, It is written
again, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.22
Luck, in a sense, is the devil's alternative to Providence,
and when the two clash, luck is the loser. Even Wentworth
seems to have foreboding of this danger, when he tries to
dissuade Louisa, due to “ [t]he hardness of the pavement for
her feet," which the devil assures Jesus that God's angels
will protect him against. But no angel intervenes to help
Wentworth protect Louisa from her offense.
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Paul Zeitlow, whom Spence cites in his essay as arguing
■that the novel affirms Providence, the idea that the indi
vidual is served out rewards and punishments that are his
due, "23 actually suggests only that this is an incomplete
view.
It would seen at least partially valid to claim that
behind what appears to be blind luck is the hand of
Providence, dealing out just rewards and punishments,
bringing good out of apparent evil, and happiness out
of suffering.24
Zeitlow, too, stays on the secular side of the "veil" or
■curtain* Spence and Ryle see suspended between Austen's re
ligious point of view, and therefore recognizes no signifi
cant distinction between "Providence" and "luck." According
to this theory, luck becomes merely the instrument of
Providence, "bringing good out of apparent evil," a theory
that Zeitlow finds "not entirely satisfying.* His alternative
interpretation is that Austen, by creating "pleasing results"
out of situations that seem disasters waiting to happen, "em
phasize [s] the dark possibilities of human life," since the
reader almost inevitably will contrast the "destinies* of
characters "if events took their normal course."25 Zeitlow
does not look at nature as metaphor for providence, and
Spence, in discussing nature's agency, does not analyze the
roles of luck or providence, other than to refer to Zeitlow's
article. Each essay, therefore, suffers by its failure to ad
dress the linkage of nature with providence and to differen
tiate the latter from "luck.’’ Consequently, both seem to wind
up with the same random, chaotic, and purposeless world that
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Kaplan also sees in Persuasion, and in which human decisions
about conduct have virtually no bearing on consequences, nor
do they justify any trust in “Providence.*
The common shortcoming of all these studies, as I have
suggested, is their failure to engage the theosophical world
of the novel, where providence may be trusted, but personal
decisions must also respect, not abuse, the potential of
providence for good. Louisa's recklessness contrasts with
what appeared to be “over-anxious caution* in the breaking of
Anne's engagement with Wentworth, but caution now is shown to
be the prudence required of those who would not “tempt"
Providence. The lesson of the Cobb also teaches restraint in
embracing an alluring future seemingly full of promise, a
lesson Anne seems to have learned in rejecting Lady Russell's
encouragement of William Elliot's courtship. Anne may not
love her cousin Mr. Elliott, but she nevertheless undergoes
her own trial of temptation. Since Anne's father, Sir Walter,
has no son, the wealthy William Elliot is *heir apparent* to
Kellynch, now an impoverished estate from Sir Walter's finan
cial ineptness. Lady Russell plays on the appeal to Anne of
succeeding her dead mother as Lady Elliot, presiding over the
ancestral home.
Anne was obliged to turn away, to rise, to walk to
a distant table, and, leaning there in pretended em
ployment, try to subdue the feelings this picture ex
cited. For a few moments, her imagination and her
heart were bewitched. The idea of becoming what her
mother had been; of having the precious name of “Lady
Elliot" first revived in herself; of being restored to
Kellynch, calling it her home again, her home for
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ever, was a charm which she could not inroediately re
sist. (160)
There is something sinister in the terms •bewitched" and
•charm,* which suggests that Anne's mind is preyed upon by
dark forces, but the forces may be less personified in the
nefarious William Elliot than in the allure of the good
•luck* such an alliance might bring. At the time of Anne's
youthful engagement to Wentworth, his ■confidence* that,
since * [h] e had always been lucfy; he knew he should be so
still* is "bewitching* for Anne. More than its representa
tive, it is luck that bewitches.
Anne's decision against William Elliot, however, is not
a knee-jerk rejection and is preceded by a conscious moral
choice against the strongest temptation to reclaim the former
influence and dignity of the baronetcy. The Bible version of
the temptation continues after the devil's failure to per
suade Jesus to jump.
Again, the devil taketh him up into an exceeding
high mountain, and sheweth him all the kingdoms of the
world, and the glory of them; and saith unto him, All
these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down
and worship me.26
With the memorable words, "Get thee hence, Satan,* Jesus rids
himself of the devil. But Anne's temptation is more persua
sive, since it is offered by her loved Lady Russell, who un
wittingly serves as the devil's mouthpiece and gives him an
advantage he might otherwise have lacked.
Louisa’s reckless leap, and Anne's refusal to "leap*
into marriage without love, reveal the relationship of pru
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dence and courage to moral values as Francis Hutcheson com
pares these "cardinal" virtues.
Every Action, which we apprehend as either morally
good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some
Affection toward rational Agents; . . . Or it may per
haps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear
vitious, if it argues the Want of such Affection . . .
And mere Courage, or Contempt of Danger, if we con
ceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the
Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs, wou'd only entitle
its Possessor to Bedlam. When such sort of Courage is
sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension
of a good Intention in the use of it. Prudence, if it
were only employ'd in promoting private Interest, is
never imagin'd to be a Virtue: . . . So that these . .
. Qualities, commonly called Cardinal Virtues, obtain
that Name, because they . . . denote Affections toward
rational Agents; otherwise there would appear no
Virtue in them.27
In the world of moral philosophy, all people are "rational
Agents." Had Louisa loved Wentworth, there might have been
something to be "admir'd" in throwing herself at him from the
parapets of the Cobb, but subsequent events show her leap to
have been simply "Contempt of Danger." Buried in the word
"Contempt" is "Tempt," and Louisa's temptation of providence
is morally wrong, as her supposed "Courage" is "no Virtue"
because not motivated by a worthy "Affection.■
Anne contrasts the "persuasion" exerted by Lady Russell
against marrying Wentworth with the temptation her pressure
aroused in Anne to accept William Elliot.
If I was wrong in yielding to persuasion once, remem
ber that it was persuasion exerted on the side of
safety, not of risk. When I yielded, I thought it was
to duty; but no duty could be called in aid here. In
marrying a man indifferent to me, all risk would have
been incurred, and all duty violated. (244)
The key term here is "indifferent," since marriage should be
a commitment of the heart, and in a marriage devoid of love,
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■all risk" of future misery is ■incurred." To love and not to
marry for reasons of "safety* may mean unhappiness, but the
concerns may also be extinguished, and if the love is still
there, then the happiness can follow, as it does for
Frederick and Anne. Since there is a "Want of Affection" in
Anne toward William Elliot, she can reject Lacty Russell's
■persuasion" on the grounds that "all risk would be incurred"
in the immorality of marriage without love.
Lady Russell might feel that Anne would see the "pru
dent" advantages of marrying Elliot, but as Hutcheson argues,
■Prudence, if it were only employ'd in promoting private
Interest, is never imagin'd to be a Virtue." However,
■safety" is morally justified as "prudence" in the early sep
aration of Anne and Frederick, a separation that Mrs. Croft
unknowingly endorses to Mrs. Musgrove in Anne's hearing.
To begin without knowing that at such a time there
will be the means of marrying, I hold to be very un
safe and unwise, and what, I think, all parents should
prevent as far as they can. (231)
The rather precipitous courtship and the succeeding happiness
of her own marriage perhaps make Mrs. Croft's observations
gently ironic, but it is that very happiness which gives au
thority to her unwitting endorsement of Lady Russell's advice
eight years earlier.
What is the source of Anne's misgivings about Elliot?
Appearances argue in his favor.
That he was a sensible man, an agreeable man,— that he
talked well, professed good opinions, seemed to judge
properly and as a man of principle,— this was all
clear enough. He certainly knew what was right, nor
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could she fix on any one article of moral duty evi
dently transgressed; . . . (160)
To be sure, there are a few hints about his past, such as the
•Sunday travelling" that Anne disapproves, and she senses
that his surface manners, "Rational, discreet, polished," may
mask a questionable character. His very appearance of being
"rational" becomes a warning for Anne, but whatever their
mix, "[h]er early impressions were incurable" (161). Her
■moral sense" functions as claimed by Francis Hutcheson.
This moral sense from its very nature appears to be
designed for regulating and controlling all our pow
ers. . . . Nor can such matters of immediate feeling
be otherways proved than by appeals to our hearts.28
Certainly the moral sense never had a greater challenge
than to reveal the character of William Elliot, the most evil
character in all Austen novels. Like the devil, he operates
through persona such as Lady Russell and is glimpsed only in
the background, where he seems engaged in surreptious
surveillance and mischief. At Lyme, the party from Uppercross
meets him on the steps to the beach, where "he politely drew
back, and stopped to give them way. . . . and as they passed,
Anne's face caught his eye, and he looked at her with a de
gree of earnest admiration* (104) . A momentary glance, but
Wentworth notices it. Another brief encounter in the halls of
the inn, a view from the window of a departing curricle, and
Elliot is gone. His identity is deduced because he wears
mourning black for his deceased wife, as does Anne's immedi
ate family because of their relationship, a connection that
Mary Musgrove blurts out: "In mourning, you see, just as our
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Mr. Elliot must be" (105). Black, of course, is also associ
ated with the devil, whose evil spirit seems to hover over
Louisa’s disaster on the Cobb the following day.
Elliot next materializes in Bath to press the claim he
has staked by visual possession at Lyme. He has not even the
justification of greed in his designs on Anne and the
baronetcy, since he has already made his money by swindling
Mrs. Smith's dead husband and through his success as a
lawyer, that consistently contemptible profession in Austen's
novels, with the notable exception of John Knightley in Emma.
Further, he will inherit Kellynch, with or without Anne, so
she is not potentially useful to him, but Mrs. Smith, who is
privy to those in whom Elliot does appear to confide, tells
Anne that "he truly wants to marry you" (204). So why does he
want Anne? There really is no suggestion of love either way.
Elliot never commits himself; his courtship is carried on
largely by proxy, and his motives only guessed at through
hearsay.
On the other hand, Mrs. Clay, through her stalking of
Sir Walter and, if successful, her potential of producing a
male heir to Kellynch herself, does represent a threat to
William Elliot's inheritance. Whatever motives may be as
cribed to his desire for Anne, they become irrelevant when
her engagement with Wentworth forces Elliot into what might
be called “Plan B," and he joins with Mrs. Clay in a strate
gic alliance of enemies.
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In fact, Kellynch is near bankruptcy, were it not for
revenue from the lease to the Crofts. Wickham in Pride and
Pre-iudice and Willoughby in Sense and Sensibility at least
have money worries to excuse their infidelity. Even Henry
Crawford in Mansfield Park cuts his own throat in seducing a
married woman, while his sister seems excused because of an
absence of proper guidance and example in her education. All
these are only moral jellyfish compared with Elliot's wicked
ness. But Kellynch offers this viper the respectability and
honors of a venerated past, despite its bankrupt present, to
grace his career of treachery and deceit.
The warnings flashed by Anne’s moral sense are shock
ingly verified by the subsequent revelations by Mrs. Smith of
how Elliot ruined them financially and caused the death of
her husband, after they had helped him in his early days of
need as an impecunious young lawyer.
It was a dreadful picture of ingratitude and inhuman
ity; and Anne felt at some moments, that no flagrant
open crime could have been worse. (210)
"Ingratitude* and "ungrateful* are not terms used carelessly
by Austen. In Mansfield Park Fanny Price, devastated at Sir
Thomas’ accusation of ingratitude, fervently prays, *[h]eaven
defend me from being ungratefulI" (323), and Edmund reacts to
Fanny’s suggestion that Mary Crawford may be "very ungrate
ful" by cautioning that "(u]ngrateful is a strong word* (63).
The association of ingratitude with criminal behavior has a
long history— Squire Allworthy in Fielding’s Tom Jones con
siders it worse than a crime1*— but this seems to be the only
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instance where criminality defines an Austen character's in
gratitude- Applying this label to William Elliott sets him
apart as the most nefarious character in these novels, and
his association with the devil that Austen seems to suggest
invites comparison with God's accusation of Satan in Milton's
Paradise Lost: "ingrate, he had of mee / All he could have; .
. ."30 Certainly Eliot "has it all" and therefore turning on
the source of his prosperity also stamps him as the ■ingrate"
of PersuasionAnne's "moral sense" is also akin to the growth of her
feeling that she may be reunited with Wentworth: "Surely, if
there be constant attachment on each side, our hearts must
understand each other ere long" (221). This hope is stimu
lated by Frederick's emotional affirmation that "[a] man does
not recover from such a devotion of the heart," as he had
thought Benwick felt toward his dead fiance: "He ought not—
he does not* (183) . Anne reads "his feelings as to a first,
strong attachment" as revealing his unchanged love for her.
This wholehearted commitment to the power and authority of
feeling makes Persuasion unique among Austen's novels and
contrasts with the errors in Pride and Pre-iudice of "first
impressions" (its original title), as well as with the re
versibility of "first attachments" in Sense and Sensibility.
My discussion has concentrated on the last conversation
in the novel, when Anne explains her moral decisions in rela
tion to the standard of personal happiness. Frederick doesn't
really respond to Anne's exposition of philosophical belief,
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and his own comments reflect his gratitude at the personal
happiness he has gained, yet may not "deserve." I read their
statements more like soliloquies directed at the audience, in
which the didactic moral meaning of what has past is conveyed
via the speaking voice of a character.
But between these two soliloquies is one true piece of
dialogue. Frederick asks Anne, hypothetically, if Anne would
■have renewed the engagement" when Wentworth's earnings and
career were assured within two years of their separation.
“'Would II ' was all her answer; but the accent was decisive
enough." Frederick takes this to mean that "[s]ix years of
separation and suffering might have been spared" (247), but I
doubt that Frederick's response can be accepted as the inter
pretation of "Would I i" When truth and confession are laid
on the table, so to speak, why would Austen interject a
rhetorical question? The answer, I believe, is that the hypo
thetical event never happened, and in a world where "the
event decides, ■ we only know what we do, not what we might
have done.
Frederick asks a philosophically unanswerable question,
and Anne's rhetorically ambiguous response can only under
score the meaning of "as the event decides." Gratitude for
the re-discovered happiness that blesses their reunion perme
ates the lovers' conversation, and therefore the occasion for
happiness also calls forth the response of gratitude. "The
event," rather than intentions or motives, creates gratitude,
just as past ills vanish in present happiness.
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The narrative information that "the accent was decisive
enough" to convey some sort of unequivocal meaning seems, to
me,, to be a sort of joke Austen is playing with her readers
and also to contradict Philip Drew's theory about the omnipo
tent, God-like, author. What Austen is saying, I believe, is
that “no honest answer can be given to Frederick's question,
and I am certainly not going to supply one." However, to tan
talize readers with the desire for that which they cannot
have, she adds "but the accent was decisive enough."
There is a peculiar poignancy in this closing conversa
tion, because they are the last words of Austen characters,
except for the unpublished fragment, Sanditon. and almost
Austen's last words, since she was dead within the following
year. Having closed with a mischievous joke to tease her
readers, her voice falls silent, and the manuscript of
Persuasion was published posthumously, with a title selected
by Henry Austen. Who knows what she might have entitled it?
Providence would have been unthinkable, because Jane Austen
would have shared Samuel Johnson's antipathy to the vulgar
ization of divinity, but I think that Happiness might not be
a bad candidate.
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CONCLUSION

In all Austen novels, people'assert claims and rights,
both to property as well as to other people. Mr. Collins
introduces himself as the claimant to Longboum, the Bennet
estate, by legal right of entail, and he proposes to extend
that claim to include Elizabeth as his prospective wife. Sir
Thomas Bertram must travel to Antigua to protect his claim
and colonial estates, while at home the alliance of his
daughter with the Rushworth family brings to Mansfield Park
the even more opulent and desirable Sotherton property.
Dynastic plotting is never very far from Emma's mind, and in
Persuasion, only the "heir presumptive" rights of the morally
corrupt William Elliot can save Kellynch from the claims of
creditors, staved off for the time being by surrendering
proprietary rights to the Crofts as lessees.
Against legally protected acquisitiveness, the novels
offer another kind of exchange based on giving, not taking.
Since the benefits are not a matter of right, the
beneficiary's response is "gratitude" for happiness that
depends on another's "benevolence." This kind of exchange is
important in all Austen plots, but in Northanaer Abbey and
Sense and Sensibility, the first two novels in probable order
of composition, there is a certain mechanical quality to the
process that appears to reflect a more rigid view of benevo
lence and gratitude as a kind of moral cement that preserves
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a superior-inferior relationship between giver and
beneficiary. Catherine Morland does seem to turn the
relationship to her advantage, but at substantial personal
cost, and gratitude marks the sum of her hopes, as it does
for Marianne Dashwood in Sense and Sensibility. However, with
Pride and Prejudice, the expression of gratitude, the
response itself, becomes a kind of reciprocal benevolence, a
dynamic interchange that energizes thereafter all enduring
and approved relationships in Austen novels. The power of
this dynamic seems limitless in Pride and Pre-iudice. and
although tested and questioned in later novels, survives to
become the all-encompassing virtue of Persuasion.
Austen's source for freeing benevolence and gratitude
from their traditional hierarchical immobility appears to be
Francis Hutcheson's Newtonian model of moral gravitation as
developed in early editions of An Inquiry into the Original
of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, and Mark Loveridge's
scholarship, based on evidence in Emma, has established, I
feel conclusively, that Austen was well acquainted with this
work.1 My study looks closely at the ideas that underlie the
mathematical exercise on which Loveridge focuses and confirms
Austen’s understanding of Hutcheson, at least as early as the
revising of First Impressions into Pride and Pre-iudice. The
“bridge" between philosophic theory and the dramatized world
of the novels is provided by the Discourses. or published
sermon texts, of the Anglican latitudinarian bishop, Thomas
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Sherlock, whose concern is the practical application of
virtue to conduct.
The claims and takings in the novels are shadows cast by
disputed rights and claims asserted in the world around Jane
Austen, including both the military and ideological conflict
with revolutionary France. Thus, the disputes concern not
only claims to people and property, but also to the moral,
ethical, and religious legitimacy of the claimants. Upon his
reappearance in Uppercross, Frederick Wentworth bases his
right to choose among prospective brides on the wealth he has
gained by 'taking" French vessels in combat (66). Wentworth,
as well as Sir Thomas with his Antigua properties, represent
the intersection of real and novelistic worlds, of substance
with shadow.
Claims are legitimized by an empowering "system," and
therefore challenges to legitimacy also attack the "system"
that supports them. The term "system" is used pejoratively by
Emma when she labels Frank Churchill’s manipulations as "a
system of hypocrisy and deceit,— espionage, and treachery"
(399), a charge that Mr. Knightley anticipates in his
unfavorable contrast of Frank’s values as "French" with
English standards (149). Churchill himself implies that he
has a "right" to Jane Fairfax that justifies his trickery,
and therefore both Emma and Mr. Knightley, by challenging his
■system," deny Churchill’s claim of "right."
Law, specifically the English common law and
Constitution, is the "system" that Edmund Burke defends

t
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against the French challenge and would seem included in Mr.
George Knightley*s sweeping defense of things English,
perhaps symbolized by his younger brother's profession as a
lawyer. But John Knightley is the only lawyer in the novels
to be treated approvingly, and the law as a "system, • as well
as its practitioners; fare poorly at Austen's hands. Law
facilitates claims and takings that impoverish Mrs. Dashwood
and her daughters in Sense and Sensibility, and William
Elliot, Lucifer himself, is a lawyer who systematically
defrauds Mrs. Smith in Persuasion. For Austen, gratitude has
no role in such a system of legal selfishness, and yet the
systemization of gratitude was very much an issue in the mid
to late eighteenth century. Burke accuses French
revolutionaries of "ingratitude,"2 whereas William Godwin
claims that, in his system of universal virtue built on pure
reason, gratitude "is no part either of justice or virtue."3
Godwin's principal objection to gratitude is that it is
a feeling with no basis in reason, unlike Burke, who defends
feelings expressed as reverence for traditional authority,
which would include King Lear's "dues of gratitude." But
Austen seems to want no part of any "systems, ■ since they
either serve to legitimatize deception or to enforce
inequalities, including institutionalized gender inequality.
The novels give full authority to individual feelings,
informed by intelligence and not by conformity to the author
ity of systems, as guides for moral behavior and loving rela
tionships. Feelings are the verdict of the senses, mediated
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by the mind, the union of heart and head that Hugh Blair
found appealing in Francis Hutcheson.4 For Austen, foremost
among the feelings is gratitude, supremely powerful as love's
herald, but a power with the potential for mischief as well,
as Emma discovers in Harriet's designs on Mr. Knightley, and
still with the power to oppress when invoked by Sir Thomas
against Fanny in Mansfield Park.
The authority of feelings, however, does not mean that
the individual is a law unto itself, and feelings are still
subject to the test of their contribution to human happiness.
Hutcheson's standard of happiness as the test of virtue
identifies his philosophy as a precursor of utilitarianism,
and Austen's novels also seem to rest on this principle. But
Hutcheson's theories are always grounded in Christian
doctrine, and he supports the standard of human happiness by
arguing that this is also God's wish for His children. Anne
Elliot discovers that "Providence" works for happiness, and
if it is deferred, it is not denied. Both Anne and Wentworth
learn this truth, and their gratitude, ultimately, is for the
happiness which is the gift of "Providence."
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2 Vol. 5, Works 138.
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4 The Edinburgh Review 20.
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